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Abstract  
 
 
This thesis concerns the normative dimension of transitional justice—the problem of which 
moral and political values should guide the process of transition from conflict and 
authoritarian rule to democracy. The central thesis is that the value of security should be a 
normative priority in the process of transition, because establishing security is a necessary 
condition for democracy and other transitional measures (lustration, compensation, 
institutional development and reconciliation, to name but a few). The thesis develops an 
account of how the value of security informs a justification of the measures utilised in the 
transition to a politically legitimate state. In doing so, it explores how the value of security 
(much neglected in political philosophy) informs our understanding of central political 
problems and concepts—including state legitimacy, democracy, the function, content and 
value of laws (including the concept of the ‘rule of law’) and the role of human rights in state 
coercion. 
 
 
Far from being an issue confined to the academy, the problems of transitional justice are a 
reality for a number of states around the world who are struggling to achieve democracy. 
This thesis represents a contribution to the scholarship around this process of political 
transition. It seeks to show the important insights that moral and political philosophy can 
provide for the process of moving from conflict and authoritarian rule to democracy. In 
doing so, it illustrates how the problems of transitional justice are in fact central problems for 
political philosophy. 
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I. Introduction 
 
After periods of conflict, authoritarian rule and political oppression, states are 
faced with the challenge of transitioning to more just, democratic and rights-respecting 
societies. Over the last few decades, the field of ‘transitional justice’ has emerged as an 
interdisciplinary area of scholarship which grapples with the question of how states 
should achieve the transition to democracy, while appropriately dealing with past 
wrongdoing. 
The Nuremburg Trials gave rise to the first debates around transitional justice, 
though not under that name. This scholarship grew further after a number of democratic 
transitions in South America, Africa and the Balkans in the 1970’s and 1980’s, and after 
the decommunization and democratisation of ex-Soviet states in the 1990’s.1 In their 
inception, these debates were largely the remit of scholars in law, social science and 
international policy.2 Yet in the last two decades the field has attracted the attention of 
moral and political philosophers who have sought to focus on the ethical and political 
values which underpin the measures and policies which guide the transition from 
conflict and authoritarian rule to more democratic, rights-respecting societies.3 
It is this normative dimension to transitional justice that I shall be concerned with 
in this thesis. My argument is that security should be a key priority in the transition from 
conflict and illegitimate rule to democracy and the rule of law. I will argue that the value 
of security should govern the sorts of measures that are employed in the wake of 
conflict—post-conflict punishment, the limited self-defensive actions carried out by 
citizens in the absence of a legitimate state, of the rule of law, of state coercion and of 
other measures which states employ to achieve democracy. 
In this introduction I want to sketch the outline of this view, explaining why it is 
both novel and important. I should emphasise that this chapter will be largely 
                                                                
1 For a full ‘genealogy’ of transitional justice scholarship, a history of the “development of ideas associated 
with … phases of transitional justice”, see Teitel (2003). 
2 See for example Elster (2004a), Posner & Vermeule (2004) and Teitel (2000). 
3 See, for example, early philosophical engagements by Elster (2004) and Pogge (2008, pp. 146–167) and more 
recent engagements Corradetti, Eisikovits, & Rotondi (2015), May (2012), Mollendorf (2008) and Murphy 
(2016). 
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descriptive and synoptic of the main arguments to be developed through the thesis. I 
will not commit myself to any substantive philosophical claims in this introduction.  
The chapter will run as follows. In the following section, I provide four reasons 
as to why focussing on the morality 4  of transitional justice, and on the normative 
principles that guide the process of political transition to democracy, is important. In 
section three I outline the arguments in each chapter of the thesis. In section four I 
introduce the emerging field of ‘jus post bellum’, and explain how security has been 
problematically neglected by this emerging debate on the morality of war’s aftermath. 
In section five I sketch the outline of the idea of security, and explain (albeit in brief) why 
pursuing security in the wake of conflict and authoritarian rule is important. 
 
1. The normative dimension of transitional justice 
 
Traditionally the remit of legal and social science scholarship, the problems 
involved in the process of transitioning towards democracy have increasing interested 
moral and political philosophers. There are a number of reasons why focussing on the 
morality of transitional justice is important. In this section I will highlight four.  
 
1.1. Different visions of justice 
 
First, different cases of post-conflict transition have been guided by different 
moral principles, and views about what morality requires. For instance, many of the 
justifications of the trials of Nazi officials at Nuremburg were retributive—the argument 
being that trials were necessary because the remaining members of the Nazi 
administration were culpable for such heinous atrocities that justice required them to 
suffer punishment. The retributive nature of the trials is captured in the opening 
statement of the US prosecutor at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson: 
 
The wrongs which we seek to condemn and punish have been so calculated, so 
malignant and so devastating, that civilisation cannot tolerate their being 
ignored…What makes this inquest significant is that these prisoners represent 
                                                                
4  More accurately, the thesis concerns the morality and general jurisprudence of transitional justice. An 
important aspect of general jurisprudence concerns the moral principles which underpin the law and legal 
institutions. In this thesis I will analyse security as a moral principle that should guide political practices, 
and also as a principle that informs the justification of aspects of law, including how laws should function, 
the standards they should meet and how legal institutions should be constructed. 
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sinister influences that will lurk in the world long after their bodies have returned 
to dust. We will show them to be living symbols of racial hatreds, of terrorism 
and violence, and of the arrogance and cruelty of power…any tenderness to them 
is a victory and an encouragement to all the evils which are attached to their 
name (International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg Germany, 1946, p. 
3).  
 
This desire for retribution is also illustrated by Churchill’s initial rejection of political 
trials and his alternative suggestion to have the defendants shot. He is said to have once 
commented: 
 
I’m changing my mind about the list of war criminals… I’d like sixty or seventy 
of the people around Hitler shot without trial (Quoted in Sprecher [1999, p. 28]) 
 
These retributive sentiments are common in the wake of the heinous acts that are 
committed in war or under authoritarian rule. And, at least in the case of Germany, these 
sentiments no doubt in part explain the quick trials and executions of prison camp staff 
in Auschwitz and Dachau, for example.5 
Contrast the case of Nuremberg with other cases of post-conflict transition such 
as post-apartheid South Africa, which is a paradigm case of political forgiveness and 
restorative justice. As part of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), past 
offenders were granted amnesty in exchange for information about crimes and their 
engagement with reconciliatory practices with victims. The examples of Germany and 
South Africa illustrate how different visions of justice guide different cases of political 
transition. It is therefore important to engage with these different moral principles to 
analyse their value, coherence, how they fit with other moral values and how they 
facilitate and indeed sometimes hinder the transition to democracy, to evaluate which 
principles, or perhaps which combination of principles, are the best to pursue for 
transitional societies. 
 
1.2. Distributive justice demands 
 
Secondly, focussing on the moral principles which guide cases of transitional 
justice is important because problems of distributive justice commonly confront states 
                                                                
5 The trials of the staff at Auschwitz took place 24th November–22nd December, 1947. The 23 death sentences 
were carried out in one day—28th January, 1948.  
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transitioning from conflict and authoritarian rule towards democracy. This is most 
clearly the case with respect to measures such as compensation for victims but also with 
respect to resourcing institutional development, aid or education, for instance. These 
measures invite questions about who is owed what and by whom in political societies, 
questions which have traditionally been the remit of moral and political philosophy. 
Indeed, often conflicting principles arise with respect to these measures—does the value 
of achieving retributive justice outweigh that of reconciliation? Should institutional 
development take place before lustration measures to remove members of the past 
regime from positions of power? Should resources be allocated on the basis of need or 
desert?6 These decisions are made all the more difficult (and all the more important) by 
the fact that transitional states are often resource poor, and pursuing one value often 
comes at the expense of pursuing others. It is when these conflicts arise, that focussing 
on the moral values which underpin certain measures such as compensation, lustration, 
punishment, institutional development (to name but a few) becomes important.  
 
 
1.3. The justification of international institutions 
 
 
Thirdly, focussing on the normative principles guiding periods of transition is 
important because the international bodies which aid states during these periods often 
face questions about their role, and their responses often rest on appeals to moral 
principles. To give an example, the UN Security Council, which was formed in 1946 and 
whose primary role is to “promote peace and stability” globally, is constantly faced with 
normative questions concerning its mission and purpose in transitional contexts. It is 
when these international institutions face criticism—as was the case for the Security 
Council in its failures in the Balkan and Rwandan genocides, and its more recent failures 
in the 2002/2003 invasion of Iraq7—that questions about the normative purpose of these 
international bodies and institutions come to the fore. In the case of Iraq, two camps 
emerged in the debate over the role of the Security Council. One held that the Security 
Council ought to serve a minimal role in deciding when the use of force was permissible, 
the other prescribed the more expansive role of “organising collective action to enforce 
institutional norms” internationally (Luck, 2006, p. 4). It is when these alternative, and 
                                                                
6 I should emphasise that I will not be interested in the value conflicts which arise in transitional justice, 
though for a good analysis of these conflicts see Elster (2004b). 
7 See Luck (2006, pp. 3–4) for a discussion of the criticisms of the Security Council over its failures in Iraq. 
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sometimes conflicting, visions of the role of international institutions arise that a focus 
on the normative principles guiding these institutions, and the principles which support 
their policies, becomes important.8 
 
1.4. Broader problems of political philosophy 
 
 Fourthly, and this will be particularly important with respect to the arguments 
in this thesis, transitional justice is intimately connected with other concepts, values and 
practices which moral and political philosophers have been long occupied with—
democracy, punishment, the rule of law, human rights, security and political legitimacy, 
to name but a few. As I will illustrate throughout this thesis, the process of transition 
forces us to re-evaluate our understanding of these political concepts, values and 
practices, which we commonly take for granted in more developed democratic contexts 
under the rule of legitimate governments who respect the rule of law. This is to say that 
cases of democratisation and political transition force us to re-evaluate core problems of 
political philosophy—what is a politically legitimate state? Why does it matter that states 
possess legitimacy? What is the value of democracy? Are only democratic states 
legitimate? What is the rule of law? Is legal punishment morally justifiable? Does 
justified legal punishment require a legitimate state? I will return to these questions 
throughout the thesis, and I will demonstrate how the context of transitional justice and 
democratisation pose unique problems which must be accommodated by our 
understanding of these concepts and problems. 
 It is for these reasons that attending to the morality and general jurisprudence of 
transitional justice is important. 
 
2. The argument of the thesis 
 
In this section I will outline the main arguments of each chapter of the thesis. 
In the following chapter I focus in more depth on the concept of security. As a 
political value, security has been under-analysed in political philosophy compared with 
other values such as liberty, justice and rights. Having highlighted some of the 
                                                                
8 While I will not engage directly with the UN Security Council, I draw out some of the implications of my 
arguments on the functioning of international institutions throughout the thesis.  
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shortcomings in the analysis of security by philosophers and criminologists, I introduce 
and defend a conceptual distinction between two senses of security—the negative and 
the positive senses. I then explore how this distinction elucidates the different ways in 
which security is valuable and is intimately related to values such a predictability, 
liberty, guarantees and the importance of being able to claim security from political 
institutions. 
In Chapter Three I consider the question of whether it is permissible for citizens 
to engage in rough justice punishment in the absence of a legitimate state and of 
functioning state legal institutions. Having defined rough justice, and observed some 
cases of rough justice in transitional justice contexts (where they are ubiquitous), I draw 
upon some of Locke’s arguments about the natural right to punish in the state of nature 
to develop a defence of rough justice based on deterrence, institutional improvement 
and the protection of basic rights. I conclude by considering the implications of my 
account for rough justice practices in cases of political transition. 
In Chapter Four I develop a justification of legal punishment that is sensitive to 
some of the problems endemic to transitional societies. In particular, the account I 
develop is i) sensitive to the fact that transitional justice contexts are without a legitimate 
state and ii) responds to the fact of increased rights violations in fragile, transitional 
communities. The account I defend appeals to the more basic right to threaten in the 
interests of self-defence, as the basis of a justification for a rudimentary system of laws 
(threats) and punishments. Contrary to the mainstream view in the philosophy of 
punishment9, my account rejects the premise that a legitimate state is a pre-requisite for 
justified legal punishment, and instead defends the view that justified punishment can 
in fact facilitate the move towards a legitimate state.  
In Chapters Five and Six I consider the problem of political legitimacy with 
respect to transitional justice. This is important because an essential goal of transitional 
justice (if not the essential goal) is the establishment of a legitimate state. According to 
the mainstream view in transitional justice scholarship, this means a state that is 
democratic. In chapters five and six I challenge this mainstream view. In particular, 
while I agree with the view that democracy should be the ultimate goal of political 
                                                                
9 This widely endorsed view in the philosophy of punishment is captured by Anthony Duff: 
 
Any normative theory of punishment depends on some more or less articulated conception of the 
state (2001, p. xviii). 
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transition, I challenge two mainstream views about the role democracy plays in 
legitimising the state. 
In Chapter Five, I reject the view that democracy is necessary to justify state 
coercion.10 This, I claim, is because there are occasions when democratic governance (in 
particular the majority rule aspect) can license injustice, and can conflict with other 
important goals such as the protection of minority groups. This, I argue, is exacerbated 
by certain features of transitional justice contexts—the presence of rival factional, 
cultural or religious groups and the absence of developed institutional safeguards to 
protect minority rights. I defend an alternative view of state coercion which holds the 
protection of human rights as a necessary condition on justified state coercion. I then 
explain how this view is better suited to the problems faced by transitional societies. 
In Chapter Six I consider the problem of political legitimacy (which I distinguish 
from the problem of justified coercion). I challenge the view that democracy is a 
necessary condition on a legitimate state.11 I then draw upon an argument developed by 
Machin (2012) which states that four necessary conditions must be met (horizontal 
equality, acceptable vertical inequality, publicity and an institutionalised voice) for a 
state to be legitimate. In defending this view, I present the outline of a view of political 
legitimacy which does not require democracy, but which preserves some of the more 
valuable aspects of democratic governance. I then explain how this view of legitimacy is 
better equipped to explain the right to rule in politically fragile and resource-poor 
contexts such as transitional societies.  
In Chapter Seven I consider the permissibility of retroactive law-making in 
transitional justice contexts. Retroactive laws were famously applied during the 
Nuremburg trials to retroactively create the international crimes of genocide and crimes 
against humanity and to apply these crimes to the heinous acts of Nazi officials. 
Generally however, retroactive laws are considered to be both legally and morally 
problematic (in both general jurisprudence and under domestic constitutions and 
international law). In this chapter, I deny that retroactive laws are in fact legally and 
morally problematic. My claim is that there are certain cases where retroactive laws are 
neither. These are cases where de facto authoritarian officials amends the legal system 
to facilitate their unjust policies, and in doing so render themselves free from legal 
liability. In these cases, retroactively criminalising the acts of these officials is neither 
                                                                
10 Winter (2013) defends this view. 
11 This view is defended by Buchanan (2002), Winter (2013), Estlund (2008, pp. 85-97) and Christiano (2004), 
amongst others.  
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unfair nor legally problematic, I claim. I then provide a positive justification for 
retroactive laws on the grounds of deterrence and reasons based on the transition to 
democracy. My broader aim in this chapter is to challenge the strong presumption 
against retroactive law-making which exists in both general jurisprudence and under 
international law. 
I conclude the thesis by drawing out some of the implications of my arguments 
for cases of political transition. I also seek to show how problems of transitional justice 
are genuine problems for moral and political philosophy. 
  
3. Jus Post Bellum and ‘Just Peace’ 
 
In this section I will show how the value of security has been problematically 
neglected in the emerging philosophical scholarship on the morality of war’s aftermath. 
Concomitant to the growth in transitional justice scholarship has been an 
increased philosophical interest in the morality of war’s aftermath. This interest has 
evolved into the field of ‘jus post bellum’12 (literally, ‘justice after war’). Jus post bellum 
represents the third wing of just war theory which, with the traditional categories of jus 
ad bellum and jus in bello (governing, respectively, the initiation of war and conduct 
within it), forms the tripartite approach to the morality of war, assessing the justice of 
war’s beginning, middle, ending and aftermath.13 
Commentators of jus post bellum have placed emphasis on the importance of 
achieving ‘justice’ after war. The way they develop this view is by defending a number 
of principles to govern the aftermath of war, in the same way as just war theorists have 
developed principles to govern the initiation of war (jus ad bello) and the way in which 
war is fought (jus in bellum).14 
Larry May (2012), for example, introduces six principles for the post bellum 
phase—rebuilding, retribution, reconciliation, restitution, reparation and proportionality, 
                                                                
12 For accounts of jus post bellum see, for example, Bass (2004), Freeman & Djukić (2008), Mollendorf (2008), 
Orend (2006, pp. 160–219) and Rodin (2008), amongst others. 
13 There is an important distinction between the process of ending a war (i.e. of securing peace) and the 
aftermath of war (i.e. what to do when peace is secured). This distinction will not impact on my arguments 
in this thesis, though see Mollendorf (2008) for a discussion of the morality of ending a war, which he 
captures under the banner of ‘jus ex bello’, which he distinguishes from jus post bellum.  
14 Ad bello conditions on the initiation of war include just cause, right intention, proportionality, legitimate 
authority and last resort. In bello conditions on conduct in war include discrimination, proportionality and 
necessity. 
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arguing that “for a just peace to ensue, these principles must all be met, at least to a 
certain extent” (2012, p. 22). Brian Orend argues that “a more secure possession of rights” 
is what the successful transition from war should achieve and this requires compensation, 
sanctions, rehabilitation, apologies and trials (2006, pp. 160–189). And Gary Bass (2004) 
claims that jus post bellum should be guided by the principles of economic reconstruction, 
restoration, war crimes trials, political reconstruction and reparation. He claims that the 
primary duty of an occupying state is to “get out as soon as possible”, but that in the 
case of genocidal states, a just occupying power has a duty to: 
 
Reconstruct the genocidal state: by imposing more stable political institutions; by 
arresting and trying war criminals; and even by intervening in the educational 
system to promote a more humane next generation (Bass, 2004, p. 412). 
 
 In all of these accounts of the priorities of the post war period there is a 
conspicuous lack of emphasis on the importance of achieving security. To be sure, 
theorists of jus post bellum have touched on the importance of principles and measures 
which are related to security. For instance, Larry May writes that states have an 
obligation to “rebuild (or build) the capacity to protect human rights” (May 2012). And 
in a more detailed argument, Williams and Caldwell (2006) have argued that jus post 
bellum must be built on the protection of human rights. They recommend the following 
measures to secure this goal: restoring order, economic reconstruction, restoration of 
sovereignty and the punishment of human rights violations. And they write: 
 
Without order, a society can descend into a Hobbesian state of nature in which 
even the right to life may be impossible to secure... public order is an essential 
foundation for the restoration of human rights (Williams & Caldwell, 2006, p. 
318). 
 
Yet despite these summary accounts, the demands of security in the post-conflict 
period have been either underemphasised or else relegated in priority, behind what are 
often deemed to be more exigent goals—retributive or restorative justice, economic 
development, restoration, and so on. In this thesis, I want to show that the neglect of 
security is problematic. 
Johnson has written that: 
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Perhaps the most difficult problem posed by contemporary warfare, all in all, is 
the difficulty of achieving a stable, secure ending to it (1991, p. 191) 
 
 
I want to take this problem seriously, and I will argue that establishing security is a moral 
and political priority in the wake of conflict and illegitimate rule. My argument will not 
be that security is the only post-conflict priority, but rather that it is a priority which is 
so significant that it both shapes a number of the measures that we pursue in the wake 
of conflict and authoritarian rule and also that in limited circumstances it advises the 
suspension of other values commonly deemed to be requirements of justice after 
conflict.15 
 
4. The moral significance of security 
 
In this section I want to briefly highlight some features of the view that security 
should be a normative priority after conflict. Defending this view will be the aim of the 
thesis, so my claims here will be necessarily broad and synoptic. In particular, I will 
respond to two questions—what impact does the emphasis on promoting security after 
conflict and authoritarian rule have on our understanding of transitional justice 
measures? And why should security be a priority? 
What impact does the concept of a secure peace have on our understanding of 
transitional justice? There are two points to raise here. First, throughout this thesis I want 
to argue that the value of security informs our understanding of the importance of 
certain measures. In particular, I will show how the value of security informs a 
                                                                
15 David Hume once wrote of the need to suspend principles of justice in times of catastrophe: 
Suppose a society fall into such want of all common necessaries, that the utmost frugality and 
industry cannot preserve the great number from perishing, and the whole from extreme misery; it 
will readily, I believe, be admitted, that the strict laws of justice are suspended, in such a pressing 
emergence, and give place to the stronger motive of necessity and self-preservation. Is it any crime, 
after a shipwreck, to seize whatever means or instrument of safety one can lay hold of, without 
regard to former limitations of property? Or if a city besieged were perishing with hunger; can we 
imagine, that men will see any means of preservation before them, and list their lives, from a 
scrupulous regard to what in other situations, would be the rules of equity and justice? (1953, pp. 
18–19). 
Hume is widely taken to be a consequentialist. I think his point here is more interesting than being a 
straightforward endorsement of consequentialism. I think his claim should be taken to be that in times of 
emergency or scarcity, different deontic considerations present themselves, such as duties of self-
preservation, the preservation of others and allocating resources on the basis of need, rather than according 
to equity. This view is consistent with a range of broadly deontic (or at least non-consequentialist) moral 
views such as prioritarianism or moral pluralism, and need not commit us to consequentialism. The 
arguments in this thesis will be sympathetic to the Humean view.  
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justification of practices such as limited self-defensive violence and punishment in the 
absence of a legitimate state, retroactive law-making and of the problem of how we 
construct a democratic state. I will also show how the value of security impacts on how 
we understand the broader concepts of democracy, the rule of law, political legitimacy 
and other concepts which are ubiquitous in the literature on transitional justice and 
political philosophy. Second, in making these arguments I will show that the problems 
of transitional justice are in fact genuine problems for political philosophy, the neglect 
of which illustrates important limitations in how the concepts of political legitimacy, 
democracy, legal punishment and the rule of law have been understood and addressed 
in political philosophy. I will draw out some of the implications of my argument on 
problems in political philosophy in the conclusion.  
Why should the establishment of a secure peace be a priority after conflict or 
authoritarian rule? One of the main arguments of this thesis is that promoting security-
based measures is indispensable to transitional justice policies, and it is indispensable 
because security is a vital pre-condition for securing other important political goals 
(goals of transitional justice and of political societies more generally). Security is 
presupposed by a number of transitional justice measures such as lustration, 
international punishment and compensation. It is also presupposed by the measures we 
put in place to establish legitimate states, i.e. the basic conditions for political 
cooperation and a functioning democracy (even going to the ballot box to vote requires 
some level of physical safety, and that other of our basic needs are met). Security is also 
presupposed by other forms of institutional development—welfare systems which 
allocate provisions to the needy, healthcare systems which care for the sick, legal systems 
which apprehend suspects all presuppose some level of societal security. Indeed, 
throughout the following chapters I will develop these claims further.  
It is because achieving most if not all political goods presupposes some level of 
security, that we should take security seriously as a goal of transitional justice (and as a 
desiderata of theories of justice) in a way that theorists in both transitional justice 
scholarship and in political philosophy more generally have failed to. Exploring and 
defending this position will be the aim of this thesis.  
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II. Negative and Positive Security 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Security is something we often take for granted in developed, democratic 
societies. Yet security is not enjoyed by all human beings universally. Insecurity in the 
form of violence, political instability, authoritarian rule or a lack of access to basic 
resources is a problem which confronts a large number of human beings around the 
world. Consider the following 2014 United Nations Development Report: 
 
1.5 billion people live in countries affected by conflict—about a fifth of the 
world’s population. And recent political instability has had an enormous human 
cost: About 45 million people were forcibly displaced due to conflict or 
persecution by the end of 2012… more than 15 million of them refugees (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2014, p. 4).16 
 
Security is also a central aim of transitional justice. In this thesis, I will argue that the 
establishment of security is a vital stage in the process of transition towards states that 
are democratic, human rights-respecting and subject to the rule of law. Security—in the 
first instance the basic security of human beings, but also the security of resources, of 
state institutions and of the economy, amongst other goods—are key priorities in this 
process of political transition. 
In order to develop this view, it will be important to get clearer about what 
security is, and why it may be of value. This is the purpose of the present chapter. My 
aim is to analyse the concept of security—what it means to say something or someone is 
‘secure’—in more depth. And in understanding what we mean by security, and why it 
matters to us, I want to better understand why it is something that states and 
                                                                
16 I should note that these figures do not take into account the more recent migrant crises in the wake of 
ongoing conflicts in Syria, Yemen, Iraq or Afghanistan, amongst other locations. 
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international bodies should seek to promote, particularly with respect to contexts that 
are politically insecure, and emerging from violence or oppression.  
Compared with concepts like justice, liberty, legitimacy and human rights, the 
concept of security has been under-analysed by moral and political philosophers. Jeremy 
Waldron writes of security: 
 
There has been no attempt in the literature of legal and political theory to bring 
any sort of clarity to the concept (2010, p. 112). 
 
This neglect is problematic, because it results in a gap in our understanding of political 
concepts. And this gap in our understanding is problematic because many take it for 
granted that promoting security is a basic condition on the legitimacy of states.17 It is also 
problematic because security is often at stake in value trade-offs. For instance, the need 
to promote security is commonly appealed to in debates about the (legal and moral) 
permissibility of torture in ticking-time bomb18 cases. And security is commonly seen to 
be in tension with promoting liberty or privacy in debates over the permissibility of 
preventative (pre-trial) incarceration of terrorist suspects deemed to be dangerous, or in 
the search and arrest warrants granted to police, for instance. Understanding what 
security is, and why it is valuable, is essential for understanding how it relates to and 
sometimes conflicts with other moral values, and for understanding how much weight 
to assign to security when it comes into conflict with these values. 
Debates around the meaning and moral value of security are nascent.19 And part 
to the aim of this chapter is to contribute to this emerging discussion about security as a 
moral and political value. More particularly, I want to contribute to this debate by 
introducing a distinction between the negative and positive senses of security. I will argue 
that there are in fact two things we may mean when we speak of something or someone 
being secure. Having defended the distinction between negative and positive security, I 
                                                                
17 This view of legitimate authority is famously defended by Hobbes (2008). Bernard Williams also defends 
the view that security is the first condition of political legitimacy. He writes that the ‘first political question’ 
is “the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation. It is ‘first’ because 
solving it is the condition of solving, indeed posing, any others” (Williams, 2005, p. 3). 
18 Ticking time bomb cases are designed to test our intuitions about the permissibility of torture. We are 
asked to imagine that a terrorist subject has been apprehended. This suspect knows the whereabouts of a 
ticking time-bomb which has been placed in a highly populated area and is set to detonate imminently, 
killing numerous people. The question is, whether we may torture the suspect to gain information about the 
whereabouts of the bomb. The dilemma is thus between the safety and security of the terrorist suspect, and 
the safety and security of a large number of individuals. 
19 See, for example, John (2011), Rothschild (1995), Waldron (2010) and Weinert (2009).  
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will go on to show how it impacts on our understanding of the value of security, and 
how it illustrates the ways in which security is intimately related to other values. 
The chapter will run as follows. In the following section I analyse different 
aspects of the concept of security. I begin by considering the close relation between 
security and the concept of safety. I then consider some recent engagements with the 
concept by political philosophers and criminologists (Waldron [2010, pp. 111-164], [2012] 
and Zedner [2009]). In section three I introduce and defend a conceptual distinction 
between the negative and positive senses of security. In section four I consider the value 
of positive security—particularly the way it is intimately connected to the values of 
assurance, liberty and what I term ‘claimability’. In section five I point to a number of 
practices and institutions which evince the value of positive security. In section six I 
consider the value of negative security—particularly the way it is intimately connected 
to the values of negative liberty and safety from harm. In section seven I draw out some 
implications of the negative and positive security distinction on the problem of 
promoting security in emerging democracies. 
 
2. The concept of security 
 
 In this section I will analyse the concept of security. I’m interested in what it 
means to say that an individual or a particular state of affairs is secure. I will begin by 
considering the relationship between security and the closely related concept of safety. 
 
2.1. Security and safety 
 
 What does it mean to say an individual is secure? One way of understanding 
security is as being intimately tied up with the concept of ‘personal safety’. Dictionary 
definitions hold the two concepts to be broadly synonymous. The OED, for instance, 
defines safety as, “the state of being protected from or guarded against hurt or injury; 
freedom from danger” and the state of being secure as being “safe from danger, harm; 
to ensure the safety of; to protect”. According to this dictionary definition, to be secure 
and to be safe are broadly the same where this means being guarded or protected from 
personal hurt, injury, danger or harm. 
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 Some commentators on security have taken a similar view. This sense of security 
is often gestured at by Hobbes, for instance. Though he provides no formal definition of 
the concept, he often writes of the perils of threats to “life or liberty” and of the “danger 
of violent death” (Hobbes, 2008, pp. 129-130) constitutive of the insecure state of nature.20 
More recently, Henry Shue has described security in the terms of physical safety, which 
he includes—with the right to subsistence—amongst his account of basic moral rights 
(1996). Security, in Shue’s sense, is safety from violations to one’s person, 
 
No one can fully enjoy any right that is supposedly protected by society if 
someone can credibly threaten him or her with murder, rape, beating, etc… A 
full right to physical security belongs, then, among the basic rights (Shue, 1996, 
p. 21). 
 
  
Neoclaus has also pointed to this sense of security as physical safety—which he claims 
is central to the corpus of 18th Century liberal thinkers such as Ferguson, Priestly, Paine 
and Paley (Neoclaus, 2007, p. 141). Writing of this tradition he claims, “security … slips 
back and forth between … security as simply safety from violence and security as 
facilitating the expression of human liberty” (Neoclaus, 2007, p. 141). 
 There are two key elements to this view of security as being broadly synonymous 
with personal safety. First, is the emphasis on physical or bodily security—to be insecure 
is to be subject to threats of harm to one’s person (killings, assault, physical violations). 
Second, is that security is a negative concept, where the sense of negative intended here 
is not the evaluative sense of bad or unwelcome but the sense of the absence or negation 
of certain things. Security is the negation of harms and threats of harm to one’s person. 
 Waldron, who has developed by far the most detailed analysis of security to date 
(Waldron, 2010, pp. 111- 164; 2012), has convincingly argued that the view which holds 
security to be synonymous with personal safety is limited. He terms this the ‘pure safety’ 
account of security (2012, p. 17) which he claims misses a number of the things that we 
generally deem to be constitutive of security. He highlights that the pure safety account 
fails to account for the particular fear of violent harm that we possess—the fact that it is 
not just any bodily harm that constitutes a threat to our security but severe harms which 
cause significant suffering. The pure safety account also fails to accommodate threats to 
our security in the form of threats of material loss. It says very little about the 
                                                                
20 For Hobbes, the state of nature is the natural state of human beings prior to the formation of societies ruled 
by governments. His description of the state of nature is famously of a context full of violence, scarcity and 
harm (Hobbes, 2008, pp. 92-97). 
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phenomenon of fear and how it relates to security. It does not account for the importance 
of future-looking assurances against threats. It gives no explanation of the relationship 
between security and other constituents of wellbeing (such as health or religious freedom). 
It cannot account for disruptions to individual ways of life from threats to security. And 
it fails to account for the importance of communal security—the sense of security as a 
communal, political value (Waldron 2010, pp. 117–118).  
 Waldron holds that while it is true that some of what we understand about 
security is based on physical or bodily safety, it is important to have a more 
comprehensive conception of security that captures some of these broader intuitions 
about what a secure state of affairs amounts to.  
 I share Waldron’s scepticism about the explanatory scope of the safety view of 
security. While the concept of safety captures some of the aspects of security, it does not 
capture them all. To put this slightly differently, the concept of security seems to be a 
wider and more expansive concept than the concept of safety, capturing more than just 
the absence of harms and threats to our person. 
 Waldron’s alternative is to ‘deepen’ the pure safety to better account for the way 
security accounts for and relates to other values. I will turn next to consider Waldron’s 
account, which I will ultimately claim is limited as well.  
 
2.2. Waldron on security 
 
 
 Waldron’s alternative view of security is based on what he terms a ‘deepening’ 
of the pure safety account (2012, p. 23). This deepening of the concept seeks to better 
account for the relation between security and other values and goods. What are these 
values and goods? 
 Waldron claims they are values such as ‘ways to life’21—the role security plays 
in facilitating our life plans and goals (including the plans and goals of those who are 
close to us). Secondly, security also plays a role in protecting the material goods required 
to carry out these goals (2012, p. 18). Thirdly, the importance of freedom from fear, and 
the significance that our mental states have in our understanding of security—“fear 
                                                                
21 By ‘ways of life’ Waldron means the routines, plans, goals and aspirations that make for a valuable human 
existence. He writes: 
  
 
By mode of life, I mean not just daily routines but also the reasonable aspirations people have for 
their lives—the trajectory of their lives, if you like (Waldron, 2012, p. 18). 
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seems to be a mental state that is itself partly constitutive of insecurity” (2012, p. 18). The 
deepened view of security captures this affective aspect, as an important part of what it 
means for an individual to be secure. Fourthly, the pure safety account fails to account 
for the sense that security is important instrumentally as a “mode in which other goods 
are enjoyed” (Waldron, 2012, pp. 21-23), and Waldron’s deepened view captures this 
relation between security and other goods. The particular goods Waldron has in mind 
are political and social liberties (or ‘rights’). He claims: 
 
 
Security is not only a good in itself but an underwriting of other values, a 
guarantor of other things we care about. Some of these values might be liberties. 
We might think of ourselves as secure (or insecure) in the privacy of our homes, 
secure (or insecure) against arbitrary incarceration, secure (or insecure) in our 
religious freedom. A demand for civil liberties is often a demand for security in 
this regard (Waldron, 2012, p. 21). 
 
 
 Waldron’s alternative view of security is preferable to the pure safety account 
because it better accounts for the way security relates to and is in part constituted by 
other values. Yet the problem is that in developing this alternative to the pure safety 
view, Waldron provides an overly ideological account of security based on a view of life 
within modern liberal democracies. This is particularly evident in Waldron’s emphasis 
on security as it relates to political and social rights (2012, pp. 21-23). Waldron’s claim is 
that there is an intimate interconnectedness between security and rights—“security is 
not only a good in itself but an underwriting of other values…Some of these values 
might be liberties” (2012, p. 21), “a demand for civil liberties is often a demand for 
security in this regard” (2012, p. 21), “security is something we value in connection with 
our rights—enjoying them securely” (2012, p. 22); “security is the sine qua non for the 
enjoyment of the very rights that are spuriously opposed to security” (Waldron, 2012, p. 
22).  
 To be sure, there is a sense in which this is correct, security does underwrite many 
of the political and civil rights which we enjoy in developed, liberal democratic states. 
But the concern is that is that in developing this view, Waldron is claiming that we 
cannot fully understand the concept of security without a conception of political liberties 
in the background—that something is missing from our understanding of security 
without this vision of a society that protects liberal rights—to property, religious 
freedom, and so on. 
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 This seems wrong. It still makes sense to speak of security—and of individual’s 
being secure—in communist societies, or pre-industrial societies, or even in benign 
dictatorships22, societies which do not promote the sorts of liberal rights protected in 
Western democracies (and the sorts of rights which Waldron has in mind). It also makes 
sense to speak of security in communities which are prescriptive about the ways of life 
that individuals must pursue—theocracies or totalitarian states which do not allow 
individuals to freely pursue their own life goals. There is an important sense in which 
individuals within these societies are still secure, even if they are not free to express 
themselves or to freely pursue their version of the good life. And while of course this 
sense of security may quite different from our rights-based sense of security in liberal 
democracies, we shouldn’t allow a set of ideological commitments preclude the 
possibility of senses of security that are non-Western or rights-based.23 
 Where the ‘pure safety’ account of security is limited because it is too minimal—
recognising security as being simply a matter of safety from physical harms—Waldron’s 
alternative is too wedded to a liberal ideology, to assumptions based on political 
arrangements particular to liberal societies. What we want, then, is a conception of 
security that is neither reduced to pure physical safety nor overly dependent on 
ideological commitments based on political arrangements at a certain time, in a certain 
part of the world. 
 Another field of scholarship that has engaged with the concept of security is that 
of criminology. I turn next to consider one criminological account developed by Zedner 
(2009) before developing my own alternative view.  
 
2.3. Zedner on Security 
 
 The concept of security has been considered in depth by some criminologists.24 
The most developed recent account in the criminological literature (at least that I am 
familiar with) is that of Zedner (2009), which I will consider in this section.25 While I 
                                                                
22 Assuming the dictator seeks to protect citizens. 
23 The broader point is that while our concepts should be sensitive to, and even in part shaped by, historical 
circumstances and values, they should not be so shaped as to become unintelligible to other ways of life or 
political arrangements that are not Western or liberal. 
24 See also Wood & Shearing (2012) and Loader & Walker (2007). 
25 I do not want to imply that Zedner’s view is representative of all of the views in the criminological 
literature. I draw upon Zedner’s view because it is the most comprehensive recent engagement with security 
in the criminological literature that I am aware of. 
27 
 
agree with certain elements of Zedner’s view, I want to challenge Zedner’s conception 
of what she sets out as the ‘objective’ sense of security. 
 Sensitive to the diverse contexts in which the concept of security is employed26, 
Zedner writes that security is “not a single, immutable concept but many” (2009, p. 9). 
Zedner proceeds to analyse security by distinguishing between four senses of the 
concept—the ‘objective’, the ‘subjective’, the ‘pursuit’ and the ‘symbol’. 
 The objective sense of security is the state of “being without threat” (Zedner, 
2009, p. 15). Zedner writes that an aspiration to absolute objective security is necessary, 
yet that “it makes sense to recognise that its perfect attainment is unachievable” because 
“security is predicated on the continuing presence of that which threatens it” (2009, p. 
15). The objective sense of security is contrasted with the subjective sense—which 
captures the phenomenological dimension of how we feel, experience and relate to 
secure and insecure contexts. It captures the importance of things like “freedom from 
anxiety or apprehension” and “varies not only according to objective risk but also 
according to extraneous factors such as individual sensitivity to risk and danger” (2009, 
p. 16).27 
 Zedner also draws a distinction between security as a pursuit and security as a 
symbol. Security as a pursuit captures the sense of security as a societal goal, and 
encompasses the many legal and political measures that societies adopt to achieve that 
goal. Recognising security as a continuous pursuit is important, Zedner claims, because 
it, “means recognising that it is probably unattainable and at best impermanent” (2009, 
p. 19). It captures the essential mutability of security measures, the fact that societies 
must constantly amend and revise their approaches to security in the light of new 
threats. This is contrasted with the symbolic sense of security, which is altogether “less 
tangible”, and is not concerned with the objectives for achieving security, but instead 
captures the “rhetorical” aspects of the concept. Zedner gives the following examples to 
illustrate this symbolic aspect of security: 
 
                                                                
26 As Zedner writes of the concept of security, “It is wantonly deployed in fields as diverse as social security, 
health and safety, financial security, policing and community safety, national security, military security, 
human security, environmental security, international relations and peacekeeping” (2009, p. 9). 
27 I agree that the distinction between subjective and objective security is important. Objective security 
pertains to the factual matter of whether an individual is or is not secure. An individual is objectively secure 
if, as a matter of fact, their environment is a secure one. Subjective security, on the other hand, concerns an 
individual’s beliefs or feelings about whether they are secure. While important, this distinction is not one I 
will discuss in any length in this chapter, because I am more interested in the distinction between negative 
and positive security, to be developed shortly. 
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Symbolic security underpins the promotion of neighbourhood watch and 
community safety stickers by local police; the security markings on bicycles, car 
radios and other valuables; and the security posters that adorn airports, railway 
stations and other places of high risk (Zedner, 2009, p. 22).  
 
Symbolic security captures the way in which security is employed as a symbol in a range 
of societal practices and measures. 
 While interesting, there are reasons to be sceptical about Zedner’s four-way 
distinction of the concept of security. In particular, I want to point to two concerns. The 
first challenges the strength of Zedner’s distinction between security as a pursuit and 
security as a symbol. Zedner’s account of the symbolic functions of security—
neighbourhood watch, community safety stickers and security markings on bicycles, car 
radios and other valuables—seem, on the most plausible interpretation, to be measures 
employed to achieve security through deterrence. This is not to deny these measures are 
symbolic. But it is to question Zedner’s division between what she terms the symbol and 
the pursuit. If these symbolic features of security are ultimately used to prevent theft, by 
reminding would-be thieves about the presence of authorities (as seems the most 
plausible explanation), then ultimately these measures look to belong to the sense of 
security as a societal practice involving objective measures to reduce insecurity. And this 
suggests the distinction between the symbolic and the pursuit is not that strong, indeed 
if it is present at all. 
 The second challenge is to Zedner’s conception of objective security. Zedner 
claims that objective security is the state of “being without threat” (2009, p. 14), and the 
state of being “protected from threats” (2009, p. 14). Yet in my view there is an important 
distinction between the sense of security as being without threat and the sense of being 
protected from threats. Zedner captures these two states of affairs under the banner of 
objective security. But what I want to suggest is that both conceptually, and in terms of 
our understanding of the moral value of security, it is important to distinguish between 
these two states of being without threat and of being protected from threats, they do not 
amount to the same state of affairs.   
 In what follows, I want to develop a different way of carving up the concept of 
security which distinguishes between the positive and negative senses of the concept. 
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3. Negative and Positive Security 
 
 Where the ‘pure safety’ account of security is limited because it recognises 
security as being only a matter of being absent of physical threats, Waldron’s alternative 
is too wedded to ideological commitments and thus limits the understanding of security 
to rights-based political arrangements particular to liberal democracies. And recent 
criminological engagements have failed to appreciate the significant distinction between 
being objectively free from threat and objectively protected from threat.  
 In this section I will put forward an alternative view of security—based on a 
distinction between the positive and negative senses of the concept. To be sure, there are 
valuable things to preserve from previous accounts—the ‘pure safety’ view captures the 
intuitive importance of physical safety in our understanding of security. Waldron’s view 
captures the importance of security in facilitating people being safe, protected and free 
to carry out their life goals. Zedner’s criminological view captures the importance of 
security as a communal pursuit—something we are constantly striving for and which 
guides legal measures and political practices. In my alternative account of security I will 
preserve some of these important elements from these previous accounts. My account 
preserves the importance of personal safety, and it also builds on this view by including 
(as Waldron does) the importance of the safety of our material possession and assets. My 
account also captures aspects of Waldron’s view that security is essential for facilitating 
our pursuit of life goals, and Zedner’s view that security is a societal pursuit which 
communities quest after.  
 The alternative view of security I will develop in this section is based on a 
distinction between two ways of understanding security—the negative and positive 
senses. One way of understanding security is as a negative concept—pertaining to the 
absence of harms and threats: 
 
Negative security: the absence of harms to our person, our bodily integrity and our 
material possessions, and the absence of threats to these things in the foreseeable 
future. 
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Negative security28 captures the importance of physical safety—safety from killings, 
assaults, physical violations—which is essential to our understanding of what it is to be 
secure. Yet negative security is not completely synonymous with bodily safety, it also 
captures the absence of harms to our financial and material possessions. Moreover, the 
negative sense of security captures an important temporal dimension to security in 
including the absence of threats. This captures the sense that what matters about security 
is not just the absence of immediate harm, but also the absence of foreseeable threats of 
harm.29 Negative security, then, is the negation of harms and threats to our life, bodily 
integrity and possessions. 
 Contrast this with the positive sense of security which I define as follows: 
 
Positive security: the existence of norms, rules or procedures which exist to protect 
and provide for individuals. 
 
Positive security is the presence of measures which exist to protect and provide for 
individuals. These things, I claim, are the norms, rules or procedures which exist in 
political communities.30 
 Where the negative sense of security captures the sense of security as being 
without harms or threats, the positive sense captures the sense of being protected, under 
the protection of a system of rules, norms and procedures which serve to protect and 
provide. 
 To see this distinction more clearly, consider the following desert island example: 
 
 
                                                                
28 The sense of negative here is not the evaluative sense of bad or unwelcome but the sense of negation or 
the absence of something. And the same is true of positive which I here take to mean the presence of 
something. 
29 To give a good example that was presented to me by my supervisor. We would not feel secure playing a 
game of Russian roulette, not because harms are imminent (they may never come to me—the other player 
may be the unlucky one) but because of the foreseeable threat or risk of harm—it could be me in the future. 
30 Isiah Berlin (1979) famously introduces a distinction between the negative and positive senses of liberty, 
from which I took some guidance in setting out my own conception of positive and negative security. 
Negative liberty is the sense of liberty as “not being interfered with by others” (1979, p. 123), which Berlin 
contrasts with the positive sense—the sense of liberty where individuals are able to freely pursue their own 
life goals—where “my life and decisions depend on myself, not on eternal forces of whatever kind.” (Berlin, 
1979, p. 131). This positive sense of freedom requires the capacity for self-mastery, self-consciousness and 
an awareness of one’s own desires. Berlin’s account of negative liberty is similar to my view of negative 
security, to the extent that both require the negation of certain things. Yet Berlin’s account of positive 
freedom is quite different to my view of positive security, mainly because Berlin appeals to internal 
psychological states in his account of positive liberty. I shall consider the relation between negative liberty 
and my own sense of negative security in more depth below. 
31 
 
Suppose there are a number of individuals on a peaceful desert island. Each has 
access to sufficient resources and possessions to live a decent existence, and they 
do not face any immediate harms or foreseeable threats to their person or their 
possessions. 
 
 
Could we say that these individuals are secure? In one sense, yes. These individuals are 
safe—they face no present harms or foreseeable threats, they have sufficient resources to 
guarantee their survival, at least in the foreseeable future. Yet in another sense, they are 
not secure. The reason for this is that they do not enjoy positive security. There are no 
norms, rules or procedures in place to protect and provide for these individuals. Because 
of this, they are not secure in the sense that they are not under the protection of a third 
party. As such, they have no guarantees that their circumstances will remain as they are—
no forward-looking assurances that they will not be subject to threats in the future.31 They 
have no back-up plan or insurance policy to guarantee their continued wellbeing in the 
event that they suffer some form of hardship, say, if they were to suffer injury. They have 
no healthcare guarantees, or guarantees that their fellow islanders will not target them in the 
more distant future. 
 What I want to claim is that while it makes sense to say that the individuals on 
the desert island are secure in the negative sense that they are not subject to immediate 
harms or threats, it does not make sense to say they are secure in the positive sense that 
they are protected or provided for by norms, rules or procedures. Later I will highlight 
some examples of institutions which evidence this value of positive security. Prior to 
doing so, I want to get clearer on what positive security is by considering the way in 
which it relates to other values. Later in the chapter I will do the same with the negative 
sense of security. 
 
4. The value of positive security 
 
 The desert island example illustrates some of the features of the concept of 
positive security. In this section I want to develop these further. I want to show how 
positive security is valuable because it is intimately related to other values—assurance, 
liberty and what I term ‘claimability’. Elucidating the relationship between positive 
                                                                
31 We are to assume here that the individuals on the desert island have not promised or contracted to not 
attack one another. If they had, then they may possess positive security insofar as a promise or contract may 
be said to be a rule, norm or procedure which exists to protect.  
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security and these three values will help us to get clearer on the concept of positive 
security, and will also help us to appreciate its importance. 
 Positive security exists, I have argued, when there are norms, rules and 
procedures in place to protect and provide for individuals in communities. Part of the 
role of these norms, rules and procedures of positive security is restrictive—to ensure that 
the standards of negative security are met by preventing individuals (through 
disincentives) from killing, harming or stealing from one another.32 J.S. Mill gestured at 
something akin to this function of the rules of positive security (though he does not put 
it in these terms) when he writes: 
 
All that makes existence valuable to anyone depends on the enforcement of 
restraints upon the actions of other people. Some rules of conduct, therefore, 
must be imposed—by law in the first place, and by opinion on many things (Mill, 
1974, pp. 63-64). 
 
 
I certainly do not want to endorse Mill’s strong claim that all that makes existence 
valuable depends on restrictions on others, because this seems absurd. Though Mill does 
capture the restrictive function of the norms, rules and procedures of what I have termed 
positive security. Mill not unreasonably suggests that these restrictions must take the 
form of laws, I do not share this view, however, and it is for this reason that I have framed 
positive security in the terms of ‘rules, norms and procedures’, rather than laws. This is 
because I believe it is in principle possible to have positive security in an anarchist 
society where there is no centralised authority which has the monopoly on law-making 
power.33  
                                                                
32 Rules, norms or procedures may restrict and guide action in a number of ways. Legal rules, which are one 
example of the rules of positive security, impose negative legal obligations on individuals to not steal or kill, 
and positive legal obligations to pay tax, both of which are backed up with the threat of sanction. Other rules 
and norms disincentivise in other ways, for instance with the threat of social castigation attached to norms 
of etiquette, or the threat of sanction in sports games.  
33 The philosophical anarchist denies that a centralised, coercive system of law is ever permissible, and 
therefore rejects the permissibility of the state. A number of author’s have defended this anarchist objection 
to the state in different ways. For an argument on the conflict (and ultimate irreconcilability) between 
political authority and individual autonomy see Wolff (1998) and for an argument from the ‘communal’ 
school of anarchism see Miller (1984, pp. 45-59). To be sure, different schools of philosophical anarchism 
defend different approaches to social disorder—‘individualist’ anarchists hold that punishment and social 
order are the role of de-centralised protective agencies (Nozick, 1974, pp. 12-17), whereas ‘communal’ 
anarchists claim that social order can be promoted through communal disapprobation (Taylor, 1982, pp. 65-
94) —moral norms backed up with the moral condemnation of the community attached to disobedience. 
The crucial point I want to highlight is that all of these measure are compatible with the ‘rules, norms and 
procedures’ of positive security. It follows that positive security is compatible with an anarchist society and 
does not in principle require laws. 
33 
 
 As well as being restrictive, the norms and rules of positive security also serve to 
provide—to ensure individuals receive the goods they require for a decent, dignified 
life—goods such as welfare, healthcare, insurance, employment benefits (I will consider 
these examples of positive security institutions below). 
 What is valuable about positive security in this form of norms, rules and 
procedures? Here I will point to three values—assurance, liberty and the value of 
claiming protection. Moreover, I will also explain how these values—particularly the 
value of assurance—are related to time and the temporal element to positive security. 
 I will begin with the value of assurance. Recall the example of individuals on a 
desert island. These individuals possessed sufficient resources to enjoy a moderately 
decent existence and suffered no immediate threat to their person or material 
possessions. While enjoying security in the negative sense, I claimed, they did not enjoy 
security in the positive sense. One of the reasons for this, I argued, is that they did not 
enjoy any assurance or guarantees as to their safety (both bodily and in terms of material 
possessions) beyond the immediate future. Positive security provides assurance of safety 
in the future. It captures the important future—oriented aspect of security—the thought 
that what we value about security is not just that we are free from harms in the 
immediate present, but that we have reasonable assurance34 that these harms will not 
present themselves in the future. 
 Possessing assurances about our future is valuable because we live our lives 
based on projections about how our futures will be. To be uncertain about the future is 
a significant burden, especially if this is uncertainty about our survival—whether we 
will live, be safe from attack or be safe from debilitating harm to ourselves or our 
personal possessions. What matters about security is not just that we are immediately 
safe but that we have assurances of our safety in the more distant future. This is what 
the individuals on the desert island lacked. And this assurance is one fundamental 
difference between the values of negative and positive security.35 
                                                                
34 I include the qualification of ‘reasonable’ on assurances to capture the idea that it is near impossible to 
have a 100% guarantee of security. 
35 There is a strong challenge to this view that positive security is required to given assurance. Consider a 
Garden of Eden case where individuals have access to near infinite resources required to live a good life. 
Such a case is a challenge to the need for positive security because it looks like we no longer need the rules, 
norms or procedures to protect or provide for us or to provide us with assurances. While interesting, I think 
the challenge fails. First, if we assume the individuals in this case are mortal (as they plausibly must be, if 
the example is to be interesting) then they would wish for the security of their health and insurance against 
accidents, and we could still recognise this as a form of procedure of positive security. Second, recall the 
original story of Adam and Eve—they are cast out of paradise for failing to obey rules. The original story 
captures the notion that even with near infinite resources, some individuals (for whatever reason) may fail 
to obey the rules of an authority. This supports the view that positive security (say, in the form of ten 
commandment-style directives) would be valuable. First, this provide extra assurance, we have clear 
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 How do the norms, rules and procedures constitutive of positive security provide 
this assurance? One way is through their restrictive function. The norms, rules and 
procedures serve in part to deter or disincentivise individuals from harming, killing or 
stealing from others. In this sense, the existence of norms or rules provides extra assurance 
to individuals that are potentially subject to harm. In the absence of this norm or rule the 
individuals on the desert island rely on trust—they trust others not to harm them. But 
the restrictive function of the norms, rules and procedures of positive security provides 
extra assurance, on top of this trust, by dictating standards for what happens when 
individuals disobey directives (i.e. as laws do). Second, rules and norms provide 
assurance by providing individuals with the goods they require to live a decent, 
dignified life. State welfare and healthcare systems operate in this way—in the event of 
losing our jobs or suffering illness, we have assurance that we will not be financially 
destitute or likely to die. Thirdly, some procedures provide assurance by providing us 
with insurance or a contingency plan. Insurance policies operate in this way—they 
guarantee that in the event of financial hardship or personal accident, one’s mortgage 
will still be paid, or some level of income guaranteed. 
 The assurance provided by these measures is valuable because our expectations 
about how the future will turn out and about our own welfare looking forward, forms 
an important part of our planning and our everyday life. We make plans, form 
relationships, take on job opportunities, and take on commitments based on a vision of 
how our lives will be in the future. This expectation is guided by the deeper assumption 
that we will be safe and secure in our person, our health, wellbeing, and possessions in 
the future. Possessing confidence about our security in the future is important, and is 
fostered by the assurances provided to us by the rules, norms and procedures of positive 
security. Without these assurances, we would find it difficult to plan or to form proper 
intentions about our future lives. Our lives would be like the individuals in the desert 
island example, individuals who are content but who possess no certainty about their 
futures. 
 The second value of positive security is that of liberty. What I want to argue here 
is that positive security promotes freedom in certain ways. To see this compare the desert 
island community with a community that possesses the rules, norms and procedures of 
positive security (say, a community with an insurance industry or a hospital). Suppose 
                                                                
guidelines on what happens when individuals ignore rules. Second, these guidelines disincentivise rule-
breaking. Indeed, I think we can see the directives of a deity in a Garden of Eden as being an example of 
valuable positive security. 
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an individual gets great pleasure from skydiving, and being able to pursue this activity 
is essential to them living a full and meaningful life. If this individual exists on the desert 
island, without the norms, rules and procedures to protect and provide for them they 
would likely be more cautious and risk averse, and for good reason. It would be 
irrational for this individual to skydive. What if they broke their leg? Could they be 
certain they could still work or gather food or protect themselves from others? Even a 
minor accident on the desert island could be fatal in the sense that it could seriously 
impact on their ability to survive. Whereas in a community with positive security, this 
individual would have a greater freedom to skydive. They have assurances in the event 
they are injured that they will receive medical care, unemployment benefits and will be 
insured against other harms or losses. In this respect at least (and other things being 
equal), communities with positive security promote freedom better than communities 
without positive security. Positive security gives individuals guarantees (greater 
assurances) and thereby gives them the freedom to pursue the things they find 
meaningful. 
 A third value of positive security pertains to what I will term ‘claimability’. For 
something to be claimable in the sense I intend here it must be: i) someone’s 
responsibility to ensure that a certain state of affairs (X) comes in being and ii) justifiable 
for an individual to make a claim to redress in the event that X does not occur. Take the 
example of a legal contract. In the event that a contract is violated, the individual who 
suffered from the violation is justified in claiming recompense from the one who is 
responsible for its violation, and the state generally takes on the responsibility to enforce 
this claim. In this sense contracts are claimable. I want to suggest that the same is true of 
the norms, rules and procedure constitutive of positive security. In the event that an 
individual (a) steals from another (b), a is justified in claiming against b by virtue of the 
norms or rules which prohibits stealing (they may also be justified in claiming against a 
police force, say, for failing to protect them).36 Or in the event that an institution fails to 
provide healthcare for an individual (z), z is justified in claiming against this institution 
by virtue of the norm or rule which requires that individuals receive healthcare. Of 
course there are a number of further questions about who is responsible for providing 
redress, what constitutes a justified claim, what amount of redress is required, and so 
on. My point here is simply that the norms, rules and procedures of positive security can 
                                                                
36 This is most obvious in the case of a law which prohibits stealing, because in this case the victim has a 
claim against the state, and the thief, to redress. Yet it is also conceivable that the same claims may be made 
in anarchist communities which are not governed by coercive laws, but other forms of norms or rules. 
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in principle be claimable, serving as the basis of a justified claim, and are valuable as 
such.37 
 In this section I have sought to further develop the concept of positive security 
by explaining its relationship with the values of assurance, liberty and claimability. In 
the following section I want to briefly point to some examples of practices and 
institutions which evince the property of positive security. 
 
5. Examples of positive security  
 
 In this section I want to illustrate how the value of positive security is evinced by 
certain practices and institutions. My aim in this section is largely descriptive—I want to 
pick out features of the world which positive security describes. My main claim will be 
that we in fact cannot understand the sense of security we commonly associate with 
these institutions without the concept of positive security. And this supports the 
distinction between positive and negative security I have introduced in this chapter. 
 To begin with, consider the examples of ‘social security’, ‘job security’ or ‘financial 
security’. 
 
i) ‘Social security’ requires the presence of procedures around the state’s 
provision of resources. Social security is not comprehensible as a negative 
concept—as the negation of harms or threats, but is essentially a positive concept, 
it requires the existence of political institutions which provide monetary 
assistance. 
ii) ‘Job security’ would not make sense without rules and procedures 
around work, and the protections and guarantees of employment rules and 
entitlements (the rights provided by job a contract such as the entitlement to an 
employment tribunal, for instance).38 
                                                                
37 One thing to raise here concerns the nature of the guarantees afforded by positive security. Guarantees 
can take a number of forms. For instance, I may have a guarantee from a friend or a parent that they will 
support me in times of financial hardship. While this promise would be claimable, it would not be claimable 
in the same way as a legal guarantee or some other procedure which obligated the state, or some other body, 
to support me. One reason for this may simply be that such a body would likely have greater resources than 
a friend or a parent. Another reason is that claims comes with different degrees of force—legal claims are 
more forceful than other forms of claim because of the associated legal sanction.  
38 One may respond that a lone famer on a plentiful desert island has job security. Yet I would question 
this—I would suggest that what the famer has is negative security in the sense that there is no harm or 
immediate threat to their livelihood—insofar as there is no guarantee that their employment will be secure 
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iii) ‘Financial security’ would not make sense without rules and procedures 
such as rules of property ownership and protections to guarantee this ownership. 
iv) More difficult cases are those such as ‘relationship security’, a ‘secure 
family’ or a ‘secure marriage’. My sense is that it does still make sense to speak 
of positive security with respect to these referents, we can still highlight certain 
social norms or norms of conduct which are constitutive of the security in things 
like marriage, families and relationships—monogamy, care and trust, for 
instance. 
 
What I want to claim is that we cannot understand the sense of security used in these 
and other cases in purely negative terms. The sense of security in the notions of social 
security, job security or financial security do not make sense if they are understood only 
in the terms of absence of harms or threats. To understand these senses of security we 
require the positive sense of security—the sense of societal norms, rules and procedures 
protecting and promoting the security of certain things. 
 There is another sense in which positive security is descriptive—it provides an 
explanation of the function of institutions that exist in modern-day liberal societies. 
Here, though, we should be careful. I have already argued that Waldron’s account of 
security is problematic because it rests completely on a view of life in liberal democracies 
where civil and political rights are legally protected. Waldron’s insistence on the 
relationship between security and rights was problematic, I claimed, because it seems to 
imply that we cannot understand the concept of security without this particular view of 
rights-based political arrangements and the values associated with liberal democracies. 
I do not take this view. What I want to suggest is that while positive security is not the 
same as (nor does it require) laws or political rights, it can explain the sense of security 
connected to these things. Positive security can explain the following sorts of political 
institutions, 
 
i)      Laws—both first-order laws such as those found in criminal and civil 
statutes (which are restrictive and disincentivise harms) and also second-order 
rules and procedures designed to protect suspects against the application of 
                                                                
in the future (i.e. potential threats from a physical accident or bad weather), they do not possess job security 
in the positive sense. 
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first-order rules (procedural rules such as due process, habeas corpus, fair trials 
with fair representation). 
ii)    Insurance or pensions schemes—institutions to provide remuneration 
in the event of hardship or loss or to the elderly when they can no longer work. 
iii)    Healthcare—institutions which exist to provide for those who face 
illness. 
iv)    Welfare for those who are vulnerable or less well off or who suffer 
hardship—unemployment benefits/ childcare benefits/ disability benefits/ 
support for injured soldiers—institutions/ procedures designed to provide 
compensation to those who have suffered harms/ loss or to provide for those 
who are jobless or otherwise unable to work. 
 
My claim is that we cannot understand the sense of security that these laws, practices 
and institutions provide in purely negative terms, but requires the positive sense of 
security. These laws, procedures and institutions illustrate the norms, rules and 
procedures of positive security which exist to protect and provide for individuals. They 
also illustrate the closely related values of assurance, liberty and clamability. And in 
capturing these values, particularly the former, these practices and institutions capture 
the important temporal dimension of security, the relationship between security and the 
way we project ourselves towards our future. 
 
6. The value of negative security 
 
 In this section I will analyse the concept of negative security. Like my analysis of 
positive security, I’m interested in how negative security is related to other values. My 
claim will be that negative security is intimately related to the values of negative liberty 
and safety from harm. 
 An individual is negatively secure when they are not subject to harms or 
immediate threats of harm against their life, person or property. 
 What is valuable about a state of affairs which is absent of these harms or threats? 
On the face of it, the question seems obvious. No one wants to be killed, attacked or 
stolen from. This would either end, or seriously impact on, our capacity to live a decent 
existence, to pursue the things that are meaningful to us. Yet it will be worth examining 
further exactly what is valuable about a state of affairs in which negative security exists. 
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This is because further values underpin our intuitions about negative security and 
recognising these values will help to provide a more comprehensive picture of what is 
valuable about negative security. What are these further values? I will argue that two 
values are intimately connected to negative security—negative liberty and safety from 
harm. 
 Our sense of what is valuable about negative security is guided by our intuitions 
about liberty and personal freedom. The ability to act freely and to freely pursue our life 
goals presupposes some level of negative security in the form of protection from harms 
and threats. In this sense, negative security is intimately connected to negative liberty. 
Negative liberty is the freedom from impositions which restrict our liberty—death, 
imprisonment, coercion or assault, for instance. Berlin, who first introduced the negative 
sense of liberty writes, “by being free in this sense I mean not being interfered with by 
others” (1979, p. 123). Many of these harms are also encompassed by negative security—
and there is some level of cross-over between the absence of harms to our negative 
security and negative liberty. For instance, harms such as death, bodily assault or certain 
forms of coercion pertain to both.  
 Yet negative liberty and negative security are importantly not synonymous 
concepts. I may be negatively unfree (i.e. subject to liberty restrictions) yet possess 
negative security—as in a case where I am incarcerated away from others, but not subject 
to bodily threats, for instance. Or consider the case of coercive laws—such laws are 
liberty restricting and pose threats to our negative freedom, but they don’t infringe our 
negative security. If such laws licensed serious incursions against our persons or 
property, they may begin to pose a threat to our negative security, but while all laws are 
liberty restricting, not all laws curtail negative security. 
 The line between negative liberty and negative security is subtle, yet still 
intelligible. The point I want to raise here is that the values are sufficiently close that 
much of what we value about security links to what we value about negative liberty—
the freedom from obstacles to our liberty. Personal freedom requires a degree of negative 
security—to be free is to be able to pursue our projects and life goals without 
interference, and this presupposes negative security in the form of protection from 
harms and threats to our life, person or property. 
 Negative security is also intimately connected to the value of being safe from harm. 
I have argued that safety and negative security are importantly different concepts 
(because the latter captures the absence of threats to our material possessions). Yet some 
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of what we value about negative security is connected to what we value about our 
personal safety. One of the problems of insecure contexts (and perhaps the main thing 
we fear about them) is the threat of violence and suffering. Violence is unwelcome 
because it involves physical and psychological harm. Harm is not only painful, it can 
otherwise be a serious obstacle to our interests and the pursuit of our life goals. It is for 
this reason, amongst others, that harm is dis-valuable. A state of negative security is 
therefore valuable, because it is absent of these harms to our person and material wealth 
in the present and threats of these harms in the foreseeable future: at least where this can 
be assured to a reasonable degree.39 
 Related to this is the harm of fearing insecurity. The fear we feel about our 
personal safety, future wellbeing and material possessions can be seriously 
debilitating.40 And this phenomenological dimension of how we respond to insecure 
contexts must be recognised as a form of harm which arises from how we relate to 
insecure contexts. This is to say it is not only the actual harm constitutive of violent 
attempts against us, or our property, that is problematic about insecure contexts. It is the 
fear and anxiety that we feel towards potential attempts that is partly constitutive of what 
is problematic about insecure contexts.41 
 Negative security relates to fear in the following way. To be immediately secure 
from threats to our person or possessions provides us with one reason to not be afraid. I 
would justifiably be fearful of an immediate threat to my person—say if someone were 
to begin to attack me, or if a war raged around me. The negation of these things would 
contribute to me not being fearful of immediate harm and foreseeable threats. Yet this is 
                                                                
39 There is an important sense in which we can never be completely free from the threat of harm. Even in 
states we deem to possess a high level of security, there is the possibility that we may suffer harm. What we 
seek is a reasonable level of security, and a reasonable guarantee that we will not suffer such threats. One of 
the things that must be factored into this judgement of reasonableness is the potential for unwelcome value 
conflicts. We may, of course, ensure a greater level of security by curtailing other important values such as 
privacy or liberty. We may preventatively incarcerate those we deem to pose a threat to our security, or 
search their property without their consent, for instance. Yet these sorts of measures are problematic because 
they compromise values such as liberty or privacy. And arriving at a reasonable level of security will have 
to balance these sorts of conflicts between security and other values. For an account of the need to balance 
the sometimes conflicting values of security and liberty see Waldron (2010, pp. 20-47). 
40 The feeling of fear is an aspect of the subjective dimension of security, as noted above, I will not explore 
the distinction between objective and subjective security in any depth. 
41 Of course, this fear may be rational, or it may not. It would be irrational to live in a constant state of 
heightened fear of a meteor strike, given the low probability of such a strike occurring. Yet it would not be 
unreasonable to fear attacks in a context in which such attacks are a daily occurrence. It would be less 
reasonable to fear attack in a quiet and peaceful rural village, than it would on the Gaza Strip—it would be 
completely rational to fear for our wellbeing and that of those around us within such belligerent 
surroundings. This is not to suggest that the actual phenomenon of feeling fear directly tracks the 
mathematic probability of our suffering harm. Though it is to say that fear is at least partly influenced by 
the contexts we find ourselves in, and our perceptions about the probability of harm within such contexts. 
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not the only way in which fear operates. Fear is a future-oriented mental state. I do not 
only feel fear in response to my immediate situation but I feel fear at potential threats 
which may arise in the future, or even fear the uncertainty about threats. It is here we see 
the relation between negative and positive security. Negative security provides a reason 
to not be fearful about present threats, but if we are to be assured and without fear about 
our future wellbeing, the rules, norms and procedures of positive security support this.   
 In this section I have argued that negative security is intimately related to 
negative liberty and safety from harm (bodily harm, material harm and the immediate 
fear of these threats). 
7. Negative and positive security in emerging democracies 
 
In this section I want to briefly draw out some of the implications of the negative 
and positive security distinction on the problem of promoting security in cases of 
transitional justice, where democracy is nascent. One of the core challenges of the process 
of political transition from conflict and illegitimate rule is that of establishing (or indeed 
re-establishing) an institutionalised set of civil liberties to protect individuals from 
incursions from the state, and from other individuals. In this section I want to highlight 
three implications of the negative and positive security distinction on this process of 
protecting and promoting civil liberties and cementing democracy. 
The first point to raise concerns how the negative and positive security 
distinction relates to the actual process of political transition to democracy. Two points 
on this score. First, we can recognise the establishment of negative security as the sine 
qua none of bringing about a set of institutionalised civil liberties and for achieving 
effective democracy. 42  Building institutions which protect civil liberties requires 
individuals to not be under threat of attack or physical violation. Building political or 
legal institutions while conflict rages would almost inevitably be a failed enterprise. 
Moreover, the processes of political participation required for democracy (i.e. political 
assembly or even voting at a voting booth) similarly requires individuals not to be under 
attack. 
This seems to imply that one should secure negative security, prior to positive 
security. In some instances this may be the right way to go. Yet in many, if not most, 
                                                                
42 The problem of the pre-conditions required for democracy is one I take up in more depth in chapters 5 
and 6. 
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cases bringing about negative security will require positive security measures. Think of 
measures such as humanitarian interventions, an effective police force, legal institutions 
to support law and order and promote human rights. These sorts of measures fall under 
the banner of positive security—they are guided by rules, norms and procedures which 
exist to protect and provide for individuals in fragile political societies. And in many 
cases these sorts of measures will be essential for establishing negative security—the 
negation of harms and threats. Indeed, given that transitional justice contexts are not the 
peaceful and plentiful desert islands of philosophical thought experiments, the 
promotion of negative and positive security will in many cases need to occur 
simultaneously. 
Second, in this chapter I claimed that the concept of positive security is intimately 
connected to a number of other values. This is important for transitional justice and the 
move towards establishing procedural rights. Think of the civil procedural right to habeas 
corpus—the right of the accused to appear before a court to discover the charge under 
which they are incarcerated. One of the main justifications for this legal right is to 
prevent unjustified arrest, to prevent a state from falsely arresting and imprisoning 
individuals under false charges. The right is justified on the grounds of individual 
liberty, but also falls under the banner of both negative and positive security, as I have 
used the concepts.43 That is, habeas corpus protects individuals from unjust incursions 
from the state, and as such it represents a procedure which exists to protect.  
The example of habeas corpus illustrates the interconnectedness of liberty and 
security. The process whereby the right to habeas corpus became concretised into it’s 
current legal form represented a process whereby both liberty and security from the state 
were increased and improved. One of the ways in which they were improved is that they 
became claimable, they formed the basis of a justified legal claim against the state. 
Considered from the angle of civil liberties, we see that increases in positive security go 
hand in hand with increases in negative security and liberty. 
The close interconnectedness between security and the pursuit of other values is 
reflected in recent UK legislation. Take the following example, 
 
                                                                
43 It falls under the banner of negative security because removing the right to habeus corpus would result in 
increased threats against an individual’s security (i.e. making them more likely to suffer arbitrary arrests). 
And it falls under the banner of positive security because it is an example of a rule, norm or procedure which 
exists to protect (in this case against the state). 
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Democracy, the rule of law, open, accountable governments and institutions, 
human rights, freedom of speech, property rights and equality of opportunity, 
including the empowerment of women and girls, are the building blocks of 
successful societies. They are part of the golden thread of conditions that lead to 
security and prosperity (HM Government, 2015, p. 10) 
 
The policy reflects how security is intimately connected to other values. In liberal 
democracies these protections take the form of legal civil liberties. Yet positive security 
need not take this form, and I have claimed that (at least in principle) positive security 
may still exist in societies that do not endorse the sorts of civil and social rights essential 
to liberal democracies. 
 Third, the concepts of negative and positive security provide some explanation 
of the content of international legal norms, and also about how they may be 
implemented. The particular norm I have in mind is the ‘Responsibility to Protect’, a 
relatively recent international political commitment (and emerging norm under 
international law) endorsed by member states after the 2005 UN World Summit. Article 
139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome captures the content of this norm: 
 
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, 
through appropriate and necessary means. 
 
Protecting individuals from international crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes) forms the basic content of the duty to protect. Most obviously, this 
commitment represents a commitment to bring about negative security—to prevent 
serious violations against individuals (in the case of genocide, violations on the basis of 
group membership). Yet the positive sense of security can also describe the sorts of 
measures that states should utilise to prevent international crimes. These include 
institutions to protect and promote human rights, aid to facilitate state capacity building, 
and development in international law (which itself may be seen as a form of positive 
security, as I have described the concept). 
 
 
44 
 
8. Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have introduced a conceptual distinction between the negative 
and positive senses of security. The former pertains to the sense of security as being 
without threat, the latter the sense of being protected from threat—under the protection 
of norms, rules and procedures. Throughout the thesis I will explain the different ways 
in which states can facilitate both negative and positive security in the process of 
transitioning towards democracy. I will start, in the following chapter, with the question 
of what citizens are permitted to do in pursuit of security, in the absence of a legitimate 
state. This concerns the permissibility of rough justice.  
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III. Rough Justice and Transitional Justice 
 
1. Introduction 
 
To what extent are citizens permitted to take justice into their own hands when 
the state fails to? May citizens punish wrongdoers in the absence of a legitimate state, 
when formal legal institutions fail to do so? If so, what justifies this punishment? 
These questions concern the permissibility of ‘rough justice’. Rough justice is 
substantive justice carried out by individuals or groups outside of the official legal 
institutions of the state. On the face of it, rough justice is controversial. We generally 
assume that substantive justice should be restricted to the official legal institutions of the 
state—that only the state should punish wrongdoers or impose taxation in the interests 
of distributing welfare to the poor. Yet we also look favourably upon cases of 
vigilantism, seeing them to be permissible—and even in some cases obligatory. Think of 
Robin Hood-style cases where wealth is stolen from the rich and given to the poor, or 
Clint Eastwood-style cases where bad guys face justice vigilante-style when a legitimate 
state either does not exist or else fails to realise justice. Our intuitions are thus split. On 
the one hand we believe substantive justice to be the job of the state, and on the other we 
believe that individuals or groups are at least in some cases permitted to execute justice 
when official institutions are unwilling or unable. 
The question that interests me in this chapter is whether rough justice, in 
particular punitive rough justice44, is permissible in the event that a state fails to execute 
justice by punishing wrongdoers. This problem is particularly salient with respect to 
transitional justice contexts for at least three reasons. First, because in the wake of 
                                                                
44 Rough justice may take other forms, for instance the redistributive form we see in Robin Hood-style cases, 
where social goods and resources are distributed (through theft) outside of the official institutions the state. 
These cases are distinct from the punitive form insofar as they concern the distribution of goods or benefits, 
not the distribution of harms. My focus in this chapter will be on the punitive form of rough justice. 
46 
 
illegitimate rule, official legal institutions are often slow, weak and ineffectual.45 This 
raises important questions about whether (and if so for what reasons) citizens may 
execute extra-legal justice in place of official criminal law procedures. Second, 
vigilantism is common within both conflict and post-conflict societies. We can point to 
cases of vigilante groups in South Africa, Guatemala, Peru and Nigeria, amongst other 
cases.46 In many of these cases the vigilantism was unjust—for instance the death squads 
who targeted innocent children in Brazil and Guatemala. Yet, in other cases, vigilantism 
served as a valuable means of controlling crime in the absence of a legitimate state. Such 
examples show that the question of the permissibility of rough justice is a question about 
the moral permissibility of real life practices in fragile political communities. Thirdly, 
there is a case to be made (and I will later make it) that rough justice practices can help 
to accelerate improvements in official legal institutions. This pertains to what Goodin 
(2014) has called the ‘justice-forcing’ defence of rough justice where rough justice may 
be justified if it improves formal systems of justice. Given that one of the central goals of 
transitional justice is precisely to reform institutions so that they are more just and 
effective, this defence of rough justice looks to be especially plausible in cases of political 
transition. 
The aim of this chapter is twofold—first, to come to terms with what rough 
justice is, and second to develop an account of when it is morally permissible. 
The chapter will run as follows. In the following section, I consider some 
examples of rough justice practices, both to illustrate their ubiquity, and to highlight 
some of the similar features which persist in different cases—features such as the lack of 
official authorisation, the fact that rough justice is carried out by individuals and non-
state groups and that it is not subject to the procedural requirements of more formal legal 
institutions. In section three I consider, and ultimately reject, a number of arguments 
against rough justice. This is not to suggest that rough justice is always permissible, 
however. In section four I develop some of Locke’s arguments about the natural right to 
                                                                
45 This is the case in many transitional contexts. To focus on the case of Germany in the wake of the second 
World War in particular, one commentators writes of the complete closing down of Germany courts and the 
removal of jurisdiction in the wake of Allied victory: 
 
The unconditional surrender of the Great German Reich not only brought an end to 
institutionalized terror; it brought an end to the entire judicial system… The commander-in-chief 
of the Allied forces ordered that “all German courts… within the occupied territory are closed until 
further notice”. Jurisdiction was withdrawn from the People’s Court, the Special Courts, the SS 
Police Courts, and all other forms of special criminal justice. Their functions were taken over to a 
large extent by the Allied troop themselves (Müller, 1991, p. 201). 
 
46 For a detailed engagement with vigilantism in these and other cases see Abrahams (1998). 
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punish in the state of nature47 to explain the limited conditions under which rough justice 
is permissible. The account I defend is broadly forward-looking—it states that punitive 
rough justice is permitted if it serves the aims of protection by restraining wrongdoers, 
deterring wrongdoers and deterring other would-be wrongdoers. In section five, I 
develop Goodin’s ‘justice-forcing’ principle, which I claim should serve as a 
‘contributory reason’ in favour of rough justice punishment. I conclude, in section six, 
by considering some of the implications of the account I defend for rough justice in times 
of political transition. 
 
2. What is rough justice? 
 
In this section I want to get clearer about what rough justice is. I begin by 
considering some examples of rough justice (some of which come from contexts of 
transition from conflict and authoritarian rule). Following this I draw together some 
common features of rough justice—focussing on both defining characteristics and 
empirical generalisations.  
 
2.1. The reality of rough justice 
 
Consider the following description of the execution of Muammar Gaddafi at 
the hands of his rebel captors after his deposition in the 2011 Libyan revolution: 
 
Muammar Gaddafi was immediately set upon by Misrata fighters who wounded 
him with a bayonet in his buttocks, and then began pummeling him with kicks 
and blows. By the time Muammar Gaddafi was loaded into an ambulance and 
transported to Misrata, his body appeared lifeless: it remains unclear whether he 
died from this violence, the shrapnel wounds, or from being shot later, as some 
have claimed (Human Rights Watch, 2012). 
 
The killing of Gaddafi is a paradigm case of punitive rough justice. Amongst a number 
of other atrocities, Gaddafi was culpable of gross violations of international law—
ordering the bombardment and starvation of his own people and the killing of wounded 
enemies in direct violation of the Geneva Convention. 48  In an act of rough justice, 
                                                                
47 As I will explain later, state of nature theory offers a useful theoretical device to explore the permissibility 
of rough justice because social contract theorists such as Hobbes and Locke who employed the concept used 
it precisely to explore whether individuals may enforce justice in the absence of a legitimate state. 
48 A report by Human Rights Watch describes the crimes of Gaddafi and his forces thusly: 
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Gaddafi was seized and brutally killed without trial or due process by his captors, 
outside of the official legal procedures of the Libyan state. 
Another example comes from Egypt, where members of a community 
administered fatal punishments to an individual suspected of theft during the 2011 
political uprising: 
 
In one case in March, residents of the village of Ezbat el-Gendaya… strung a man 
from his feet on suspicion he was a car-thief. The suspect was cut down, starting 
a fatal hours-long marathon in which he was beaten, escaped into a canal, was 
recaptured and beaten again. In a video shown to Bloomberg News by a villager, 
the man, his face and torso covered in blood, is dragged by one leg along a road 
(El-Tablawy et al. 2013). 
 
The example differs in a number of respects from the Libyan case, chief of which is that 
in this case disproportionately severe punishments were imposed for a relatively minor 
crime. The example also illustrates the dangers of rough justice—both in terms of the 
disproportionality of the punishment relative to the alleged offence and also with respect 
to the guilt of the suspect. After the suspect’s death there emerged questions about 
whether he was actually guilty, with some suggesting he lacked the mental capacity to 
have carried out the offence with the required responsibility to make him fully 
culpable.49 
Another set of cases illustrate the social order-promoting function of punitive 
rough justice. One example of this is the vigilante gangs in areas of Mexico, which have 
arisen in response to violent and coercive practices by drug gangs. One report gives the 
following case: 
 
Angry peasants went door to door to rid the municipality of the bullies who 
trafficked heroin and harassed residents. Within weeks, most of the drug 
traffickers had fled, and order returned (Matloff & Orlinsky, 2014, pp. 63-64).  
 
The function of these gangs is to promote social order and to remove threats to the 
community. To be sure, punitive methods are used to serve the end of social order—the 
                                                                
A brutal conflict began, with pro-Gaddafi forces indiscriminately shelling civilian areas, arresting 
thousands of protesters and others suspected of supporting the opposition, holding many in secret 
detention, and carrying out summary executions (Human Rights Watch, 2012). 
 
49 The report goes on to state that “questions about his guilt have since arisen, with the man’s father saying 
he suffered from a psychological illness” (El-Tablawy et al., 2013). 
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use of threats or the imposition of harm. Because the state failed to do so, the members 
of these vigilante gangs served justice by assuming the role of protectors of the 
community, much like an informal police service. And they used rough justice practices 
to promote this end. 
In a similar vein, we may think of less extreme though analogous cases of 
punitive rough justice, such as cases of ‘playground justice’ where school bullies are 
punished by other students, outside of the official disciplinary procedures. Or when 
siblings enforce justice on one another, outside of the authority of their parents. While 
different in nature and degree to political or community-punishment contexts, these 
cases have structural similarities insofar as individuals are imposing justice outside of 
the official procedures of authorities such as teachers or parents. While the defining 
characteristics of rough justice I highlight allow for these sorts of cases, in this chapter I 
will be chiefly interested in acts of rough justice carried out by citizens outside of the 
state.  
In this section, I have introduced some cases of rough justice. I do so for three 
reasons. First, to show the broad range of rough justice practices. Second, to support the 
view (which still needs to be defended) that under limited conditions rough justice may 
be permissible in the absence of an effective state. Third, to show that it is counter-
intuitive to say that rough justice is never permissible, given the valuable use it serves in 
at least some of these cases. 
Later I will develop an account of the conditions under which individuals are 
permitted to engage in rough justice practices. Prior to this, I will highlight some of the 
defining characteristics of rough justice, in the interests of offering a clearer definition of 
what rough justice is. 
 
2.2. Defining characteristics of rough justice practices 
 
 
There are two defining characteristics of rough justice practices considered 
above (and indeed of rough justice more generally). Rough justice practices are: 
 
a. Unauthorised—not licensed by the state, or any other official body with 
recognised authority. Instead, rough justice achieves substantive justice 
either in spite of or instead of the state, or any other official authority. 
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b. Concerned with the distribution of goods or harms—rough justice practices seek 
to either provide goods (money, property, welfare through taxation or 
theft) or impose harms (i.e. punishment or taxation). 
 
These two defining characteristics are essential to rough justice practices. Twinned with 
this, we may also highlight some empirical generalisations pertaining to rough justice 
practices. These features are not essential to rough justice, but rough justice practices 
tend to have these empirical features, 
 
c. Without procedural safeguards—rough justice practices are not subject to 
official procedural rules such as due process, habeas corpus or fair, impartial 
trial procedures. 
 
d. Substantively imprecise—rough justice is generally substantively rough in the 
sense that it is disproportionate and the punishment rarely fits, or is 
equitable to, the crime. 
 
In his definition of rough justice, Goodin (2014, p. 3-4) includes the defining 
characteristic that rough justice is ‘approximately just’ in the sense that rough justice 
punishments do not fit the severity of the crime. My view is that we should see this as 
an empirical generalisation, rather than a defining characteristic of rough justice. While 
rough justice punishments are likely to be often disproportionate, it is not inconceivable 
that rough justice punishments may reasonably fit the severity of wrongdoing. The same 
is true of the procedural safeguards condition—on my account, it is not inconceivable 
that rough justice practices can be subject to some procedural safeguards (i.e. trial 
procedures). 
One objection to my definition of rough justice is that I have lost what is 
characteristically rough about rough justice practices. This objection states that there is 
another sense of roughness which my view fails to capture—the sense that is opposite 
to ‘perfect’ justice—justice which is imperfect, imprecise, not enough or too much. 
According to this sense, state justice can be rough as well because state sanctions and 
punishments sometimes fail to match the crime, or are sometimes not subject to fair legal 
procedures (fair trials, non-biased judges, and so on). While plausible, I think this sense 
of rough justice fails to capture what I take to be essential to rough justice—the absence 
of official authorisation. My definition captures this essential element while being 
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sensitive to some of the features of the competing definition by recognising the absence 
of safeguards or substantive imprecision as empirical generalisations. I agree that formal 
state justice can be rough in the sense of being imprecise and subject to far from perfect 
legal procedures. Yet this is to say that state justice evinces the same empirical features 
as in my definition of rough justice. State justice cannot be rough justice as I define it, 
because it does not meet the absence of official authorisation condition which in my view 
is a defining characteristic of rough justice. 
With this definition of rough justice in place, I want to turn now to consider 
whether punitive rough justice is permissible. Why does rough justice stand in need of 
justification? There are two reasons. First, rough justice involves the imposition of 
harm.50 Given that it is morally problematic to harm another individual—even if that 
individual has committed wrongdoing—it must be shown that the value of punishing 
justifies this harm. Second, rough justice is carried out by individuals or groups that lack 
official authority. Given that we generally restrict punishment to agents who possess 
some form of official authority (parents, teachers, the state) we must explain why 
punishment is still permitted despite this lack of official authorisation. 
In the next section I will consider some potential arguments against punitive 
rough justice—arguments which support the view that rough justice is impermissible. 
Meeting these objections will be the first step to providing a positive justification of 
punitive rough justice, which I will do in section four.   
 
3. Why may rough justice be impermissible? 
 
In this section I will consider some arguments against rough justice. To motivate 
these arguments I want to focus in on a particular hypothetical case—consider the 
following: 
 
Suppose a cold blooded murder has taken place in a community. The state has 
been ineffectual in punishing wrongdoers in this community (either because it is 
unable or unwilling). Tired of this lack of justice, a group of individuals gather 
together to capture and punish the culprit. They have been given a description 
                                                                
50 These harms may take a range of forms and we need not think that the type of harm be restricted to 
incarceration used by most legal systems. Rough justice may involve whippings, beatings, public shaming, 
seizure of property. I will not go into any depth about what sorts of harms should be imposed in rough 
justice (see Goodin [2014] for a discussion of the different sorts of punitive measures that may be adopted 
in rough justice). Though, as with legal punishment, it seems right to think that some forms of punitive 
treatment would be prohibited—for instance the cruel and unusual punishments prohibited by many 
domestic constitutions and also under international human rights law. 
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of the culprit by individuals within the community who witnessed the murder. 
After some searching they happen upon an individual who fits the description. 
They are now faced with a decision of what to do next. 
 
I take it that, intuitively, there is something to the view that the group may be permitted 
in imposing some level of punishment.51 That is, assuming that the group have both 
sufficient evidence to believe the suspect is guilty, and that the state will fail to punish 
them, it is not obviously contrary to justice that the group may be permitted to impose 
some level of punishment. Yet of course this intuition remains to be defended. To defend 
the use of rough justice punishment in this case we must reject some possible arguments 
against imposing rough justice in this case. What would such arguments look like? 
There are two broad sets of arguments—authority-based objections and 
instrumental objections. I will consider each in turn. 
 
3.1. Authority-based objections—the state monopoly on force 
 
One objection to rough justice appeals to the argument that only the state 
possesses the authority to coerce and punish (through law). We generally take the state’s 
monopoly on authority for granted—it is widely agreed that only the state has the 
authority to impose laws and enforce punishments in the event that laws are broken. 
And that states have this authority at the exclusion of other groups or individuals.52 It 
follows that punishment by individuals or groups outside of the state is impermissible. 
One thing to note is that the monopoly on authority only applies to states that 
are legitimate. And if a state loses its claim to legitimacy, say by committing human 
rights violations against its citizens, or by being seriously ineffectual at promoting law 
and order, then a state may lose its claim to possessing the monopoly on force.53 Indeed, 
the question that interests me here is precisely that of whether individuals are permitted 
to punish in the absence of a legitimate state. So we may think that the monopoly of 
                                                                
51 I take it that intuitions will likely be split on this, and that it is not yet clear on whom the burden on proof 
lies—on those who believe punishment is permitted or on those who believe punishment is not permitted. 
My point here is simply that there is something in the view that the group may be permitted in punishing. 
52 To say the state has the monopoly on coercive authority is not to say that it is completely impermissible 
for other groups or individuals to use violence in certain cases. Limited violence is generally permitted in 
the interests of self-defence, or defence of others, for instance. 
53 I do not want to commit myself to any substantive view of political legitimacy at this stage. Though my 
assumption here is that on any plausible view of legitimacy, serious violations of human rights or serious 
ineffectiveness at promoting law and order would undermine a state’s claim to legitimacy. I discuss the 
problem of political legitimacy in more depth in chapters 5 and 6.  
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authority objection fails to get off the ground, because when a state is illegitimate, it loses 
its claim to possessing the monopoly on coercion.  
Yet we should still be open to the view that the authority to punish should be 
restricted to a state, even if this state is illegitimate. Could there be any arguments to 
support this? 
Hobbes (2008) provides one argument. For Hobbes, only an official authority 
(in his view the sovereign) is permitted to punish wrongdoers because if other agents 
are permitted to punish then this sharing of authority and power will lead to the collapse 
of the commonwealth and a return to the belligerent state of nature. His argument may 
be summarised as follows:  
 
a) Humans are inherently self-interested and thus the natural pre-political state 
of nature is belligerent (Hobbes, 2008, p. 92-96). 
b)    Joining together in commonwealth is morally preferable to remaining in the 
state of nature (2008, p. 129). 
c)   The only way to ensure peace in the commonwealth is by instituting a 
sovereign (2008, 132). 
d)   To establish and maintain peace, the power of the sovereign (including their 
power to coerce and punish) must be absolute (2008, p. 161). 
e)   If other agents are permitted to execute their power, or if state power is 
shared amongst agents, then the sovereign will lose their power and civil war 
(and a return to the state of nature) will necessarily ensue (2008, pp. 250-260). 
f)  Therefore, punishment by any group or individual ọther than that licensed 
by the official sovereign (or state authority) is impermissible. 
 
Hobbes’s argument for the monopoly of sovereign power is an instrumental argument. 
It appeals to the badness of a state of affairs in which power is divided, or where others 
besides the sovereign state are allowed to possess power, in order to explain why the 
sovereign, and the sovereign alone, is justified in enforcing its power. 
Yet it is possible to challenge Hobbes’ instrumental argument for the monopoly 
of force by appealing to cases where sharing authority across a range of state institutions 
does not lead to the dissolution of state power, and a return to the belligerent state of 
nature. One of the strongest examples of this is the separation of powers doctrine 
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observed by a number of democracies around the world. The separation of powers is a 
doctrine which advises that the most powerful institutions of the state—a) the executive 
b) the legislature and c) the judiciary—should be separated to avoid undue influence 
between these institutions.54 Indeed, one of the reasons for maintaining the separation 
of powers is precisely to prevent the potential injustices of an overly powerful monarch. 
And the fact that there is relative peace in states which observe the separation of powers 
undermines Hobbes’s claim that sustaining peace requires that a sovereign must possess 
absolute power, and that only an omnipotent sovereign can secure peace. 
To be clear, the separation of powers example does not undermine the view that 
only the state ought to have a monopoly on power per se—only Hobbes’s defence of the 
monopoly of force in the form of the claim that distributing power (to bodies other than 
a sovereign) will lead to civil war and the dissolution of the commonwealth. 
What other defences of the monopoly of state power are there? A second line of 
argument is that only legal punishment—carried out by an official legal authority whose 
laws have been broken—is permissible. It follows that rough justice is impermissible, 
because it is not carried out by those with legal authority. 
There are three responses to this view. The first is to re-emphasise that the 
question of the permissibility of rough justice is precisely one of whether punishment is 
permissible when an authority (be this the state, or a school or parent) fails to administer 
punishment. What interests us here is cases where an official legal authority is either 
unable or unwilling to punish. Thus to object by stating that only legal institutions may 
justifiably punish is to beg the question, given that what interests us here is whether 
punishment is permitted when official authorities fail. 
Second, one may appeal to intuitive cases where punishment looks permissible, 
even though it is not administered by the official legal institutions of the state. Think of 
siblings punishing one another when a parent fails to or a child punishing a bully on the 
playground for repeatedly harming other children.55 If the legal authority objection were 
correct, then it would follow that these cases were impermissible—the world would be 
                                                                
54 The executive is responsible for the governance of the state, and (at least in parliamentary democracies) 
generally encompasses the higher ranking electives in government. The legislative body are responsible for 
making new laws. In parliamentary democracies this is officials who belong to the party with majority 
support. The judiciary are the body responsible for interpreting and applying the law. The separation of 
powers doctrine recommends that these bodies are to a greater or lesser extent kept separate. One of the 
main recommendations of this doctrine is judicial independence—the independence of the judiciary from 
government.  
55 To be clear, there is a difference between preventative self-defensive harming and punishment. The former 
seeks to prevent wrongdoing, the latter is a response to wrongdoing. That said, I will later argue that 
preventing wrongdoing can justify limited rough justice punishment. 
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such that siblings were never able to punish one another or children were unable to 
retaliate to bullies. Intuitively, these cases of punishment do not (other things being 
equal) look to be always impermissible, even in the absence of a legal authority. And if 
these cases are intuitively plausible then I take it that the question of the permissibility 
of rough justice remains an open one, and is not precluded by the legal authority 
objection. 
Third, we can challenge the view that states always possess the monopoly on 
power by appealing to the permissibility of state secession. Secession takes place when 
a state loses its claim to legitimacy (and therefore to possessing the monopoly on 
coercion) and a smaller group secedes to form its own political community. Secession 
generally takes place (and looks to be permissible) when a state persistently persecutes 
a minority group.56 Secession is valuable because it can allow minority groups to escape 
persecution, or it may offer a chance for a smaller political community to reclaim their 
independence from a larger group who have usurped their territory. The permissibility 
of secession challenges the strength of the monopoly on power condition. It does so on 
the grounds that a state loses its legitimacy and thus its claim to the monopoly on power 
by violating the rights of its citizens. And the same applies, in principle, to cases of rough 
justice.  
What, then, to make of the monopoly on authority claim? To be sure, there are 
some reasons for thinking that only the state should be permitted to introduce laws and 
execute punishments in the event that laws are broken. There is certainly something to 
Hobbes’s claim that if the state does not have a monopoly on law-making power then 
conflict may ensure. One can imagine a case in which a number of political bodies are 
making and enforcing laws over a territory, and point to some problems. Which laws 
are binding over which citizens? Are citizens subject to the laws of all of these political 
agents? What if the laws are contradictory? Won’t not these authority-bearing groups 
come into conflict? Even violent conflict?  
Yet I take it that these reasons are contributory reasons against rough justice—
reasons which form a presumption against rough justice in all but the most 
extraordinary of cases. And the extraordinary cases I have in mind are ones in which  the 
state in question is illegitimate, inefficacious or otherwise fails to protect citizens. In these 
circumstances, the state’s claim to possessing a monopoly on force is undermined and 
the presumption against rough justice is weakened. 
                                                                
56 For a limited defence of the moral right of minority groups to secede see Buchanan (1997) and Copp (1998). 
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In this section I have argued that the monopoly of force condition is not absolute 
or unconditional and therefore that it does not preclude the permissibility of rough 
justice in limited cases. This leaves scope for the permissibility of rough justice in cases 
where a state is illegitimate or otherwise fails to protect and promote law and order. 
 
3.2. Instrumental objections 
 
Another set of arguments against rough justice are broadly ‘instrumental’. They 
are instrumental in the sense that they appeal to the potential bad consequences of 
allowing groups or individuals to execute punishments, and claim that these 
consequences are sufficiently problematic that rough justice should never be permitted. 
One set of instrumental objections concerns the potential for miscarriages of 
justice. We can note at least three objections: i) the potential for innocents to be punished, 
and, ii) the potential for punishments to be disproportionate to the wrongdoing and iii) 
the potential costs to those who administer rough justice—for instance, the threat of 
retaliation or the costs of psychological trauma. 
The first challenge—that rough justice may falsely punish the innocent - is 
exacerbated by the fact that rough justice will typically not be subject to the same 
procedures of fair trial (with burdens of proof, fair representation, impartial judges, and 
so on) which are constitutive of official procedures carried out by legal authorities. One 
thing to note, though, is that even with such procedures, official state legal institutions 
still falsely imprison individuals.57 Moreover, there is no reason to think that rough 
justice practices cannot be subject to some form of trial procedure which will mitigate 
the chances that the innocent will be punished. The point to emphasise is that the mere 
chance of punishing an innocent cannot be sufficient to undermine the permissibility of 
punishment because if it were, then state punishment would be impermissible. Instead, 
the possibility of punishing the innocent could inform a set of conditions on the way in 
which rough punishment is carried out, a point I discuss in more depth below.   
The second instrumental objection is that rough justice punishments will 
inevitably be disproportionate to the degree of wrongdoing. That the punishment fit the 
crime is an intuitive principle of justice. It is clearly unjust for murderers to receive a 
                                                                
57 It is difficult to get exact figures on the number of false convictions, though one study in America which 
includes a ‘conservative’ failure rate of 0.5% estimates that in one year there were 9,969 false convictions out 
of 1,993,880 (Huff, Rattner, & Sagarin, 1996, pp. 53-62). 
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week’s imprisonment, or for traffic offenders to be punished with thirty years 
imprisonment. Underpinning this is the thought that the degree of punishment should 
be proportionate to the severity of the wrongdoing. And because rough justice will likely 
enforce disproportionate punishments, it is impermissible, according to this argument.  
One way of meeting this objection is to emphasise that judgements of 
proportionality are difficult even in an official legal setting. In what sense is 30 years 
imprisonment proportionate to murder. Or 20 years to rape. Or in what sense is the 
severity of a traffic offence proportionate to a small monetary fine. These proportionality 
judgements make sense considered ordinally—that is, relative to one another in the sense 
that more severe offences should be met with a relatively more severe sentences (and 
vice versa for less severe sentences). But it is extraordinarily difficult to say with any 
certainty that punishments are proportionate considered cardinally—i.e. that 30 years 
imprisonment fits the severity of murder.58  
The point of these observations is to suggest that making punishment 
proportionate is not unique to rough justice practices, but is a notoriously difficult aspect 
of official sentencing decisions as well. Those in charge of official sentencing seek to 
achieve a ‘best fit’ where this factors in the severity of the wrongdoing, the deterrent 
capacity of the sanction, amongst other factors. In principle, of course, this applies to 
rough justice as well. Rough justice practices may be subject to ‘best fit’ proportionality 
requirements. These could include prohibitions on disproportionately severe 
punishments—for instance death penalties for minor theft. I take it, then, that the 
disproportionate punishments objection is not sufficient to undermine the permissibility 
of rough justice, if it is then why does it not undermine the permissibility of official legal 
punishment? Instead, like the punishment of the innocent objection, the 
disproportionate punishment objection would set conditions on how rough justice 
should be carried out (for instance a prohibition on punishment that is 
disproportionately severe).  
Earlier I defined rough justice as having the empirical feature of substantive 
imprecision—that rough justice punishments rarely fit the wrongdoing. Below I will 
develop a limited justification of rough justice which is sensitive to this feature of rough 
justice. I will recommend what I term a ‘principle of parsimony’ as a condition on rough 
                                                                
58 For a discussion of this problem of proportionality, and an attempt to resolve it, see Davis (1983). 
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justice punishments, which states that agents of rough justice should operate with a 
presumption in favour of more lenient punishments.   
A final set of instrumental objections appeal to the costs of administering 
punitive rough justice for the individuals involved—costs such as the threat of 
retaliation or any physical or psychological dangers involved in administering rough 
justice, for instance. I take it that this objection would be weighty if individuals were 
forced to engage in rough justice. But assuming that individuals have chosen to take part 
in rough justice and are aware of the risks, then this objection loses its force. 
The authority-based and instrumental objections to rough justice are weighty, 
but not sufficiently weighty to render rough justice impermissible. This is largely 
because the same problems are inherent to formal legal institutions as well.59 Moreover, 
these concerns can be mitigated if rough justice practices are altered in such a way as to 
be sensitive to them—by including trials procedures or by setting proportionality 
conditions on punishments. Authority-based and instrumental objections to rough 
justice are thus not sufficiently weighty to preclude the permissibility of such practices. 
Yet meeting these objections is only the first step in a defence of rough justice. The second 
step is to provide some positive justification for why punitive rough justice is 
permissible. This will be the purpose of the following section. 
 
4. Justifying Punitive Rough Justice 
 
In this section I will provide a defence of the limited conditions under which 
rough justice is permissible. Prior to developing my own protection-based account, I 
want to begin by raising some points with respect to another potential option for 
justifying rough justice—the retributive defence. 
 
 
                                                                
59 Goodin (2014, pp. 7-13) develops a number of different arguments as to why formal justice measures are 
‘rough’ as well. These include that the range of punishments are sometimes “rough-grained” in the sense 
that there is not always the option to incarcerate and there is a less extensive range of sanctions; that rough 
justice punishments are disproportionate and that rough justice is “roughly authorised” in the sense that 
some procedures of state authorisation are questionable. 
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4.1. Reasons for skepticism about desert 
 
Retributive justice is most commonly framed in the terms of moral desert.60 
According to this view, it is permissible to impose punishment on wrongdoers because 
this is what they deserve by virtue of their culpable wrongdoing. In terms of rough 
justice, this defence states that when the state fails to bring about a state of affairs 
whereby wrongdoers receive the suffering they deserve, then citizens are justified in 
imposing suffering on wrongdoers through rough justice practices. 
On the face of it, the desert-based account has some attractive features. First, the 
principle that ‘wrongdoers deserve to suffer’ tracks the intuitions that a number of 
people share about how wrongdoers should be treated, particularly those who are 
culpable of serious wrongdoing. Many share the intuition that it would be a grave 
injustice if serious wrongdoing were not met with some form of punishment, and that 
for this reason there is virtue in inflicting suffering on those responsible for egregious 
acts. Returning to a case like that of Gaddafi, many share the intuition that it was right 
and just that Gaddafi suffered as he did, given the horrific acts he himself committed 
and sanctioned. That something would be seriously wrong if Gaddafi were to run free 
from his crimes and be living well somewhere. And that the virtue of this punishment is 
simply that an individual like Gaddafi deserved it. 
While many share this intuition in the case of egregious wrongdoing like that 
carried out by Gaddafi, there are also reasons for denying that desert should be sufficient 
to justify punitive rough justice. To be clear, the particular argument I offer is not a 
knock-down objection to moral desert. Though it does advise caution about appealing 
to the moral value of desert to justify rough justice (and indeed to legal punishment more 
generally). The protection account I move on to defend in the next section does not rely 
on moral desert. 
The argument I will outline against desert is a well know one, which other 
critics have termed the ‘whole-life objection’.61 The whole-life objection targets the view 
which underpins the desert justification that justice requires that an individual’s 
                                                                
60 There are a number of different defences of retributive justice—rights forfeiture (Simmons 1991; Wellman, 
2012), fair play theory (Morris, 1968) and more traditional ‘eye for an eye’ style accounts (such as that 
defended by Kant [2012, p. 106]). Here I will focus on the desert-based view because it is the most common 
defence of retributive justice. For desert-based defences of retributivism see, amongst others Berman (2008), 
Davis (1972), Kleinig (1973), Moore (1997) and Murphy (1973). For a synopsis of the different defences of 
retributivism see Cottingham (1979). 
61 For a detailed discussion of the whole life objection to desert see Tadros (2011, pp. 68-73). 
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treatment (be this in the form of the reception of rewards or the imposition of suffering) 
should be proportionate to their desert.  The whole-life objection states that the decision 
of what an individual deserves should be evaluated in light of a consideration of whether 
this individual has received what they deserve over the course of their entire life. To 
impose deserved punishment in response to wrongdoing in one-off cases is problematic, 
this objection goes, because this may not actually lead to an equal balance of treatment 
and desert. 
W.D. Ross was the first to develop the whole-life objection to desert-based 
retributive punishment. He writes: 
 
What we perceive to be good is a condition of things in which the total pleasure 
enjoyed by each person in his life as a whole is proportional to his virtue similarly 
taken as a whole. Now it is by no means clear that we should help to bring about 
this end by punishing particular offences in proportion to their moral badness. 
Any attempt to bring about such a state of affairs should take account of the 
whole character of the persons involved, as manifested in their life taken as a 
whole, and of the happiness enjoyed by them throughout their life taken as a 
whole… in the absence of such a view of the whole facts, the criminals that a 
retributive theory of state punishment would call on us to punish for the sake of 
doing so may well be persons who are more sinned against than sinning (1930, 
pp. 58-59). 
 
Ross’s point is that unless we have the full facts about a person’s life and the treatment 
they have received, in imposing deserved suffering on wrongdoers we may be 
punishing someone who does not in fact deserve it.  
To better see this objection, consider a more specific example. Suppose an 
elderly individual has lived a selfless life—giving their money to charity, helping those 
in need, being kind and compassionate to everyone they meet—and all of this at great 
personal expense. Suppose further that this individual has lived a life of hardship, 
suffering unjustified abuse and attacks from others (perhaps because of their race, 
gender or religious beliefs). Suppose further still that this individual’s selflessness has 
gone unacknowledged—they have received no reward or recognition for their long life 
of service to others. Finally frustrated by life’s injustices this individual, in an act of 
uncharacteristic anger, steals a small amount of money from another individual to feed 
themselves. In such a case can we still plausibly maintain the intuition that this 
individual deserves to suffer? That imposing punishment would mean that this 
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individual has received the justice they deserved? It seems difficult to maintain that 
justice would require making this person suffer, given the virtuous life they had led. 
The case points to two worries about desert. First, we know too little about an 
individual’s life and about their aggregate levels of desert and treatment to guarantee 
that the punishment they receive amounts to giving them what they deserve. Indeed, we 
may see this as being especially problematic in rough justice cases which lack the trial 
procedures which in part seek to discover the degrees of culpability of offenders. Second, 
if it is true that justice requires punishing the deserving, then why doesn’t justice require 
rewarding the virtuous? That is, why should the elderly individual in the hypothetical 
case be made to suffer for their one uncharacteristic transgression, rather than receiving 
rewards and recognition for all of the virtuous acts they have carried out in the course 
of their life? 
While it seems right to think that the state ought to show a proper concern for 
the wellbeing of its citizens, it is implausible to suppose that the state—or individuals 
outside of it—should be concerned with ensuring that individuals receive exactly what 
they deserve over the course of their lives. And I take it that the burden of proof is thus 
on the defender of desert to explain why this should be the case.  
To reiterate, this worry about desert should not be seen as a knock-down 
objection. It does, however, advise caution about endorsing a desert-based defence of 
rough justice. I take it that the burden of proof is on the defender of desert to explain 
how the whole-life view does not seriously problematise the desert account of 
punishment. 
 
4.2. Prevention, deterrence and restraint 
 
 
In this section I will develop a broadly forward-looking justification of rough 
justice. The account is forward-looking in the sense that it appeals to the potential future 
benefits of punishing wrongdoers to ground a justification of when punishment is 
permitted. The account I defend has two aspects—first, it claims that rough justice is 
permissible if punishing wrongdoers serves to protect innocents by restraining 
wrongdoers, deterring wrongdoers or deterring would-be wrongdoers. Second, it states 
that rough justice may play a significant role in ameliorating the formal justice 
mechanisms of the state, and this serves as a ‘contributory reason’ in favour of enforcing 
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rough justice. These may be termed the ‘prevention-based’ and ‘justice-forcing’ 
principles, respectively. 
To support the view that individuals may punish wrongdoers in the interests 
of protecting innocents I will draw upon some of Locke’s arguments about the natural 
right to punish in the pre-political state of nature. 
 
4.2.1. Insights from state of nature theory—Locke on the natural right to punish 
 
In this section I will consider Locke’s view that individuals are permitted to 
punish wrongdoers in the state of nature—a context absent of a legitimate, effective state, 
and that this permission is grounded in the more basic right to self-protection and 
protection of others.62 The Lockean view is not without problems, however, and in the 
following section I will challenge Locke’s view with a view to amending it to narrow the 
conditions under which punishment is permissible.   
To frame the consideration of Locke, let’s imagine that we find ourselves in a 
community where no effective state exists, where there are laws but they are ineffectual 
in governing conduct and they are not backed up with a credible threat of sanction or 
punishment. Moreover, suppose this context is a fragile and violent one—perhaps due 
to residual violence from factional groups that had been at war with one another, or from 
supporters of a powerful dictator who persecuted minority groups. Violence, thefts and 
assault are common within this context, and due to the absence of effective laws 
members of the community have banded together in rough justice parties to put an end 
to the wrongdoing. 
What are these individuals permitted to do? Locke claims that one of the natural 
rights that individuals possess in the state of nature is that of punishment.63 According 
                                                                
62 Not all state of nature theorists endorse the right to punish in the state of nature. Hobbes rejects it, writing, 
“a punishment is an evil inflicted by public authority, on him that hath done, or omitted that which is judged 
by the same authority to be a transgression of the law” (Hobbes, 2008, p. 241). It follows that private 
punishments between individuals are impermissible. Yet Hobbes also claims that individuals possess a pre-
political right to self-preservation, which they retain in political societies (Hobbes, 2008, p. 97). Supposing 
that punishment is one means for individuals to protect themselves in the absence of a legitimate state (as I 
will argue below it is), it is unclear why Hobbes cannot allow punishments in the interests of self-
preservation. 
63 Importantly, Locke claims that the state of nature exists not only in the absence of a political state, but also 
when a state is illegitimate with respect to citizens. In Simmons terms, “persons can be in the state of nature 
not only before the institution of government, but also after its collapse or during the rule of a despotical 
government” (1991, p. 315). I am assuming here that the state and it’s laws are so ineffective at protecting 
and punishing that it is illegitimate (on any plausible account of legitimacy), and therefore that individuals 
are in a state of nature with respect to one another. 
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to Locke, individuals possess a natural right to inflict punishment on wrongdoers who 
violate natural law by committing rights violations against others without justification. 
In order to understand why the natural right to punish exists in man’s natural state 
outside of political authority, it will help to take a brief detour into Locke’s account of 
the individual rights which exist in the state of nature. 
The state of nature, for Locke, is a context in which “men living according to 
reason, [exist] without a common superior on earth, to judge between them” (2003, p. 
108). It is a context in which no political authority exists to mediate the private disputes 
of individuals. For Locke, while the state of nature is absent of man-made positive law, it 
is governed by natural law. This is God’s law for men on earth (2003, p. 160) which exists 
for the preservation of mankind and imposes a duty on individuals that they “ought not 
to harm another in his life, liberty or possessions” (2003, p. 102). When an individual 
violates this duty, by violating the rights of others, natural law grants individuals the 
right to “execute the law of nature” in the form of the right to punish (2003, p. 103). To 
ensure that rights violations do not take place, natural law is enforceable. If natural law 
were not enforceable then, Locke claims, it would be “in vain” (2003, p. 103), by which 
he means it would be unable to fulfil its function of preserving individual rights and 
‘mankind’ more generally. And it is from this right to enforce natural law that the natural 
right to punish derives. 
Locke acknowledges that the notion of a natural right to punish “will seem like 
a very strange doctrine to some men” (2003, p. 103). One of the ways in which Locke 
meets such concerns is by setting conditions on the right to punish. The first is that the 
right to punish is not a right to use limitless or arbitrary force—individuals do not have 
“arbitrary power to use a criminal, when he has got him in his hands, according to the 
passionate heats or boundless extravagancies of his own will” (Locke, 2003, p. 103). 
Instead, the natural right to punish must be used with careful discretion. 
The natural right to punish may only be exercised if punishment is to serve one 
of the following aims. First, to restrain wrongdoers and thereby prevent them from 
committing culpable rights violations: 
  
That all men may be restrained from invading others’ rights, and from doing hurt 
to one another… the execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every 
man’s hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressor of the law 
to such a degree as may hinder its violation (2003, pp. 102-103). 
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Second, the natural right to punish may be used in the interests of deterring both the 
wrongdoer and other would-be wrongdoers: 
 
Every man may upon this score, by the right he hath to preserve man in general… 
bring evil on anyone, who hath transgressed that law… and thereby deter him 
[the wrongdoer], and by his example others, from doing the like mischief (2003, 
p. 103).  
 
Third, the right to punish may be executed in the interests of retributive justice. The 
natural right to punish may be enforced, 
  
To retribute to him [the wrongdoer], so far as calm reason and conscience 
dictates, what is proportionate to his transgression (2003, p. 103). 
  
From these passages we see that Locke defends the use of the natural right to punish on 
the limited grounds that it serves i) to restrain, ii) to deter the wrongdoer, iii) to deter 
other would-be wrongdoers iv) retributive justice. 
Locke’s account gives us some answers as to what the members of our 
hypothetical community may do. In the absence of a legitimate state, Locke’s defence of 
the natural right to punish permits rough justice on the grounds that it serves one (or 
more) of these four goals. In the following section, I will raise some challenges to the 
Lockean view, with a view to amending his account to respond to some of these 
challenges. 
 
4.2.2. Developing the Lockean view 
 
In this section I want to raise two challenges to the Lockean account of the 
natural right to punish. The first challenge is that there is an incoherence in Locke’s use 
of both retributive and forward-looking reasons for punishing, in many cases these two 
sets of reasons are fundamentally incompatible. The second is that Locke’s view is 
problematically absent of a condition on the reasonable proof of guilt.  I raise these 
challenges with a view to amending the Lockean view in such a way as to strengthen it 
against these objections, and thereby to make the view more plausible as a defence of 
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rough justice. In particular, I want to eventually defend the following necessary 
conditions on punishment:  
 
i) That punishment should serve to protect by restraining, deterring 
wrongdoers and would-be wrongdoers. 
ii) That a person has forfeited their rights against punishment (made 
themselves liable) by committing a rights violation.  
iii) That there is a reasonable guarantee that punishment will protect 
innocents. 
iv) That punishment is proportionate to and does not exceed the level of 
punishment required to prevent further rights violations. 
v) That there should be a presumption in favour of using the minimum 
level of force that can be reasonably deemed to deter certain 
wrongdoing.  
vi) That there have been some procedures put in place to establish the guilt 
of suspects 
 
In this section, I will defend each of these conditions. But I want to start by challenging 
Locke. 
The first challenge to the Lockean view is that it is not clear how the conflicting 
reasons that Locke provides in defence of the execution of the natural right to punish fit 
together. Locke claims that the natural right to punish may be exercised “to retribute to 
him [the wrongdoer]…what is proportionate to his transgression” and also to retrain, 
deter and deter others. But how do these backwards-looking retributive reasons relate 
to the forwards-looking deterrence and restraint-based reasons? Do they not come into 
conflict? 
One case to suggest they do come into conflict is the following. Suppose that 
three individuals exist in a state of nature with respect to one another. One individual A 
attacks another innocent individual I. I is then faced with the decision of whether to 
punish A. I knows that the punishment of A will have a significant deterrent benefit on 
the third individual B. I also knows that only a very small degree of punishment will be 
required to deter and disincentivise B (a good natured person) from committing any 
wrongdoing themselves (a good degree less than that recommended by retributive 
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justice). In this case, the small degree of punishment required to deter conflicts with the 
basic requirement of retributive justice that the punishment fit the crime. The same 
indeed is true for punishments which far exceed the severity of the wrongdoing. 
Suppose I knows that their punishment of A will only deter B if it is extremely severe. 
Punishing A in the interests of preventing B will require a level of sanction that is far 
greater than that allowed by retributive justice.  
The point of these cases is that there are times when the retributive reasons for 
punishing and deterrence or prevention-based reasons will come into conflict. We 
cannot hope that these fundamentally conflicting reasons for punishing will easily fit 
together in all cases. If the only way in which to deter and protect is through 
disproportionate punishment, it is simply not clear which principle we should endorse.64 
For this reason, I think we should amend the Lockean view, and given my 
scepticism about the desert-based retributive view highlighted above I think we should 
ground the justification of punishment on prevention and deterrence. The most plausible 
defence of these reasons for punishment is grounded in considerations of self-protection 
and the protection of other innocents. Consider the following principle: 
 
Protection principle: it is permissible to punish wrongdoers in the interests of 
restraint, deterrence of wrongdoers and deterrence of would-be wrongdoers if 
doing so serves to protect innocents.  
 
There are, however, a number of potential problems with a defence of rough justice 
grounded on the protection principle alone. First, if the value of punishing is that of 
protecting innocents, then why think that only those guilty of wrongdoing should be 
punished? There will be cases where framing and punishing an innocent individual may 
serve to deter others and thereby serve the aims of protection. And if it is protection 
which is doing all of the justificatory work, then why think that this punishment is 
impermissible? 
Locke’s account provides us with a way around this worry in the notion of rights 
forfeiture. For Locke, it is not the case that any individual may be punished in the state of 
nature, but only those who by committing a rights violation against another have 
                                                                
64 The same challenge has been levelled to ‘mixed accounts’ of punishment (defended most notably by both 
Rawls [1955] and H.L.A. Hart [1970], respectively). Mixed accounts seek to combine the retributive and 
broadly consequentialist justifications of punishment into a more coherent justification. For more extended 
criticism of mixed accounts see Boonin (2008, pp. 207-212). 
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forfeited their rights against punishment.65 Another way of putting this is in the terms 
of liability. By committing culpable wrongdoing in the form of a rights violation against 
another, individuals lose their right against being punished and thereby become morally 
liable to punishment. Liability is distinct from desert in a number of ways but chiefly 
because an individual can deserve punishment but not be liable for it. For instance, an 
individual may deserve bad treatment because they are a wicked, but they would not be 
liable for bad treatment because they had not committed a rights violation. Liability 
applies to cases where individuals commit moral (or indeed legal) rights violations, 
whereas desert tracks moral culpability, motive and character.66 
The notion of rights forfeiture provides an argument as to why punishing the 
innocent in the interests of protection is impermissible—innocents have not made 
themselves liable to be harmed because they have not committed a rights violation. It 
also provides a reason as to why only wrongdoers may be punished in the interests of 
protection—namely, that they have made themselves liable by losing their rights against 
punishment (by committing a rights violation). Consider the following principle, 
  
Rights forfeiture principle: it is permissible to carry out punitive rough justice on 
an individual (in the interests of protecting others) only when this individual has 
forfeited their rights against punishment (made themselves liable) by committing 
a rights violation.  
 
Amending the protection account with the forfeiture principle explains why it is 
impermissible to punish the innocent in the interests of protection. I want to suggest that 
rights forfeiture is a necessary condition on punishment. Others, such as Wellman (2012), 
have argued that rights forfeiture is sufficient for punishment. I don’t agree with this 
view. For one, it looks to license punishing individuals for extraordinarily minor acts of 
wrongdoing, requiring rough justice punishment for theft of crisps, for instance. For this 
reason I think forfeiture is only necessary, twinned with other conditions such as 
prevention.  
A second potential difficulty with the protection account is that there may be 
some uncertainty about the protective benefits of rough justice punishment. Given that 
this is an empirical question, it may be difficult to ascertain whether punishment will in 
                                                                
65 For Locke’s account of forfeiture see Locke (2003, p. 110) and for discussion see Simmons (1991). For a 
more developed defence of the rights forfeiture theory see Wellman (2012). 
66 For other differences between liability and desert see McMahan  (2009, p. 8). 
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fact have any protective benefit. And if it doesn’t, then we may wonder whether it is 
permissible for individuals to take on the costs of rough justice punishment, when there 
are no discernible benefits. We can meet this worry with the following principle: 
 
Reasonable chance of protection principle: rough justice is only permissible if there is 
a reasonable guarantee that it will protect innocents by retraining wrongdoers, 
deterring wrongdoers or deterring other would-be wrongdoers from violating 
the moral rights of other innocents. 
 
This principle limits rough justice to cases when there is a clear protective benefit that is 
discernible. Again, I want to defend this as a necessary condition on punishment. 
At this point a third worry may arise that by removing a desert-like, retributive 
requirement that the punishment fit the crime, it looks like any level of punishment is 
permissible in the interests of protection. This is a worry because it seems to permit 
extreme levels of punishment in response to minor crimes, in the interests of preventing 
others—the death penalty for minor theft, for instance. And this is clearly unjust. 
One way around this form of worry is to introduce a further proportionality 
requirement on the level of punishment that is permissible in the interests of deterrence, 
prevention and restraint. To justify such a condition one may appeal to analogous cases 
in which there are proportionality conditions on levels of justified harm. Take a case of 
self-defence. We do not generally believe that any level of violence is permissible in the 
interests of self-defence or defence of others—i.e. that we may kill an attacker to prevent 
them from hitting an innocent person. This is because such a level of force would be 
disproportionate to the level of harm to be prevented. Rather, we include a condition on 
proportionality—that the level of harm used in self-defensive violence must be 
proportionate to, and not unreasonably exceed, the level of harm prevented. Or take a 
case of military intervention. When a state intervenes in the conflict of a foreign state it 
is not the case that any level of force is justified to prevent further violence but only the 
minimum level of force that is required to prevent further harm. Thus it would be 
disproportionate for state A to intervene in state B and kill 10,000 people in the interests 
of saving 1,000 of state B’s citizens. Again, this is because this level of force would be 
disproportionate. 
We can recognise the same proportionality requirement on the justification of 
preventive punishment in the form of the following principle: 
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Proportionality principle: rough justice punishment67 must be proportionate to and 
not exceed the level of punishment required to prevent further rights violations.68 
 
Here, however, a fourth problem arises. This is that there is likely to be uncertainty about 
the level of punishment or restraint that will be required to prevent rights violations. 
This uncertainty is especially likely in the case of rough justice punishments because 
there is not the same evidence as to what level of sanction is sufficient to prevent certain 
rights violations as there are in formal justice systems. In this sense, rough justice has an 
inherent uncertainty, and administrators of rough justice are essentially in the dark. Who 
is to say that three days incarceration will disincentivise property theft? Or that 
whipping an individual for assaulting an innocent victim will prevent such attacks in 
the future? This is a problem that official state systems of punishment will suffer from 
less. State jurisdictions will have reasonable levels of data and research on the deterrent 
capacity of criminal sentences, for instance. And they may amend the level of sentence 
in light of this information. Yet the same evidence is not available for rough justice 
punishments. 
In the face of this uncertainty, there are two ways in which a defence of rough 
justice may go. One could argue that more severe punishments should be the norm, on 
the grounds that such punishments would better deter and ensure protection. Or, one 
could try to defend a presumption in favour of less severe punishments—because in the 
face of uncertainty, justice requires this presumption. I want to defend the latter 
principle on the basis of three arguments—proportionality, that rough justice is prone to 
abuse and that wrongdoers may possess a reasonable excuse or justification for their 
acts. What we want is a principle that can accommodate these difficulties (to be outlined 
further below), and I want to defend the following principle: 
 
Principle of parsimony: in the face of uncertainty about the level of punishment 
that will restrain, deter or disincentivise would-be wrongdoers, there is a 
presumption in favour of the minimum level of force that can be reasonably 
deemed to deter certain wrongdoing.  
 
                                                                
67 To be clear, I do not mean to restrict this condition to rough justice punishments alone, the same condition 
could in principle apply to state punishment. Yet it may be especially important in the case of rough justice—
given the absence of procedural safeguards, rough justice may be prone to abuse. 
68 I take it that this would provide one means of responding to the disproportionate punishment objection 
to rough justice detailed in section 3.2. above.  
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The principle of parsimony is supported by three arguments. The first pertains to the 
proportionality condition elaborated above, in the face of uncertainty about how much 
punishment will prevent, this condition informs a principle which limits the level of 
permissible force. That is, in the face of uncertainty about the balance of harms to 
benefits, the principle of parsimony requires the use of the minimal reasonable harm. 
Second, the condition on minimum punishment would be supported by the fact that 
rough justice is prone to abuse. Given that it may be easy for the administrators of rough 
justice to get carried away and to use excessive punishments, it is prudent to include a 
condition that minimal punishment should be the norm. Thirdly, the minimum 
punishment principle is sensitive to the fact that some wrongdoers may have reasonable 
justification or excuse for particular acts of wrongdoing which may have been missed by 
the absence of a trial. In the face of this potential uncertainty about the culpability of 
wrongdoers, it seems right to start with a presumption that the minimum level of 
punishment should be administered. 
The second challenge to the Lockean account relates to Locke’s treatment of 
how the guilt of wrongdoers is determined in the state of nature. Locke starts his defence 
of the right to punish with the fact of wrongdoing. That is, the discussion of the natural 
right to punish starts with the fact that wrongdoing—in the form of a natural rights 
violation—has taken place, and the guilt of the wrongdoer is not reasonably in doubt. 
Yet suppose, as may well be the case with rough justice, that this guilt is in dispute. 
Locke places no condition on proof of guilt in his defence of the natural right to punish. 
And this is clearly problematic if we apply Locke’s defence to the case of rough justice 
where there may well be occasions when the guilt of a suspect is unproven. One worry 
with the absence of a trial or other procedures to prove guilt in Locke’s account is that it 
makes it more likely that innocents will be punished. 
One way around this worry is to introduce the condition that rough justice is 
only permissible in the event that there has been some attempt to establish the guilt of 
wrongdoers prior to the imposition of punishment. Consider the following principle: 
 
Reasonable certainty of guilt principle: rough justice is only permissible in the event 
that there have been some procedures to establish the guilt of suspects. 
 
Clearly, the justification for such a requirement is that it will mitigate the chance that 
innocent people will be falsely punished by rough justice parties. 
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Yet potential difficulties arise around the nature of this requirement. What are 
the precise details of the procedures to establish guilt? Are we talking about the same 
features of formal legal trials—requirements of procedural justice such as strict 
standards of proof and evidence, juries and judges, rights to fair representation, rights 
to appeal? It is implausible to suppose that these standards will be able to be met by 
those in charge of punitive rough justice. 
Yet suppose less strict standards are introduced—imagine a requirement that 
at least one impartial person is required in procedures to establish the guilt of a suspect. 
Or, where in a case where only one individual has witnessed the crime, they prove the 
guilt to another—i.e. establishing motive, providing evidence of the act. Or that suspects 
are given the opportunity to have their defence heard by a small group of individuals. 
Or suppose that certain features of formal trials are preserved—the presumption of 
innocence, or standards of proof such as the less demanding civil standard of the balance 
of probabilities. It is not inconceivable to have these less strict standards as requirements 
on the permissibility of rough justice.6970 
Indeed, the justification for procedures to establish guilt as a requirement of 
rough justice may be grounded in considerations of protection. If the justification of 
rough justice is that punishing wrongdoers serves to deter would-be wrongdoers then 
presumably practices which falsely punish the innocent will be less successful than 
procedures which apprehend and punish the guilty. Surely practices which only punish 
wrongdoers will have a greater deterrent effect on would-be wrongdoers. And this 
serves as a further protection-based reason in favour of some procedures to establish 
guilt.  
In this section I have challenged the Lockean defence of the natural right to 
punish on two grounds—first, for its mixture of the fundamentally incompatible 
protective and retributive principles and second for including no condition on 
establishing guilt. I did so with a view to developing a narrower account of the 
conditions under which rough justice is permissible. I began by removing the retributive 
condition that punishment is permissible to retribute the wrongdoer with a 
proportionate level of harm. Instead, I placed emphasis on the forward-looking 
                                                                
69 Earlier I argued that an empirical generalisation about rough justice practices is that they are not subject 
to trial procedures. To emphasise, this is only an empirical generalisation, it is not a defining feature. There 
is no reason—other than past experience of rough justice cases—to think that rough justice cannot be subject 
to limited trial procedures. 
70 I will not go into detail about the precise nature of these standards, my point here is simply that it is 
conceivable that they are and indeed ought to be included in rough justice practices.  
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dimension of Locke’s account—that punishment is permissible for restraining 
wrongdoers, deterring them and deterring other would-be wrongdoers. I limited this 
defence with conditions on rights forfeiture, reasonable guarantee of protection, the 
presumption of minimum punishment, and the reasonable assurance of guilt. These 
limiting conditions are designed to limit the level of potential harm that rough justice 
practices may pose to the wrongdoer themselves, and to other innocents who may be 
falsely apprehended by rough justice parties. 
 
5. The Justice-Forcing Defence 
 
Here I will develop a second avenue for defending rough justice practices. More 
particularly, I will develop an argument for rough justice outlined by Goodin (2014, pp. 
13-21) which is based on the idea of what he terms ‘justice-forcing’. This justification 
appeals to the ameliorative effect that rough justice practices may have on official state 
legal institutions. According to this argument, individuals may be permitted to take 
justice into their own hands by punishing wrongdoers if doing so substantially improves 
the justness or effectiveness of an official state legal system. Goodin writes: 
 
Someone might pursue a course of rough informal justice as a “justice-forcing 
strategy”, aimed at inducing changes in a more just direction in the formal 
system of justice (Goodin, 2014, p. 11). 
 
Goodin claims that the justice-forcing defence would be subject to two conditions. First, 
that the practices engaged in are just in themselves, unjust practices cannot permissibly 
be used in pursuit of improvements in official justice. Second, the intention behind rough 
justice practices must be directed towards the improvement of the formal justice system 
(Goodin, 2014, p. 12). 
Goodin gives three examples of rough justice practices which had previously 
served this justice-forcing role: lynch mobs, foreign intervention and the seizure of 
property. I will focus on Goodin’s example of the lynch mob, as this best illustrates the 
justice-forcing potential of punitive rough justice. Lynch-mob justice was justice-forcing, 
Goodin claims, because “lynchings were sometimes in response to a mob’s perception 
that the court’s verdict was… too lenient, by the prevailing standard of morality 
represented by the lynch mob” (2014, p. 12). To be sure, lynch mobs often operated with 
unjust motives (for instance in the lynchings of innocent members of particular racial 
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groups). Yet sometimes lynch mobs also achieved substantive justice in places where no 
formal justice system existed. And it is these cases which meet the ‘justice-condition’. 
Part of the benefit of achieving substantive justice was that they helped to accelerate the 
establishment of a “proper, trustworthy system of law enforcement… in the neglected 
community in which the rough justice occurred” (2014, p. 14). According to the justice-
forcing rationale, then, lynch mob justice may in certain circumstances be permissible 
insofar as it achieves substantive justice and accelerates improvements in formal justice 
practices. 
I agree with Goodin that rough justice can serve this ameliorative, justice-
forcing role. And indeed this role may be especially important in times of transitional 
justice where one of the goals is to improve the formal justice institutions of the state. 
But what role should the justice-forcing defence play in a wider account of rough justice? 
There are three options—justice-forcing could be as i) a sufficient condition for justified 
punishment 71 ; ii) a necessary condition on justified punishment, or iii) a pro tanto, 
contributory reasons in favour of punishment. Here I will defend the latter. 
There are good reasons for scepticism about the view that justice-forcing should 
be a sufficient condition for rough justice. We can imagine cases in which no formal legal 
system exists, and there is no prospect of one existing (or no prospect of improving an 
illegitimate system that does exist), yet where there is still a significant protective value 
from punishing. If justice forcing is taken to be sufficient then punishment is 
impermissible in these cases, even though it may be incredibly valuable (for instance in 
protecting hundreds or thousands of innocents). As I’ve argued above, it is implausible 
to think that punishment is impermissible because no legal system exists, or because there 
is no prospect of improving an existing system.   
The same problem arises if justice-forcing is taken to be a necessary condition 
for punishment. There will be cases when punishment serves a substantive function in 
protecting innocents but when it serves no ameliorative function in improving a state 
legal system. Again, it is implausible that punishment is impermissible in the event that 
it fails to improve a legal system, when the same punishment would serve to protect a 
large number of individuals. We can imagine a case in which punitively retraining a 
wrongdoer will prevent them from harming hundreds, even thousands, of innocents, 
                                                                
71 In places, Goodin endorses the sufficient condition view. For instance when he writes, “someone might 
pursue a course of rough informal justice as a ‘justice-forcing strategy’, aimed at inducing changes in a more 
just direction in the formal system of justice” (Goodin 2014, p.11). 
74 
 
yet where this punishment serves no justice-forcing function. If justice-forcing is taken 
as a necessary condition on punishment then this punitive restraint would be 
impermissible. I take it that this consequence is absurd, and it follows that justice-forcing 
should not be seen as a necessary condition on punishing.   
Instead, I take it that justice-forcing should serve as a contributory reason in 
favour of punitive rough justice. Consider the following principle: 
 
Justice forcing principle (j-f-p): forcing systemic improvements in formal legal 
institutions is a contributory reason in favour of punitive rough justice.  
 
By a contributory reasons I mean a pro tanto reason—a normative reason which may be 
more or less salient in different cases, and a consideration that may be outweighed by 
other conflicting considerations. Justice-forcing, as a contributory reason, serves to 
supplement the protective account defended above. The idea is that it is the protection 
of innocents that serves to justify the infliction of harm of wrongdoers but, other things 
being equal, the idea that this punishment can help to ameliorate formal legal procedures 
serves to add extra justificatory force to support this punishment.  
 
6. Rough Justice and Transitional Justice 
 
In this section, I want to apply the account of rough justice defended in this 
chapter to a transitional justice context. Take the hypothetical case outlined above. 
Suppose we find ourselves in a community where no effective state exists, where there 
are laws but they are ineffectual in governing conduct and are not backed up with the 
credible threat of sanction or punishment. Suppose further that this context is a fragile 
and violent one—perhaps due to residual violence from factional groups that had been 
at war with one another, or because of residual violence from supporters of a powerful 
dictator who persecuted minority groups. Violence, theft and assaults are common 
within this context, and, in response, members of the community have banded together 
in rough justice parties to put an end to this wrongdoing. Suppose that within this 
context our rough justice party finds an individual they suspect to have committed a 
75 
 
rights violation against another innocent individual.72 They are faced with the decision 
about what to do. 
According to the protection-based defence of rough justice, the rough justice 
party are permitted to punish if the individual they meet the following necessary 
conditions on punishment, 
 
i) The punishment serves the end of protection by restraining, 
deterring the wrongdoer or deterring other would-be 
wrongdoers. 
 
ii) Punishment is only directed towards those who have become    
liable (i.e. by forfeiting their right against punishment by violating 
the rights of another). 
 
iii) There is a reasonable guarantee that punishment will protect  
innocents (through retraining or deterring the wrongdoer, or 
other would-be wrongdoers). 
 
iv) The degree of punishment is proportionate to and does not exceed  
the level required to restrain or deter others rights violations. 
 
v) The minimum reasonable level of punishment is applied when  
there is uncertainty about the degree required to restrain or deter 
others. 
 
vi) There have been some procedures to reasonably establish the guilt  
of the suspect, when this is in question. 
 
When these conditions are met, rough justice is permissible. This, twinned with 
the j-f-p principle which adds contributory force, 
 
vii) That punishment may ameliorate the formal justice 
mechanisms of the state. 
 
If we think about the broader relationship between rough justice and the 
process of transition to a more just social order, two things support this protection 
                                                                
72 We may fill in the details of the wrongdoing differently—perhaps the individual has been suspected of 
heinous rights violations—perhaps it is a political leader who has committed genocidal crimes, for instance. 
Or perhaps they are suspected of murder. Or perhaps they are a petty criminal. The only thing that this 
would impact is the degree of punishment that is deemed proportionate to preventing others. 
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rationale. The first is that levels of crime and wrongdoing in the wake of periods of 
conflict, civil war or authoritarian rule will (as a general rule) rise (this is a features of 
transitional justice contexts that I consider in more depth in the following chapter).73 This 
could be due to several factors such as individuals becoming desensitised to violence, a 
scarcity of resources, residual violence, revenge violence, the reluctance of authoritarian 
rulers to relinquish power, amongst others. Both security and protection in post-conflict 
settings are thus key priorities, and the protection defence of rough justice is sensitive to 
this. Second, one of the main goals of political transition is to arrive at a more just legal 
system more generally. Indeed, one of the hallmark features of an illegitimate state is 
when judiciaries are partial, fail to implement fair hearings, serve political aims or 
otherwise violate the requirements of the rule of law. I thus take it that both i) setting 
procedural conditions on how individuals may conduct rough justice and ii) the justice-
forcing defence will be important insofar as they facilitate broader aims of transitional 
justice and legal improvement. That is, given that we want transitional legal systems to 
better protect, and to conform to the requirements of procedural justice and the rule of 
law, these considerations support the protection rationale and the conditions on the 
reasonable assurance of guilt. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
I started this chapter by posing the question: to what extent are citizens permitted 
to take justice into their own hands when the state fails? I have defended the view that 
citizens are permitted to punish wrongdoers to the extent that this serves a protective 
function. I established further conditions on this permission: that the wrongdoer has 
made themselves liable by forfeiting their rights, that punishing serves to protect 
innocents, that punishment is proportionate to the level required to restrain or deter, that 
the minimum reasonable level of punishment is applied and that there have been some 
procedures to reasonably establish the guilt of the suspect. These conditions limit the 
cases in which rough justice are permissible, but if we return to a case like Gaddafi’s 
punishment, we have the basis for a justification of punitive rough justice. To be sure, 
the punishment would be quite different to that which Gaddafi actually received. Yet in 
principle, the account I have developed justifies punishing Gaddafi. 
                                                                
73 To give an example, one study of homicide rates in post-conflict settings found that numbers of deaths 
more than doubled in some countries (Archer & Gartner, 1976). 
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In the following chapter I want to stay with the topic of punishment. Yet I will 
turn from cases of rough justice to examine the forms of punitive practices that 
rudimentary legal systems can engage in to achieve some of the goals of political 
transition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
78 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Transitional Justice, Self-Defence and Punishment 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Transitional justice concerns the processes whereby states seek to move from 
conflict or authoritarian rule towards democracy, while at the same time coming to terms 
with legacies of wrongdoing. One of the central problems of transitional justice concerns 
legal punishment—implementing legal mechanisms to deal with past wrongdoing while 
at the same time promoting law and order and facilitating the transition to a more just 
legal system. 
In this chapter, I will develop a moral justification of state punishment which is 
both philosophically cogent while at the same time sensitive to some of the problems 
endemic to transitional societies. Given that punishment involves the inflicting of harm 
on wrongdoers, it stands in need of justification—it must be shown why inflicting harm 
is permissible. One the main claims of this chapter is that certain features of transitional 
justice contexts—in particular the absence of a legitimate state, and the increased 
propensity of rights violations —illustrate the importance of a view of punishment that 
has some preventative function. And this preventative function serves a central role in 
the justification of punishment I defend. 
The account I develop appeals to the more fundamental right to self-defence to 
explain why it is sometimes permissible to punish wrongdoers. Self-defence accounts of 
punishment74 are all based on the view that individuals have a moral right to defend 
themselves against culpable violations of their moral rights. It follows from this right to 
defend oneself, according to the account I will defend here, that individuals also possess 
a moral right to issue threats against would-be wrongdoers to disincentivise culpable 
                                                                
74 See Alexander (1980), Ellis (2003), Farrell (1990) and Quinn (1985) for different formulations of the self-
defensive view. I will engage with some of these views throughout the chapter, and highlight how my own 
account draws upon and differs from these self-defence accounts.  
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rights violations. When attackers ignore such threats, individuals possess a right to punish 
those who attempt to commit culpable rights violations against them, where this latter 
right is based on deterrence and bolstering the credibility of threats. The purpose of this 
chapter is to defend this account, and then to show how it can meet at least some of the 
problems faced by transitional societies. 
In developing this view, I want to make three important claims. First, and this 
claim runs contrary to the consensus view in the philosophy of punishment, that a 
legitimate state is not required for legal punishment to be permissible. Instead, according 
to the self-defensive view I defend, punishment is permissible in the absence of a 
legitimate state, so long as it serves to protect innocents. Secondly, and relatedly, 
punishment is not only permissible in the absence of a legitimate state, punishment can 
in fact facilitate the move towards a legitimate state. It does this by seeking to reduce the 
levels of wrongdoing and rights violations which pose a serious obstacle to achieving 
democracy, and implementing other measures, in the transitional period. Thirdly, I will 
explain how the self-defensive account can provide the outline of a justification for when 
and why it is permissible to enforce International Criminal Law (ICL). Both the defence 
of the self-defence account, and these three claims, represent the novel arguments in this 
chapter. 
The chapter will run as follows. In the following section I elucidate two features 
of transitional contexts which, I will claim, any account of state punishment within such 
contexts must be sensitive to. In section three I outline the self-defence account. In section 
four I defend the account by responding to a number of objections that have been 
levelled against it by Boonin (2008). In section five I show how the self-defence account 
can provide the basis of a moral justification for a rudimentary system of law backed up 
with punishments. And in section six, I reapply the account to transitional contexts and 
explain how it resolves both of the problems I raised (the absence of a legitimate state 
and the increase in rights violations), and provides the basis for a justification of the 
enforcement of international criminal law. 
 
2. Two Features of Transitional Societies 
 
In this section I will highlight two features of transitional societies which any 
account of punishment must be sensitive to. I draw attention to these features because 
they support a view of punishment which emphasises the reduction of rights violations 
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as a feature of its justification. When the context in question is constituted by political 
instability, injustice and an increased likelihood of severe rights violations, an account 
of punishment which places emphasis on reducing this injustice looks to be especially 
important. And this highlights the plausibility of an account of punishment which serves 
a broadly deterrent function, even if deterrence is not the only feature of the 
justification.75 As I will argue later on, the self-defence view I outline can be sensitive to 
this deterrent goal, while avoiding the problems commonly raised against 
consequentialist versions of the deterrence account—most notably that it violates the 
means principle by using wrongdoers merely as a means to prevent others. 
 
2.1. The absence of a legitimate state and functioning institutions 
 
The first feature of transitional justice contexts is the absence of a legitimate state 
and institutions which function to protect and provide for individuals. To be sure, this 
feature comes in degrees—in some transitional contexts there will be reasonably 
developed state institutions which play some role in protecting and providing for 
citizens, in other contexts these institutions will be almost non-existent. The degree of 
development is not significant to my argument here—what matters is that the 
establishment of a legitimate state is an important goal of transition, and that 
institutions—in particular punitive institutions—must play some role in helping 
transitional states to achieve this aim.  
In the burgeoning literature on the philosophy of punishment, most accounts 
justify practices of state punishment by beginning with the existence of a legitimate state, 
where this means (in part) a set of reasonably sophisticated legal institutions which 
punish individuals for breaking the law. Given the existence of a legitimate state, with 
sophisticated institutions of legal punishment, theorists of punishment seek to provide 
a moral justification for the punitive practices engaged in by legitimate states. Sometimes 
these accounts carry quite radical revisionary implications for how legal institutions 
within modern democracies should be structured. Yet the key point is that this 
                                                                
75 Another candidate for a wrongdoing-reducing account of punishment is the moral education theory e.g. 
(Hampton, 1984), which appeals to the educative power of punishment in reforming wrongdoers and 
thereby reducing the likelihood of reoffending. I will not engage with this account here both for reasons of 
space and also because there has been forceful criticism of the moral education view already (see for instance 
Boonin [2008, pp. 180-191]). The key criticism is that it is simply not clear why the moral education theory is 
a theory of punishment at all insofar as it lacks the crucial justification of harm element which is essential to 
an account of punishment. Given that we can educate wrongdoers, without imposing on them the sorts of 
harm essential to the practice of punishment, it is simply not clear why the moral education view offers a 
justification of punishment at all.  
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assumption remains the same—namely, that a legitimate (generally democratic) state 
exists and with it a set of sophisticated institutions charged with dispensing justice. 
But the same model, premised on the existence of a legitimate state, is not 
applicable to cases of transitional justice. When we come to consider the permissibility 
of punishment within transitional contexts, we see that the assumption of the state, let 
alone a legitimate state, is problematic. Commonly, within such contexts, the developed 
institutions which we normally believe to be essential for anything like a recognisable 
state are not in place, or if they are then it is often the case that these institutions do not 
operate with moral justification in the wake of illegitimate rule.76 Indeed, the challenge 
for transitional societies is precisely that of how to bring into existence a legitimate state—
with institutions which legitimately govern, protect and provide for individuals. 
The many theorists in the philosophy of punishment who believe that the 
existence of a legitimate state is a necessary condition for the permissibility of 
punishment 77  may simply deny that punishment is permissible within transitional 
justice contexts. This may be because the absence of a political body with the moral right 
to rule undermines the permissibility of institutions which dispense punishment. Or it 
may be because of the impermissibility of private, interpersonal punishments.78 Or it 
may be because punitive practices that are not carried out by legitimate, regulated state 
institutions may be prone to barbarity and abuse, for instance (I highlighted some such 
instrumental objections in the chapter on rough justice). 
The self-defensive view I outline below claims, on the contrary, that legal 
punishment is not only permissible when a legitimate state does not exist, but more 
strongly still that the establishment of a legitimate state can be facilitated through 
justified practices of threats and punishments. This is the case when the system in 
                                                                
76 An example of this would be the introduction of unjust Sharia law systems in Iraq and Syria by the terrorist 
organisation ISIS. See Saul (2015) for a discussion of ISIS’s legal system.  
77 A number of writers in the philosophy of punishment hold this view that the existence of legitimate state 
is a necessary condition of justified legal punishment. See, for instance, Boonin: 
Whatever we might think about the coherence or existence of other forms of punishment, it is clear 
that a punishment cannot be a legal punishment, in particular, unless it is carried out by an 
authorized agent of the state acting in his or her ofﬁcial capacity, Call this the ‘‘authorization 
requirement” (2008, p. 24). 
And Duff writes: 
Any normative theory of punishment depends on some more or less articulated conception of the 
state (2001, p. xviii). 
78 Lyons, for instance, argues against private punishments (particularly Locke and Nozick’s formulation of 
the right to punish) in claiming that, “it is not generally accepted that I have a right simply to hurt another 
who has done something wrong, just because he has done it, where there is no special relation between us” 
(1976, p. 210). 
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question serves to deter a significant number of wrongdoers from committing culpable 
rights violations against innocent individuals in fragile political contexts. If this 
rudimentary system of threats and punishments is able to achieve the end of protecting 
innocents, then the permissibility of punishment is not contingent on the existence of a 
legitimate state. Given that the establishment of a legitimate state is a central aim of 
transitional justice, this position is important, as I will argue further below. 
 
2.2. The increase in rights violations 
 
The second feature of transitional states which bears on the permissibility of 
punishment is the increased number of rights violations. To be sure, the number of rights 
violations may be less than had previously taken place under oppressive or illegitimate 
rule or in times of conflict, though this is sometimes not the case. Either way, the threat 
to life and to property often persists in transitional contexts, and pockets of violence 
commonly still exist in the wake of conflict, civil war or oppressive rule.  
Take the following statistics on the levels of violence in post-conflict states from 
a 2011 United Nations report: 
 
In parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, while the country was 
apparently on the road to peace in 2003–2004, widespread fighting between 
armed groups still continued, as did widespread human rights violations, 
including ethnic massacres and sexual violence. In Burundi, even after the 
signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, war 
crimes and other grave violations of human rights continued unabated... In 
Northern Ireland in 2006, eight years after the signing of the “Good Friday 
Agreement,” the Independent Monitoring Commission … noted continued, 
albeit significantly reduced, residual paramilitary violence … In Kosovo, after 
the NATO-led intervention in 1999, Kosovar Albanians who were believed to 
have collaborated with the former Serb authorities were targeted in revenge 
killings. Attacks were also perpetrated on the Serb minority in an attempt to 
drive them out of Kosovo and to frighten Serb refugees from returning to Kosovo 
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2011, p. 16) 
 
And the following description of the case of El Salvador is particularly stark,  
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The example of El Salvador is notorious: on average, more persons died a violent 
death in the first four years of peace than during the civil war itself (Chr. 
Michelsen Institute, 2008). 
 
The main implication figures like these carry for an account of punishment in transitional 
contexts is that it supports the view that punishment should play some role in decreasing 
the threat of such rights violations. That is, a system of law and order (however 
rudimentary) that played no role whatsoever in reducing rights violations would clearly 
be problematic. Individuals would have a justified complaint against such a system if 
it’s existence did nothing to prevent the threat of violence, theft, and so on against them, 
especially given that such threats are more likely. This highlights the plausibility of a 
system which plays some role in reducing the level of culpable rights violations in 
transitional contexts. 
To be sure, this does not yet show that a deterrence, self-defence-based account 
of punishment is morally permissible—but it does shift the burden of proof against those 
that deny that institutions of punishment should play any protective role whatsoever. 
This is to say that an account of punishment that is purely retributive or ‘backwards-
looking’, and places no weight whatsoever on the role that a system of punishment plays 
in reducing the occurrence of wrongdoing, would be seriously limited in transitional 
contexts where there is a more serious likelihood of severe rights violations.79 
In the next section I will develop an account of punishment which is sensitive to 
this deterrent, wrongdoing-reducing function, which is grounded in the more basic right 
to self-defence. I will later show how this account can be sensitive to the two features of 
transitional states that I have highlighted in this section. My claim will be that it is 
through the introduction of a rudimentary system of law and order which issues threats 
backed up by punishments, that transitional societies can decrease rights violations and 
in doing so facilitate the process of moving towards a legitimate state. 
 Another point to address is why I do not endorse a straightforward deterrence-
based view, according to which the function of punishing a wrongdoer is to deter other 
would-be wrongdoers. There are a number of well-worn objections to purely deterrent-
based views of punishment—that they can justify scapegoating and punishing the 
innocent, that they unjustifiably use wrongdoers merely as a means to deterring others, 
                                                                
79 One worry here may be that this looks uncharitable. But its not clear that it is uncharitable to views that 
completely deny that institutions of punishment should play a protective role. In any case, my point here is 
simply that the burden of proof is on those who deny that punishment should play a protective function, 
especially with respect to cases where right violations are more likely. 
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that they recommend grossly disproportionate degrees of punishment, amongst other 
challenges. The particular issue I have with purely deterrence-based views of 
punishment is that they bypass the agency of wrongdoers in their view of why 
punishment is justified. That is, in focussing solely on the future benefits of punishment, 
deterrence-based views bypass offender’s agency—whether they carried out the offence 
as a fully responsible agent, whether they had any excuse or justification, whether they 
intended the offence, whether they knew or should have known that what they were 
doing was wrong. All of these things are incidental in the deterrence-based view, and it 
is for this reason that I do not endorse a pure deterrence view. Instead, the self-defence 
view preserves the importance of human agency in its justification of when it is 
permissible to harm a wrongdoer, as I explain in more depth below.  
 
3. An outline of the self-defence account 
 
In this section I will outline the self-defence account of punishment. To begin 
with, consider a standard case of justified self-defence: 
 
An attacker (A) attempts to violently and culpably attack a Victim (V) and the only 
way for V to defend themselves is through engaging in preventative self-
defensive violence again A. 
 
Most agree80 that B possesses a moral right to engage in this preventative self-defensive 
violence, on the condition that this violence is proportionate to that which is required to 
neutralise/ stop the attack, and that this violence is a last resort in preventing the 
unprovoked attack81. In other words, V does not act impermissibly by preventatively 
                                                                
80 One exception to this ‘most’ would be staunch pacifists. I will not engage with the pacifist’s arguments 
against the use of violence here. 
81 These two conditions—the ‘proportionality’ condition and the ‘last resort’ condition—are defended by 
most writers on self-defence, and they are also required by law to permit self-defence in most jurisdictions. 
The ‘proportionality’ condition limits the degree of violence that is permissible in cases of self-defence. If an 
attacker threatens to steal a victims purse, then it would be disproportionate to kill the attacker—this level 
of self-defensive violence would not be permissible because disproportionate. There is some disagreement 
about where the threshold of proportionate violence lies, though I will assume that there is a level of violence 
that is intuitively proportionate and a level of violence that is intuitively disproportionate (I discuss the 
question of what constitutes a proportionate level of punishment below). The ‘last resort’ condition also 
limits the type of self-defensive violence that is permissible. It dictates that violence can only be used in self-
defence as a last resort. Thus if a victim is able to prevent an attacker by signalling a nearby police officer, 
instead of engaging in violence, then they must do so. It would not be permissible for them to engage in 
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attacking A in self-defence, and the reason for this is that V is in possession of a moral 
right to self-defence, a right they may execute in the prevention of culpable attacks 
against them. 
The self-defence account of punishment I shall defend in this chapter states that 
the same right to self-defence informs a justification of punishment in the form of a 
system of threats, backed up with punishment in the event the threat is ignored. Clearly, 
though, the immediate problem arises that there is a significant moral difference 
between self-defensive violence and the use of punishment to protect individuals. This 
is because where self-defensive violence aims to prevent a particular attack, an act of 
punishment is in response to a past act of wrongdoing. 
The challenge for those who defend a self-defensive account of punishment is 
thus to explain how the same right to self-defence which justifies preventive violence in 
the interpersonal self-defence cases can justify acts of punishment which respond to past 
wrongdoing. 
The account that I will defend here relies on the notion of a right to threaten.82 The 
account states that if it is true that we have a right to engage in proportionate self-
defensive violence, then we possess a right to threaten—to issue credible threats of harm 
in the interests of deterring potential aggressors from engaging in wrongdoing against 
us. The right to punish, on this view, arises when threats are ignored by wrongdoers.  
Defending this view requires a defence of two independent claims: 
 
i) V possesses a moral right to issue threats against A in the interests of 
dissuading A from committing a rights violation against them. 
ii) In the event that A ignores this threat, V possesses a moral right to 
enforce the threat through the imposition of punishment on A. 
 
In the remainder of this section, I will defend both of these principles. 
 
 
                                                                
violence if there are other, less violent means of preventing an attack. I will discuss this condition in more 
depth with respect to the right to threaten below. 
82 For similar self-defensive accounts premised on the right to threaten see Quinn (1985), Farrell (1995) and 
Ellis (2003).  
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3.1. The right to threaten 
 
I will begin by offering three reasons in favour of the right to threaten in the 
interests of self-defence. Together these reasons support the view that individuals 
possess a moral right to threaten would-be wrongdoers in the interests of self-defence. 
 First, we can provide some support for the right to threaten by observing certain 
practices which involve permissibly issuing threats with a view to disincentivise forms 
of behaviour.  Think of the erection of a fence to protect private property with the 
attachment of a sign ‘beware of the dog, he will bite’. Or signs on private land 
threatening vehicle clamping if an individual parks in that location. In these cases, it is 
not only the issuing of a verbal threat that looks permissible, it is the attachment of a 
significant physical disincentive 83  to deter certain behaviour which also looks 
permissible. Thus if an individual were to actually purchase a vicious guard-dog and 
place it behind the fence, or if clamps were imposed on cars, these activities do not 
obviously look to be morally problematic, given that a prior threat has been issued and 
given that the actual decision about whether or not to engage in a particular action is left 
down to the would-be wrongdoer themselves. 
More controversial examples would be a ‘trespassers will be shot’ sign, or the 
erection of a set of severely harmful spikes behind a wall, with the issuing of the threat 
that these spikes will cause significant harm to those who scale the wall. These measures 
are controversial because they look to violate the proportionality condition, yet in some 
cases they may be permissible—and this point depends on the threshold of 
proportionate harm. The main point is that in certain cases it looks to be permissible not 
only to introduce a verbal threat, but to back up this threat with substantial disincentives 
to deter particular actions. And the reason underpinning this is that individuals possess 
a basic moral right to self-protection and protection of property. If the right to threaten 
holds in these minor cases of trespassing and parking on private land, then it certainly 
holds in more serious cases of wrongdoing (i.e. serious rights violations). 
Second, threatening self-defensive violence does not violate a would-be 
attacker’s rights. There is nothing in the act of saying “if you attempt violent act X, I will 
                                                                
83 There is an important distinction between a purely verbal threat (i.e. a bluff) and a verbal threat backed 
up with physical disincentives. I will not talk in any depth about the permissibility of bluffing in this chapter. 
I take it that bluffing, if it is sufficient to deter, would be preferable to actually harming individuals. But I 
take it that in the real world, bluffing will not be sufficient, it will eventually be found out and the deterrent 
force of the threat would be lost. I will return to the issue of bluffing in places, though as I note will not 
dwell on it in any depth, because nothing in my argument hangs on the permissibility of bluffing. 
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prevent you through self-defensive action Y” that violates a would-be attackers rights. 
No one has a moral right against a justified threat. And if the attacker makes an 
unjustified attempt, they have forfeited their right against being (preventatively) 
threatened.  
Yet one may still have a reasonable worry that even if the issuing of a threat is 
not a rights violation, it may still be morally problematic insofar as it imposes a harm on 
a would-be wrongdoer. Farrell (1995, p. 228) has raised this point, noting that the 
levelling of a threat in fact involves the imposition of two forms of harm (or as he terms 
them ‘evils’). First, is the harm of limiting the set of choices available to a wrongdoer (i.e. 
by putting a disincentive on one course of action), second is the harm of imposing fear 
on a would-be wrongdoer about the consequences of following the course of action 
which the threat is attached to.  
The most plausible response to this form of worry is to appeal—as Farrell does 
(1995, p. 228)—to a principle of distributive justice which holds that in a two-way choice 
over the distribution of harms (in the form of fear and limited choices), justice requires 
that innocent victims do not suffer harms but that these harms are distributed to those 
responsible for posing the initial threat of attack (A). That is, supposing that the choice 
is between not levelling the threat, whereby an innocent individual suffers from limited 
choice and fear of attack, or the levelling of a threat, whereby the would-be wrongdoer 
suffers from limited choices and fear, justice requires that the individual responsible for 
posing the initial wrongful threat suffers the burden (Farrell, 1995, p. 228). Although the 
levelling of a threat entails a harm, the innocent individual is justified in levelling the 
threat and imposing the burden of fear on the would-be wrongdoer to distribute these 
harms away from themselves. This avoids the worry that threatening is impermissible 
because it entails the imposition of harms. 
A third reason in support of the right to threaten is that threatening would-be 
attackers is less harmful than actually engaging in self-defensive violence against them. 
To see this consider the following case: 
 
Suppose that A is about to culpably attack and kill V. V has two options to 
prevent this attack: he may either break A’s arm or issue a threat to break A’s 
arm. Both options would be equally as effective at preventing the attack. 
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Clearly, on the assumption that it is in fact correct that both courses of action would be 
just as effective at preventing the attacker, V would clearly be obliged to issue a threat 
to A, and not to break A’s arm. This is because the issuing of threat is less harmful than 
actually carrying out the attack. And, other things being equal, we are obliged to choose 
the option that involves the least harm (this is required by the conditions of last resort 
and proportionality).  
Together, these arguments support the claim that individuals: i) do not act 
impermissibly when they issue a threat to would-be attackers and, more strongly, ii) that 
individuals have a right to issue threats in the event that they are faced with an 
unjustified threat against them. By levelling such a threat against would-be wrongdoers, 
they do not act unjustly when their safety is under threat. The right to preventatively 
threaten is grounded in the more basic right to self-defence. The more controversial 
right, of course, is that of enforcing the threat through punishment in the event that the 
threat is ignored and an attack is carried out. I turn now to defend the right to punish. 
 
3.2. The right to punish 
 
In this section I will defend the view that individuals possess a right to punish in 
the event that a threat is ignored. I will claim that the right to punish is derived in part 
from the need to bolster the credibility of a threat and in part to ensure the deterrent 
capacity of threat-levelling. If an individual possesses a right to preventatively threaten 
self-defensive harm in the interests of self-defence, then they also possess a correlative 
moral right to impose punishment in the event that a threat is ignored. And this latter 
moral right, I will claim, is grounded in forward-looking considerations of prevention 
and general deterrence.  
Before developing this account, I want to consider an alternative account of why 
the right to punish derives from the right to threaten. This has been developed by 
Warren Quinn (1985) who claims that the right to punish can be derived from the right 
to threaten by appealing to the notion of a ‘conditional intention’. I consider the 
conditional intention account here, because the limits of this account illustrate how a 
more plausible, forward-looking account of the right to punish may look, an account I 
will develop further below. 
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3.2.1. The conditional intention account 
 
The conditional intentional account grounds the right to punish on the 
independent right to threaten (Quinn, 1985, pp. 361-373). In the act of levelling a threat 
against a would-be wrongdoer, this account states, we form a conditional intention to 
actually enforce the threatened harm in the event that the wrongdoer ignores the initial 
warning. In effect, we state: “if you do x, we will do y” where x is the attempted attack 
(or any rights violation) which the threat seeks to dissuade and y is the retaliatory harm 
of punishment. In making this justified threat, we commit ourselves (form a ‘conditional 
intention’) to actually carry out the threatened attack in the event that it is ignored. 
Quinn writes: 
  
If the urgency of self- protection makes moral room for threats it also make moral 
room for punishment… It is possible to hold that punishing a criminal for a crime 
does not violate his rights because subjecting him to the threat of punishment for 
such a crime did not violate his rights in the first place (Quinn, 1985, p. 370). 
 
The reason for this, Quinn claim, is that we form a conditional intention to 
actually carry out the threat at the time of threatening. Quinn’s setting out of the 
argument has a number of steps, though the basic structure is as follows: if an innocent 
individual is justified in forming a conditional intention to harm in levelling a threat, 
and is justified in retaining this intention at each stage of the process—from levelling a 
threat to actually enforcing the threat—then the attacker cannot object when this 
punishment comes about. And the reason for this, Quinn claims, is that the in levelling 
a threat the victim forms a conditional intention and this conditional intention carries 
forward to justify the actual harm, in the event the threat is ignored (Quinn, 1985, p. 364).  
This account of the right to punish appeals to backwards-looking considerations 
rather than the pursuit of further goods in explaining the right to punish. The 
justification of punishment looks back to the fact that a conditional intention was made 
in the past and uses this intention to explain why it is permissible to enforce the threat 
through punishment, after the threat has been ignored. 
The problem with this defence of the right to punish is that the formation of a 
conditional intention is not sufficient to actually permit us carrying out the punishment 
in the event that the threat is ignored. This is because right up to the point where we 
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have to make the decision about whether to actually enforce punishment, we possess a 
choice. And this choice must be justified at the point of punishing. To see this consider 
the following case: 
 
Suppose that V levels a threat against A to impose harm on them if they steal her 
handbag. Suppose further that in levelling this threat V forms a conditional 
intention to actually carry out this harm in the event the threat is ignored. A 
ignores the threat and decides to steal the handbag. A is, however, caught by V, 
and V is now faced with the choice about whether to punish A. 
 
What reason would V now have for punishing A? The conditional intention account 
states that the fact V made a conditional intention at the time of a threat carries moral 
force in justifying punishment at the time of the decision over whether to punish.  
The problem is that it is simply not true that the fact that V intended something 
in the past gives them any justification to do something harmful in the present. Suppose 
I form a conditional intention (justifiably) to kill someone at t1. Does the fact that I have 
intended this in the past contribute anything to my being justified in actually killing that 
individual at t2? Clearly not. What matters is whether I am justified at t2 , and my past 
intentions contribute nothing to that justification. Tadros has developed a very similar 
objection to the conditional intention account, he writes that, 
 
The difﬁculty with this [conditional intention] argument is that human agency is 
not mechanical. If I form a conditional intention that I will break your leg if you 
destroy my car, once you destroy my car I retain a choice whether to break your 
leg. Furthermore, at least if I am being rational, the reason that I had for making 
the threat cannot provide a reason to carry it out (Tadros, 2011, p. 271). 
 
The conditional intention account thus fails to generate a right to punish from the right 
to threaten. An alternative version of the self-defence account appeals to the forward-
looking values of deterrence in deriving the right to punish from the right to threaten. I 
turn next to develop this account. 
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3.2.2. Deterrence and the creditability of threats account 
 
In this sub-section I will set out an alternative version of the self-defence account. 
We may begin this defence of the right to punish by observing that in order for threats 
to work at deterring wrongdoers they must be credible.84  This is not necessarily to 
suggest that bluffing is impermissible. In an ideal world bluffing without actually 
harming someone would be optimal. Yet it is to suggest that in the real world constant 
bluffing would likely be inefficacious and would render threat-making pointless. 
Suppose I issue a threat against an attacker at t4 having previously levelled a number of 
threats at t1, t2, t3 without actually punishing the attackers who ignored them. My threat 
at t4 would be baseless, the attacker would see that my previous threats were not credible 
and would have very little reason to not carry out the attack. The best means of making 
threats effective, then, is by actually enforcing them in the event they are ignored. And 
this provides us with one reason to actually enforce the threat.85 
Yet here a worry arises that this defence of the right to punish looks to justify 
using wrongdoers as a means of deterring other would-be wrongdoers. This is 
problematic because it looks to be in violation of the ‘merely a means principle’. The merely 
a means principle is a principle of justice which states that it is morally impermissible to 
treat an individual in such a way as to use them merely as a means to some further end. 
And, the objection runs, if we punish wrongdoers solely for the reason of bolstering the 
effectiveness of future threats then we are impermissibly using them as a means to this 
end—namely, preventing others by ensuring our threats are credible. 
If we endorse the judgement that it is impermissible to use individuals merely as 
a means in this way, then we agree with the ‘merely a means principle’.86 We can see the 
                                                                
84 Farrell makes an analogous point when he writes: 
Our threats will deter only if they are credible and... credibility often requires both a readiness to 
act on one’s threats and actually acting on them once they have been ignored (Farrell, 1995, p. 222). 
85 One objection here would be to appeal to cases of nuclear deterrence, where states successfully bluff to 
deter one another. The objection being that consistently bluffing seems to work, and does not weaken a 
deterrent threat. My sense here is that the reason nuclear deterrence is so effective is due to the scale of 
potential harm. Thus if the threat is nuclear holocaust—where civilisation itself is at stake—we may think 
that bluffing would be extremely useful at deterring. But the same doesn’t apply to the bluff of proper 
punishment, proportionate to the threatened harm. 
86 The qualification of merely is very important in the formulation of the merely a means objection. It captures 
the notion that it is not impermissible to use individuals as a means, so long as we do not treat them only as 
a means. After all, we use one another as a means all the time—patients use doctors as a means of gaining 
treatment, a car salesman uses and is used by his customers to make a profit/ buy a car. These cases are not 
problematic because the individuals within them have a choice about the transaction and because their 
autonomy is being respected. The problem of using people as a mere means is that the element of choice is 
withdrawn and individuals are not respected as valuable agents. We can imagine for instance a variation of 
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force of the merely a means principle with the following set of cases—the trolley case and 
the bridge case: 
 
Trolley case: a train driver is travelling down a track when he notices his brakes 
have been cut. Travelling at an unstoppable speed he notices that the track ahead 
splits in two—five people are down the track he is travelling on, one person is on 
the other track. If the driver does nothing he will kill the five people, if he diverts 
the trolley he will kill the one person, saving the five. 
 
Bridge case: a train driver is travelling down a track when he notices his brakes 
have been cut. On the track ahead are five people, and if the train is not halted 
they are sure to be killed. On a bridge above the track are two people—one is a 
large man, big enough to stop the train carriage if he is pushed on to the track, 
the other is a smaller, stronger individual who while not big enough to stop the 
train themselves is strong enough to push the larger man in front of it, again 
saving the five.87 
 
When faced with this twin set of cases many share the intuition that while it is 
permissible for the driver to divert the train in the trolley case, it is not permissible for 
the smaller man to push the larger man on the track to halt the train. And this is because 
many believe the merely a means principle to be correct—that while it is sometimes 
permissible to pursue good consequences where harm to an individual is a foreseeable 
but unintended consequence, it is not permissible to intentionally use an individual merely 
as a means to achieving good consequences.88 
It is important to make this brief detour to the merely a means principle because 
it shows why the credibility of threat defence of the right to punish seems to be morally 
problematic. When we punish those who have ignored a threat with a view to 
supporting the efficacy of future threats we appear to be intentionally using them merely 
                                                                
a case in which a doctor is forced to write a prescription by gunpoint—in this case the agency of the doctor 
is bypassed and they are used merely as a means. 
87  Tadros (2011, p. 115) uses these twin cases in his discussion of the mere means principle, and my 
presentation of the principle is similar to his. 
88 There are different versions of the means principle and different arguments for why using people merely 
as a means is wrong. The version I have defended here is the most common formulation of the objection, 
though for a more detailed engagement with the different versions of the means principle see (Tadros, 2011, 
pp. 113-138). 
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as a means to pursuing a future good, where the good here is deterring other potential 
wrongdoers. In effect, we say to a wrongdoer: “I have to punish you, because if I did not 
the others would not be deterred the next time I level a threat. Your punishment is 
valuable to the extent that it will support the effectiveness and credibility of my levelling 
future threats”. Yet just as it is wrong to intentionally push the larger man to save the 
five in the bridge case, it is wrong to intentionally punish the one wrongdoer to pursue 
the good of deterring others by making threats more credible. The reason being that in 
both cases we are intentionally using an individual merely as a means.89 
While the means principle poses a serious objection to the ‘credibility of threat’ 
account, there is a way around it. To begin with, consider a particular example that is 
well used in the literature on self-defensive punishment.90 This is the example of the 
‘automatic retaliatory device’: 
 
Suppose that after a number of attempts against them, V designs an automatic 
retaliatory machine which responds to attempts by imposing retaliatory harm on 
wrongdoers. Suppose further that once set in motion, V is unable to prevent the 
machine from imposing retaliatory harms. V clearly publicises the fact that they 
have this retaliatory machine, and that it imposes harms, to disincentivise would-
be wrongdoers. 
 
Would V be permitted in actually activating the machine? Or would V be impermissibly 
using offenders as a mere means if the retaliatory machine were to impose harm on them 
in the event that they ignore a threat? To be sure, if the only reason the machine is 
activated is deter others then we may think that wrongdoers are being unjustifiably used 
as a mere means. But this isn’t the case (and indeed such a defence would look more like 
a straightforward deterrence account of punishment). The machine is activated for two 
reasons: i) to support the credibility of threat-making and ii) to inflict harm on those who 
ignore a threat. Importantly, within this protective function of the machine, wrongdoers 
are not treated merely as a means. The wrongdoer is punished because they chose to 
take an informed risk by ignoring a pre-existing threat and attempting to attack an 
innocent individual. While it is true that the overall purpose of the retaliatory machine 
                                                                
89 To be sure there are a number of dissimilarities between the punishment and bridge cases. The thing that 
interests me here is the analogous feature that in both cases an individual is being treated merely as a means.  
90 The example of the auto-retaliatory device is also employed by Alexander (1980), Ellis (2003) and Quinn 
(1985). 
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is to prevent future wrongdoing, those who attempt to violate victims are punished for 
their choice to commit wrongdoing—it is therefore not the case that wrongdoers are 
being punished merely as a means91 to prevent others. They are being punished i) because 
they ignored a justified threat (and thus their agency is being respected) and ii) to deter 
others (and to bolster the credibility of threats in line with this aim). 
 My claim is that all of these features are necessary for punishment to be 
permissible—that a threat has been ignored, that an act of wrongdoing has therefore 
taken place, and that punishment serves some deterrent function. We require the 
condition on an ignored threat to preserve the importance of agency in the view of 
justified punishment (and to avoid the mere means objection). And we require the 
condition on prevention because without some preventative benefit individuals would 
have no reason to erect a retaliatory system. Yet these elements should not be seen to be 
sufficient. In what follows I want to further explain the contours of the self-defensive 
view by responding to some objections. 
 
4. Defending the self-defence account 
 
In this section I will defend the self-defence account outlined above against a 
number of challenges that have been levelled against it. More particularly, I will focus 
on five challenges which have been raised by Boonin (2008, pp. 198-207): first, that the 
self-defence account permits the punishment of the innocent, second that the account 
permits degrees of punishment that are disproportionately severe, third that it permits 
punishments that are disproportionately lenient, fourth that the account fails to 
accommodate degree of responsibility and fifth that the account fails to offer a moral 
justification of punishment at all. 
 
 
 
                                                                
91 Recall the point made in footnote 85 above that what is problematic is using individuals merely as a means, 
where this means bypassing their rational agency and using them as a mere means to some further ends. 
But in the case of punishing an attacker for ignoring a threat, then it is not clear they are being used merely 
as a means precisely because their agency is being respected—they are given a choice to heed or ignore the 
threat. While they are being used to deter others, they are not being used merely as a means to this end. 
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4.1. The punishing the innocent objection 
 
The first challenge to the self-defence account states that the account is flawed 
because it permits the punishment of the innocent (Boonin, 2008, pp. 198-201). Clearly, 
it is extremely important that a system of punishment does not intentionally punish 
individuals who have not broken the law (or otherwise committed a culpable act of 
wrongdoing), this is one of the worst injustices that a system of law can commit. While 
many state criminal justice systems will inevitably punish a few innocent individuals by 
accident, it is important that these institutions do not do so intentionally. There is a 
morally significant difference between those who do and those who do not break the 
law, and any account of punishment must be able to explain why it is only permissible 
to punish those who are guilty of crimes (or wrongdoing), and why it is not permissible 
to punish those who are not. 
The punishing the innocent objection states that the self-defence account cannot 
explain why in certain cases it is impermissible to inflict harm on an innocent individual. 
To see this consider the following passage from Boonin: 
 
Suppose that the prospect of becoming sick is not enough to deter most intruders 
from climbing over the fence…Suppose also that a second toxic substance is 
available that would … make an intruder sick but would in addition have the 
following property: it would stick to the intruder’s body for a long time and 
eventually infect all of his children. And suppose, ﬁnally, that although many 
would-be intruders would not be deterred by the prospect of being made sick by 
climbing the fence, they would be deterred by the prospect of infecting their 
children and causing them to suffer. In this case, it seems clear that the appeal to 
the right to deter would-be intruders that justiﬁes coating the fence with the ﬁrst 
toxin would also justify coating it with the second. But coating the fence with the 
second toxin amounts to activating a…device by which the builder threatens to 
punish not only offenders but their innocent children as well (2008, pp. 198-199). 
 
Boonin’s challenge is that the same deterrent logic that permits threatening harm and 
punishing would-be wrongdoers permits threatening harm and punishing innocent 
individuals (in his case, the would-be wrongdoer’s children). This is because it looks to 
be permissible for an individual to level any level of threat to secure their own protection. 
And for the reason that the self-defence account licenses this injustice, it should be 
rejected.  
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The objection is misplaced. It is based on a misunderstanding about the 
conditions in accordance with which it is permissible to activate an automatic retaliation 
device in individual cases of self-defence. When we consider analogous cases of 
individual self-defence, we see that it is in fact not permissible to turn on the machine 
under the conditions that Boonin’s case indicates—i.e. when an innocent individual is 
made liable to harm in the interests of deterrence. This is because, crucially, the 
permissibility of self-defensive violence changes if the choice is between suffering harm 
or harming another innocent to divert harm from oneself. That is, if the choice is between 
V suffering harm from an attacker, or V diverting harm from themselves by diverting 
the harm to another innocent individual—I—then justice requires that V suffers the 
harm, and does not inflict the harm on I. We can see this in a familiar human shield case 
in the literature on self-defence: 
 
Suppose that A is about to attempt to kill V and the only way in which to prevent 
this attack is if V grabs a nearby innocent individual—I—and uses them as a 
human shield, thereby killing I. 
  
Would V be justified in using I as a shield? No—given that I is in no way related to the 
initial threat posed by A and is innocent in the morally relevant sense, V would not be 
permitted to use I as a shield. In this case, justice requires that V is either killed or that V 
finds some other way to defend themselves which does not involve using an innocent 
individual. 
The same applies to the decision about whether to construct a machine (or in 
Boonin’s case erect a fence) which harms innocents in an attempt to protect other 
innocent victims. Just as it is impermissible to use another innocent individual to prevent 
an attack against oneself, it is impermissible to construct a machine which will 
foreseeably or intentionally target an innocent to divert harm to ourselves.  
To see this consider the following diagram. It captures the important distinction 
between self-defensive harm in general and justified self-defensive harm. 
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Circle A contains any conceivable harm a would-be victim could threaten and enforce 
against an attacker in the interests of self-defence. The scope of self-defensive violence is 
wide—disproportionate killing (i.e. killing in response to a minor threat), 
disproportionate attacks, kidnapping an attacker’s family, torture, using an innocent as 
a human shield, and all other conceivable forms of harm that could be employed for self-
defence. Circle B contains the range of harms that it is justifiable to impose on an attacker. 
The scope of justified self-defence is by contrast small—it is constrained by 
considerations of proportionality, the non-liability of innocents to be used for self-
defence, the significance of the responsibility of an attacker, that self-defensive harming 
is a last resort, amongst other factors. 
This distinction between self-defensive harm and justified self-defensive harm is 
important and it explains why Boonin’s objection is misplaced. Boonin’s objection stands 
if we adopt the view that any form of threat or punishment are permissible for self-
defence. This view is open to the complaint that would-be victims are permitted to kill 
an attacker’s innocent family in the interests of self-defence, for instance. But we need 
not commit ourselves to that view. Instead, if we understand that only justified self-
Self-defensive harm A 
Justified 
self-
defensive 
harm 
B 
FIGURE 1: SELF-DEFENSIVE HARM AND JUSTIFIED SELF-DEFENSIVE HARM 
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defence is permissible, the scope of justified threats/ punishment is minimised such that 
the account no longer looks objectionable.  
 
4.2. The disproportionately severe objection 
 
A second challenge to the self-defence account targets the degree of punishment 
it is permissible to impose in the interests of self-defence. There are two dimensions to 
this challenge—the first states that the self-defence account will in some cases license 
disproportionately severe punishment, the second states that the self-defence account will 
sometimes endorse disproportionately lenient punishment (Boonin, 2008, p. 201-203). 
Together, both challenges undermine the self-defence account. In this section, I will focus 
on the disproportionately severe objection, and in the following section I shall respond 
to the disproportionately lenient objection. 
To see the first problem of disproportionately severe punishments, consider the 
following passage from Boonin: 
  
In the too much punishment version, the self-defense solution justiﬁes the right 
to inﬂict severe punishment for trivial offenses. Alexander, for example, raises 
this concern in the context of thieves who continue to try to steal his roses … He 
believes that it would be permissible for him to move his rose bushes to a private 
island surrounded by shark-infested waters … and that if this is so, then it would 
be equally permissible for him to construct a functionally equivalent moat to 
protect his rose bushes ... If it is permissible to build a lethal moat to protect one’s 
roses, then, according to the argument that attempts to justify the self-defense 
solution, it must be permissible to threaten lethal consequences for stealing roses 
and, ﬁnally, to inﬂict those consequences on those who steal them. But a painful 
execution for petty theft will strike virtually everyone as morally unacceptable 
(Boonin, 2008, p. 202). 
  
Boonin’s point is that the same logic which permits self-defence permits 
disproportionately severe sanctions for trivial offences. And for the reason it licenses 
gross injustice, the account should be rejected.  
This objection is misplaced, again because it assumes that it is permissible to 
threaten any level of harm in the interests of self-defence. This is not the case. As set out 
above, the sphere of harm it is permissible to threaten in self-defence is smaller than the 
full panoply of harms we may threaten in self-defence. Once we realise that it would not 
be permissible to threaten lethal violence to prevent a trivial threat (to build a lethal moat 
99 
 
to protect our roses, in Boonin’s example), we avoid the disproportionately severe 
objection.   
 
4.3. The disproportionately lenient objection 
 
The problem of disproportionately lenient punishments follows from the fact that 
the self-defence account seems to be committed to the view that the least possible 
amount of harm must be threatened/used to prevent individuals from wrongdoing.92 
Consider the following passage from Boonin: 
 
Suppose that the threat of a $500 ﬁne would be enough to deter the vast majority 
of people from burning down someone’s house…In this case, to protect our 
houses from being destroyed by arsonists, the self-defense solution would permit 
us to threaten them with a $500 fine…it would not…entitle us to threaten a 
greater ﬁne or a ﬁve-year prison sentence, because we are only entitled to 
threaten to use the least force necessary to protect ourselves…But since the right 
to punish is derived only from our right to threaten to punish, this means that 
since we would have the right only to threaten a $500 ﬁne against arsonists, we 
would have the right to punish them only in that amount (2008, pp. 202-203). 
 
The problem, of course, is that a $500 fine for committing serious arson in burning down 
someone’s house is clearly a disproportionately lenient punishment for the severity of 
the offence. Yet it seems to follow that we are obliged to punish with $500, if this is what 
is sufficient to deter.  
My response here will not be to the objection in principle, because I do think it 
carries weight. But I do think it is possible to respond to the objection by highlighting 
reasons in support of a more plausible view of proportionate punishment. My response 
rests on a distinction between two ways of formulating an account of proportionality. 
One pertains to when we are building an auto-retaliatory machine to protect ourselves 
and our property, the other pertains to when we build a retaliatory device to protect a 
large number of individuals in society by disincentivising the acts of a large number of 
would-be wrongdoers. The transition between the two forms of machine—one to protect 
by disincentivising a small number of individuals, the other to protect by 
                                                                
92 This follows from the proportionality requirement in self-defensive punishment. 
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disincentivising a large number, is significant, I will argue, because it impacts on the 
judgement of what we deem to be a proportionate threat/punishment.  
I will attend to the transition between these two machines in more depth in the 
following section. The point I want to make here is that the force of the 
disproportionately lenient objection applies most strongly to cases of a machine to 
prevent individual wrongdoing, and not to a societal system designed to prevent 
wrongdoing. In this latter case, the level of justified threat would plausibly have to be 
increased to deter more people. A societal system designed to deter and disincentivise 
culpable acts of wrongdoing could not routinely level disproportionately lenient 
sanctions, if it wants to serve its deterrent goal. 
To see this think about the sorts of considerations that would have to be factored 
into a society’s determination of what constitutes a proportionate threat. This would 
include considerations such as 
 
i) The severity of a particular act of wrongdoing. 
ii) The effect of wrongdoing on other innocent individuals. 
 
i) The severity requirement captures the idea that more serious wrongdoing 
would generally require a greater degree of threatened sanction. If individuals are of a 
mind to commit murder, then a small fine would not reasonably deter them (it could in 
an individual case, but a far greater level of threat would be reasonably required in the 
interests of deterring a larger number). 
ii) The effect of wrongdoing captures another morally relevant difference 
between cases of individual self-defence and a system of laws. This is that laws must 
factor in the effect of wrongdoing on other innocent individuals, which is not the case in 
individual self-defence. In erecting an auto-retaliatory device, an individual need only 
factor in the threat to themselves, but in erecting an analogous system a state must 
consider the likelihood and effects of wrongdoing on others. Thus where it may be 
permissible for an individual to level a lenient threat of a fine against a potential attacker, 
if this were sufficient to deter them, the state arguably would be permitted to level more 
severe sanctions in the interests of deterring others and thus preventing harm to other 
innocents. 
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To be clear, my response to the disproportionately lenient challenge is to agree 
with the challenge in principle, but to insist that it is strongest as a challenge to the auto-
retaliatory machine an individual may erect in the interests of protecting themselves. It is 
less strong against a system of laws erected by a populace to protect innocents. This is 
because in this latter case legislators are forced to make more generalised, rather than 
specific judgements of proportionate sanction to deter a large number of would-be 
wrongdoers.  In making this judgement, they would have to factor in a range of 
considerations (severity of wrongdoing and the effects of the wrongdoing on others) and 
determine proportionate levels of sanction on this basis. These sanctions would, I claim, 
have to be generally more severe. 
 
4.4. The responsibility objection 
 
 
A fourth objection raised by Boonin is the ‘no-excuses objection’ (Boonin, 2008, 
pp. 203-205). The objection states that the self-defence account cannot accommodate the 
important requirement that offenders who are less responsible for an offence (or  indeed 
not responsible at all) should be punished less (or not at all) compared to those who 
intentionally commit the same offence.  
The challenge states that the self-defence account cannot explain why those who 
are less responsible should not be punished to the same extent as those who intentionally 
commit rights violations. We may also consider cases of the mentally ill or children who, 
while they may pose a threat, are not liable to punishment or liable to less punishment 
by virtue of the fact they are either not responsible due to lack of capacity, or diminished 
responsibility. The self-defence account seems to justify the same level of harm against 
these individuals as it would against intentional wrongdoers who possess full capacity 
(and responsibility).  
To respond to this objection we can highlight that at the level of an auto-
retaliatory machine, or a system of societal laws, it would be pointless to activate the 
machine against those who are not responsible, or who lack the relevant agency to ignore 
a threat and commit an intentional rights violation. There are a number of reasons for 
this. First, threatening individuals who are unable to understand or be responsive to the 
requirements of such threats would be an unnecessary cost for such a system to bear, 
with no deterrent benefit. Second, there would be a number of reasons for wanting to 
deter only those individuals who commit intentional attacks—these individuals would 
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be i) more likely to reoffend against other innocents and ii) they would also be more 
responsive to a deterrent threat. These considerations support the view that it is not a 
worthwhile cost for a societal system to bear to level threats against non-responsible 
threats, or those who lack the relevant capacity for intentional wrongdoing. As such, the 
responsibility of would-be attackers can be factored in to the operation of the societal 
system of self-defensive threats. 
 The response here may be that this is too quick. We can see a preventative benefit 
of punishing those with no responsibility or with diminished responsibility insofar as 
we may incarcerate them or otherwise deter them from committing further wrongdoing. 
Yet recall the conditions under which we are permitted to activate the auto-retaliatory 
machine. There is no sense in which children, or those who lack the agential capacity to 
recognise threats, are liable to be harmed, and therefore the machine could not 
permissibly be activated to prevent such individuals. 
 
4.5. The failure to justify punishment objection 
 
A fifth challenge to the self-defence account is that it fails to justify punishment 
at all. To see this challenge consider the following passage from Boonin: 
  
To return once more to the relatively simpler case of the spiked fence, if we 
understand the harm caused to the person who climbs the fence to be merely a 
foreseen consequence of constructing the fence, then there is no way to move 
from the assumption that building the fence is permissible to the conclusion that 
punishment is permissible (2008, p. 207). 
 
The reason for this, Boonin claims, is that punishment involves the intentional harming 
of an individual in response to their committing wrongdoing or having otherwise 
broken the law. The problem is that the harm involved in self-defensive punishment is 
not intentional but is merely a foreseeable means of preventing wrongdoing. As such, 
the self-defence account fails to provide a justification of punishment at all. 
We see this in Boonin’s case of a fence which is erected to deter would-be 
wrongdoers. The erection of the fence is not intended to cause harm—indeed, if the 
builder had intended to cause harm, then clearly they could have developed a more 
suitable contraption to do so. Instead, the fence serves to prevent/ deter attackers from 
trespassing, and the use of harmful spikes is a means of prevention—a harm which is 
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required as part of the fence builder’s attempt to protect themselves. The challenge to 
the self-defence account states that the erection of this fence—which is sufficiently 
similar to an automatic retaliatory machine—is not an instance of punishment at all 
because it lacks the intentional element that is required for an act to be act of punishment. 
Insofar as the harm is only foreseeable and not intended, the self-defence account fails 
to provide an account of punishment at all. 
There are three responses that a defender of the self-defence account could 
develop. The first is to challenge the claim that in order for the infliction of harm to 
constitute an act of punishment it must be intentional. The second is to bite the bullet—
to accept that this challenge is weighty, but that it does not undermine the self-defence 
account as a justification of when it is sometimes permissible to harm wrongdoers. The 
third is to deny that self-defensive harming does not involve the intentional infliction of 
harm.  
Here I will defend the second response—I will argue that it is correct to think 
that the self-defence view does not justify the intentional use of harm. But, I argue, this 
is not a problem for the account. What we have is a justification of when it is sometimes 
justifiable to foreseeably harm someone in the interests of protecting ourselves and other 
innocents, and whether we want to call this ‘punishment’ or not is a semantic issue, 
which, while important, doesn’t undermine the self-defence view as an account of 
justified harm. 
In the philosophical literature on punishment, the condition of intentional 
harming is widely held to be necessary for a particular harmful act to constitute 
punishment.93 Some take this as a definitional point—that the concept of punishment 
analytically entails the intentional infliction of harm. Others appeal to this condition as 
a means of distinguishing punishment from other coercive measures such as the 
detainment of the mentally ill or the enforcement of a system of taxes, for instance. Thus 
where punishment requires the intentional infliction of harm on wrongdoers, 
detainment and taxation involve the foreseeable infliction of harm (or coercion), in the 
interests of protecting others or the individual themselves, or of gathering finances for 
the public interest. In the latter two cases, the infliction of harm is a foreseeable means 
                                                                
93 Many writers on the philosophy of punishment defend the intentionality requirement. See, for example, 
H.L.A. Hart—“it [punishment] must be intentionally administered by human beings other than the 
offender” (Hart, 1970, p. 5); “[punishment is] an evil deliberately inflicted qua evil on an offender” (Primoratz, 
1989 p. 5); “to be a punishment, an act must involve intentionally harming someone because he previously 
did a prohibited act” (Boonin, 2008, p. 17); “punishment involves the intentional infliction of harm or 
suffering on others” (Tadros, 2011, p. 21). 
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to achieving some other goal. And if another, less harmful means served the same goal 
just as adequately, then this would be required. Whereas in the case of punishment the 
intentional infliction of harm is a necessary feature of the practice.94  
One thing to take from this comparison between the intentional harm involved 
in punishment and the foreseeable harming involved in other practices, is that the self-
defensive account could be seen as a category of the latter sort of practice. That is, we 
can accept that the account is not an instance of punishment, because it does not involve 
intentional harming, yet recognise it as still being justified as a practice which involves 
foreseeable harming. And we may place self-defensive harming in the category of 
practices which use foreseeable harms to secure some further goods—practices such as 
taxation and preventative incarceration and the containment of the mentally ill, where 
the good in question is the protection of the innocent. This is to accept Boonin’s challenge 
to the self-defence view as a view of punishment, but to deny that this challenge 
undermines the account as an account of when it is sometimes justified to harm 
individuals. We can recognise societal self-defence as being permissible to protect others 
in the same way as taxation or containing the mentally unwell involve foreseeable 
harming to promote the good. And whether we want to call this punishment becomes a 
semantic issue.95 
 
5. From self-defence to a rudimentary system of law 
 
In this section, I want to briefly explore the idea that the self-defence account of 
punishment outlined above can provide the basis of a moral justification of a system of 
law and order—taking the form of justified threats and sanctions. In particular, I will 
draw attention to some features which are relevant to the move from individual self-
defence to a system of societal defence. Here the question shifts from what individuals are 
justified in threatening/ enforcing against wrongdoers in the interests of self-defence to 
what institutions/ practices a society is justified in implementing in the interests of 
defending the innocent. 
To frame this discussion, consider the following case. Suppose a society is 
comprised of would-be wrongdoers (A’s), potential innocent victims (V’s) and a group 
                                                                
94 This is consistent with the view that punishment may not be permissible if there is a less harmful method. 
95 For the sake of consistency, I will continue to use the term ‘punishment’ with respect to the self-defence 
account, notwithstanding the semantic objection to doing so. 
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of legislators (L’s). What measures would L be justified in implementing? One plausible 
set of measures would serve the aims of preventing wrongdoing. These would include 
measures such as a police force with search and arrest powers and surveillance, for 
instance. Yet on the assumption that some within group A will still be of a mind to 
commit wrongdoing, I take it that L would also be permitted to introduce a system for 
responding to this wrongdoing. Here we see the plausibility of a system analogous to 
the auto-retaliatory device outlined above. The main aim of this system would be 
preventative—to deter would-be wrongdoers from group A by prohibiting certain forms 
of action and by disincentivising individuals from engaging in these actions by making 
credible threats of punishment. In the event that these threats are ignored, the system 
(along the lines of the auto-retaliatory machine above) would then enforce these threats, 
and this enforcement would be justified to the extent that it serves the aims of general 
deterrence and the protection of the innocent. 
Yet there are good reasons as to why the system of threats and punishments 
implemented by S should not directly resemble the auto-retaliatory machine. For 
instance, such a system would have to be less automatic—largely because innocent 
individuals may be accidentally apprehended by the system, and the system should be 
built in such a way as to include safeguards preventing the unjust punishment of the 
innocent. The problem of punishing the innocent would require certain procedures such 
as trials being built into the system, to ascertain guilt, in the event that this was in 
question. The point here being that operating a large auto-retaliatory machine in a 
society without safeguards on how suspects are apprehended could be dangerous, and 
we would want certain safeguards protecting individuals from the societal machine 
which is designed to protect. 
One worry may be that the introduction of procedures to establish guilt and 
innocence would interfere with the system’s ability to protect innocent individuals. Yet 
it’s not clear that this argument stands once we realise the threat that the system itself poses 
to individuals who are innocent of wrongdoing. That is, if the purpose of the system is 
to protect the innocent from attack/wrongdoing—then it makes sense to include certain 
provisions to prevent the targeting of the innocent by the system itself. And once we 
understand that those subject to the harms of the system may be innocent victims, we 
have substantive reasons in favour of introducing safeguards to protect innocents 
accidentally apprehended by the system. Indeed, these safeguards may be grounded in 
the more basic right of self-defence, which in this case means protecting individuals from 
a system of laws that becomes too forceful, or which falsely apprehend the innocent.  
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Another safeguard we would plausibly wish to implement are measures to 
prevent the system becoming unruly and having too much power over individuals. This 
requirement would be less important in the case of an auto-retaliatory machine erected 
by an individual to protect themselves and their property—such a system would be less 
prone to abuse. Yet in the case of a societal system of self-defence, targeted against a 
number of would-be wrongdoers, it seems reasonable to include measures to prevent 
potential misuses of power. These would plausibly include provisions such as civil and 
procedural rights to guard against individuals being treated unjustly by the system. These 
may resemble the procedural rights included in most liberal democratic legal systems, 
such as rights to habeaus corpus (the right to challenge suspected unlawful imprisonment 
before a court), the presumption of innocence, rights to legal representation and to a fair 
trial and rights against unjust discrimination (such as rights to equal standing before the 
law).96 
 
6. Reapplication to transitional societies 
 
In this section I want to return to the context of transitional justice and the 
problem of punishment therein. In particular, I want to highlight how the self-defence 
account can respond to the two problems which I highlighted as being endemic to 
transitional societies at the start of the chapter. And I will conclude by thinking about 
how the self-defence account applies to the context of international law. 
To begin with, recall the two problems I highlighted in transitional justice 
contexts which, I claimed, bear on the permissibility of punishment in such contexts. 
First, the problem of the absence of a legitimate state and institutions which effectively 
protect and provide for the basic rights of individuals. Second, the problem of increased 
rights violations which are common within contexts of states transitioning from conflict 
and authoritarian rule.  
The self-defensive view provides an account of punishment which does not 
require a legitimate state. We can imagine a community of individuals who erect a self-
defensive system of law and punishment to protect the innocent from unjustified attack 
(or other forms of rights violations). This community can, in principle, erect this system 
                                                                
96 Of course, I don’t want to suggest that this justification of a rudimentary system of law would be different 
between societies. While I emphasise the plausibility of the account with respect to more fragile political 
contexts in this chapter, the same view can in principle inform a justification for laws and punishments in 
more developed liberal democratic contexts.  
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even though there is no legitimate state in existence, i.e. even though procedures are not 
in place to establish a legitimate government with the right to rule. Or we can imagine a 
just military intervention in a state in the midst of civil war. Even though this state does 
not have a legitimate government, this military power will still be justified in erecting a 
self-defensive punitive system, if in doing so they serve to deter wrongdoers (in both 
cases, punishment is justified because it serves to protect the innocent). Thirdly, we can 
imagine a case in which a just government who are undemocratic (say a benign elite 
group) could in principle erect a system of threats and punishments along the lines of 
the auto-retaliatory machine. My claim, then, is that a legitimate government is not a 
necessary condition for justified legal punishment. 97  According to the self-defence 
account, it is permissible for agents to establish a system of self-defensive punishment, 
assuming that the threats are justified98 and the system serves its aim of protecting the 
innocent. 
Second, the self-defensive view illustrates that punishment is not only 
permissible when a legitimate state does not exist, but more strongly still that the 
establishment of a legitimate state can be facilitated through justified practices of threats 
and punishments. This is the case when the system serves—as the self-defensive view 
seeks to—to deter a significant number of wrongdoers from committing culpable rights 
violations against innocent individuals. Consider the following case (which I take to be 
not wildly dissimilar to many cases of democratisation in fragile states). 
 
Suppose a state is in the midst of transitioning from authoritarian rule (by a 
belligerent dictator) to democracy. The legal system is undeveloped and fails to 
effectively arrest and apprehend wrongdoers. Suppose further that it is because 
of residual violence from both supporters and opponents of the old regime, that 
democracy cannot be implemented. 
 
                                                                
97 This is compatible with the view that it is all things considered best for a legitimate state to be in charge 
of punishment. This would ensure the laws are representative (democratic), for instance. My point here is 
simply that a legitimate state is not necessary for punishment and, in the absence of a legitimate state, 
punishment is permissible. 
98 An important element of a threat being justified is not just that it is proportionate to the harm it seeks to 
prevent but also that the individual issuing the threat is justified in doing so. This rules out a gangster with 
a history of wrongdoing from issuing threats to defend themselves. It would also rule out an illegitimate 
dictator from issuing threats to protect themselves and their friends in the elite. The reason being that in 
committing wrongdoing they lose their claim to be justified in threatening.   
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The self-defence account provides the outline of a system of punishment that in such a 
case would facilitate the move towards establishing a legitimate state. By seeking to 
prevent the instances of rights violations, self-defensive punishments can facilitate the 
establishment of a legitimate state. A system of self-defensive threats and punishment 
can also help to put in place the conditions required for elections, the just distribution of 
goods, and other pre-requisites for democracy. As such, I want to claim that the self-
defensive view of punishment, and the rudimentary system of law and punishment it 
represents, can serve as a vital tool in the process of transition. 
 Third (though this suggestion is tentative, and comes with a number of 
qualifications) the self-defence view provides the basis of a justification for International 
Criminal Law (ICL), and an argument for when states should impose it. The basic 
thought is that we can understand international law generally, and aspects of ICL in 
particular (such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture and Crimes 
Against Peace) as serving an essentially protective function.99 
 My claim is this. International law is still relatively undeveloped.100 Yet it also 
provides a reasonably comprehensive list of acts that individuals—in the main state 
leaders—cannot do, on pains of facing punishment. These include acts such as genocide 
(persecuting or killing a group of people on the basis of their membership of a national, 
racial, religious or ethnic group), torture, aggression (unjustly initiating war), war 
crimes, amongst others things. These acts are prohibited under international criminal 
law which, in effect, serves as a threat—it says, ‘if you do these things, you will be 
(individually) investigated, tried, and (if found guilty) punished.’ 
 Now, the self-defence account outlined above provides us with at least one 
reason as to why states should concern themselves with enforcing the threats of 
international law. To see this, consider the following case, 
 
Suppose that a state is in the midst of transition from authoritarian rule. The 
previous regime leader—a military dictator—has been apprehended by 
                                                                
99 Cassese captures this essential function of ICL in writing, 
   
ICL primarily addresses the conduct of individuals and aims at protecting society against the most 
harmful transgressions of legal standards perpetrated by them (whether they be state agents or 
persons acting in a private capacity) (2008, p. 8). 
 
100 We see this in the fact that modern international criminal law is widely accepted to have it’s origins in 
Nuremburg, 70 years ago. See (Cassese, 2008, pp. 4-5) for a discussion of the undeveloped nature of 
international law more generally. 
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opposition forces and given over to the official state legal system (which has now 
been purged of officials sympathetic to the dictatorship and staffed with 
impartial legal officials).  
 
There are (at least) two options for what could happen next—the dictator could be 
passed on to a relevant international criminal court, or they could be tried (under 
international law) by the national courts of the state.101 To be sure, both of these are 
viable options. Perhaps the international court is preferable insofar as it is safer, better 
resourced and therefore better able to meet procedural standards (fair trial, fair 
representation, etc.). Yet one reason in favour of a national trial is that this could increase 
the deterrent capacity of the punishment, sending a message to would-be dictators or 
otherwise unjust political officials in that state that any wrongdoing will be prosecuted. 
The key point I wish to emphasise is that the self-defence account provides the basis for 
a justification (or more modestly just one reason in favour) for punishing officials under 
ICL when a threat has been ignored and they violate their obligations under ICL—
namely, that this serves to protect innocents in both the transitional state and in states 
worldwide, by strengthening the credibility of the threat of ICL and thereby deterring 
other would-be violators. 
  
7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have outlined the self-defensive account of punishment. The 
account I provided is only an outline because further questions must be answered, some 
of which rest on substantive questions about the content of the law, including its relation 
to morality, and whether all laws can be understood as a form of threat backed up by a 
sanction.102 I have not engaged with these or other issues with respect to the self-defence 
account.  
Instead, my focus has been on developing a cogent philosophical justification of 
punishment which is sensitive to and in part seeks to resolve problems endemic to 
                                                                
101 The principle of ‘Universal Jurisdiction’ allows for the trial of certain crimes under international law 
(piracy, slavery, crimes against humanity, war crimes, torture, and genocide) in any jurisdiction, irrespective 
of the nationality of the suspect. There are a number of justifications for universal jurisdiction, but one that 
is common is that some crimes are so heinous that they amount to crimes against the whole of humanity. 
For discussion of universal jurisdiction see Bantekas (2010, pp. 344-349). 
102 This is perhaps the most natural way of reading Austin’s famous ‘command theory’ of law according to 
which “law is the command of the sovereign backed by sanctions” (Austin, 1995). 
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transitional societies—the absence of a legitimate state and the increased likelihood of 
rights violations. It is the ability of the theory to address these two aspects of transitional 
contexts that I take to be it’s key virtue. The consensus view in the philosophy of 
punishment is that a legitimate state is a necessary condition of justified legal 
punishment. And while I haven’t challenged this view in itself, I have sought to show 
how the self-defence view justifies limited forms of self-defensive punishment that do 
not require the existence of a legitimate state. Moreover, my claim was that a legitimate 
state is not only unnecessary for justified practices of legal punishment, but that justified 
practices of punishment can in fact help in the move towards a legitimate states. In 
providing this account, the self-defence view illustrates how punitive measures (at both 
domestic and international levels), designed as a system of threats and punishments, can 
facilitate the transition towards the establishment of a legitimate state, and in doing so 
can help to achieve arguably the main goal of transitional justice. In the following two 
chapters, I want to look at this challenge of establishing a legitimate state in more depth, 
particularly with respect to the problem of political legitimacy. 
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V. Transitional Justice, Democracy and the Justification of 
State Coercion 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Transitional justice is concerned with how states should progress to more just 
political societies while coming to terms with legacies of wrongdoing. A central 
challenge of this process of transition concerns political legitimacy—how societies 
should move from periods of conflict or illegitimate rule to a legitimate state.  
Naturally, the process of transitioning towards a legitimate state invites a 
number of questions about what political legitimacy is and why it should matter that a 
state is or is not legitimate. The aim of this and the following chapter will be to get clearer 
about political legitimacy, with particular reference to transitional justice contexts. 
Importantly, for reasons of space, there will be limitations on what it is possible for me 
to engage with. The problem of political legitimacy is a central problem for political 
philosophy, and it will be impossible to do full justice to the problem and the many 
sophisticated responses that have been developed to address it. As such, I want to 
confine myself to two broad questions concerning state legitimacy. In this chapter, I am 
interested in the question of what conditions a state must fulfil in order to be justified in 
coercing (through law). In the following chapter I will be interested in the problem of 
the (more demanding) conditions that a state must fulfil in order to be legitimate and to 
possess the exclusive right to rule.103 
                                                                
103 In dividing these two questions up in this way I by no means wish to suggest they are distinct. As I 
explain throughout the following two chapters, the two problems of legitimacy and the justification of 
coercion overlap such that a legitimate state is a state that is morally justified in coercing through law. My 
view throughout these two chapters will be that being morally justified in coercing is a necessary condition 
of a legitimate state. But being legitimate is not a necessary condition on being morally justified in legally 
coercing. 
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In this chapter, then, my focus will be on the moral justification of state coercion. 
Most commentators on transitional justice hold that the process of transition from 
conflict or illegitimate rule should seek to achieve democracy.104 I agree with this view 
in both this and the following chapter. Yet what interests me in this chapter is the sorts 
of coercive practices that it is permissible for states to engage in when democracy is not 
in place, or where the goal is precisely that of establishing democracy in the wake of 
periods of illegitimate rule. In these contexts, I want to argue that democratic forms of 
coercion are in fact morally problematic, and in some cases dangerous. This is because 
implementing democracy without certain pre-conditions in place (around the protection 
of minority rights and other means of limiting the legislative powers of a majority 
supported government) can lead to injustice. I make this argument by highlighting a 
dilemma at the heart of democratic views of state coercion, between majoritarian rule 
and protecting minority rights (or human rights). In the face of this dilemma, I argue 
that the protection of human rights should be the normative priority, such that it licenses 
certain forms of coercion by the state. And in making this argument, I will challenge the 
view which is now reasonably popular in transitional justice scholarship and political 
philosophy that democracy is a necessary condition on state coercion.105 
The chapter will run as follows. In the following section, I consider the problem 
of state coercion (as a feature of state legitimacy). In section three I consider the popular 
view that democracy is required to morally justify state coercion—a view both implicitly 
and explicitly endorsed by both political philosophers and commentators on transitional 
justice. In section four I highlight the dilemma between democratic procedures and the 
protection of human rights. In section five I argue that in the face of this dilemma, the 
priority should be the protection of basic human rights. In section six I sketch the outline 
of this human rights-based view and explain how it informs a justification for some 
forms of state coercion. 
                                                                
104 This view is common in policy documents on transitional justice—for instance, a UN document on 
transitional justice claims that a central aim of transition is to ‘reinforce the possibilities for … democracy’ 
(United Nations, 2008), and the International Centre for Transitional Justice writes that ‘transitional justice 
should be designed to strengthen democracy’ (International Centre for Transitional Justice, 2009). According 
to this widely shared view, the fields of transitional justice and democratisation are broadly synonymous—
the transition to a state that is legitimate (where this means in part is morally justified in coercing) is taken 
to be a transition to a state that is democratic. The view that democratisation and transitional justice are 
synonymous is particularly common in legal scholarship and policy documents around transitional justice. 
To give one representative passage:  
Rwanda's best hope for achieving democracy—and thereby preventing future interethnic 
violence—lies in its transitional justice experiment (Wierzynska, 2004, p. 1939). 
105 Both Buchanan (2002) and Winter (2013) defend this view.  
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2. Political Legitimacy and the Justification of State Coercion 
 
One of the main challenges of transitional justice concerns how states should 
move from a period of state illegitimacy to a legitimate state.106 This process of transition 
invites questions which have long preoccupied social scientists and political 
philosophers—what is political legitimacy? And why is it important that a state 
possesses it? 
To say that a state is legitimate107, in the sense I intend through this thesis, is to 
say that a state possesses a right to rule. There are different aspects to what constitutes 
the states right to rule, elements of which I will highlight in this and the following 
chapter. The element that I’m interested in in this chapter is the moral justification of 
state coercion. States routinely coerce their citizens, chiefly through the imposition of 
laws which direct their otherwise free conduct by threatening punishment or other 
forms of sanction if citizens disobey. What concerns me in this chapter are the conditions 
that states must fulfil to engage in certain forms of permissible coercion. Importantly, to 
say that a state is morally justified in engaging in some forms of coercive practices is not 
necessarily to say that it is legitimate. In the following chapter, I will be concerned with 
the more demanding standard of legitimacy. 
Because this point will be important to my arguments in the following two 
chapters, I will illustrate it with a diagram.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
106 Transitional justice is concerned not only with the transition from illegitimate rule, but also transitions 
from conflict, civil war and foreign occupation, amongst other periods of belligerence. My argument applies 
to all of these cases of political transition. 
107 There is an important distinction between the normative and descriptive senses of political legitimacy. 
The latter sense of legitimacy is developed by Weber (1964, p. 71–74). According to this view, a political 
agent, or process, is legitimate if citizens believe said agent or process to be legitimate, and therefore 
habitually obey said agent or process. The descriptive sense is distinguishable from the normative sense. 
The normative account of legitimacy appeals not to empirical questions about whether citizens believe an 
agent, or process, to be legitimate, but to moral questions of permissibility and justification. On this view, a 
political agent is legitimate if it has the right to rule. It is important to note that when I speak of legitimacy 
in this and the following chapters I mean the normative sense of legitimacy. 
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FIGURE 2: DISTINGUISHING MORALLY JUSTIFIED COERCION FROM LEGITIMACY 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Phases A to B represents the conditions that a state108 must fulfil in order to be 
justified in engaging in certain forms of coercive activity (i.e. certain forms of coercive 
law-making). Phases B to C represent the conditions that must be fulfilled in order for a 
state to be legitimate (where this more demanding standard captures the full 
requirements of the right to rule, including the moral justification of coercion109). In this 
chapter, I shall be concerned with the former, less demanding standard—what 
conditions a state must meet in order to permissibly engage in certain forms of coercive 
practices.110 
We want states to be morally justified in their use of coercion for a number of 
reasons. One is that laws are liberty-restricting. Laws direct the otherwise free conduct 
of individuals in certain ways, chiefly by imposing positive and negative legal duties on 
individuals, duties whose violation comes with the threat of punishment or sanction. 
The central tenets of criminal law, for instance, impose negative duties of non-
                                                                
108 While my focus in this section is restricted to state coercion, the justification I develop could in principle 
apply to individuals or non-state groups. Indeed, there are certain common features between the 
justification of coercion in this chapter and the justification of rough justice and punishment in chapters 
three and four (to the extent that promoting security, in this chapter in the guise of the protection of human 
rights, is a priority). 
109 To reiterate, I do not want to suggest that the criteria for morally justified coercion and legitimacy are 
distinct. To say a state is legitimate is to say, at least in part, that it is morally justified in coercing and that 
constitutive of the right to rule is being morally justified in coercing citizens through law. To reiterate, my 
view through these two chapters will be that being morally justified in coercing is a necessary condition of 
a legitimate state. But being legitimate is not a necessary condition on being morally justified in coercing. 
See both Wellman and (1996, pp. 211–212). Dworkin (1986, p. 191) for variations of this view that legitimacy 
entails being morally justified in coercing. 
110 As I explain further in the following chapter, my view aligns most closely with Simmons (2001). Simmons 
distinguishes between a morally justified state and a legitimate state. For a state to be morally justified it’s 
existence must be shown to be, “on balance morally permissible… that it is rationally preferable to a feasible 
nonstate alternative” (Simmons, 2001, p. 126). This is distinct from the more demanding standards of 
legitimacy, the “complex moral right it [the state or government] possesses to be the exclusive imposer of 
binding duties… and to use coercion to enforce these duties (Simmons, 2001, p. 130). 
A B C 
Morally Justified coercion Legitimate state 
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interference on citizens (to not kill, steal, and so on), and tax laws impose positive 
obligations to provide wealth for the common good.  Given that it is prima facie wrong 
to restrict and direct the otherwise free conduct of individuals, the authority of the state 
to introduce and enforce these laws requires moral justification. 
Secondly, states not only coerce, but they claim to have authority over a 
particular jurisdiction or territory. As such, they impose laws and demand compliance 
not only from those who are born within the territory which the state has authority over, 
but also over foreign nationals who by entering this jurisdiction become subject to the 
state’s coercive authority. Again, the fact that a state claims authority over all those 
within a particular geographical territory—including non-nationals—requires an 
explanation. We need a reason, or set of reasons, as to why the state is morally justified 
in exercising its authority in this given territory, over individuals who are not nationals 
of the state, country or region. 
Thirdly, states claim to possess a monopoly of force and authority over a given 
jurisdiction. States use coercion exclusively—in such a way that the laws of the state have 
supreme power and no other group has a moral claim to impose laws. Buchanan 
captures this notion that states create and enforce laws monopolistically when he writes, 
 
A state not only uses coercion to secure compliance with its rules, it also attempts 
to establish the supremacy of those rules and endeavours to suppress others who 
would enforce its rules or promulgate their own rules (2002, p. 690). 
 
Given that legitimate states not only coerce citizens, but seek to have exclusive authority 
to coerce, this requires moral justification. We require a reason as to why the state, and 
the state alone, is morally permitted to create and enforce laws and to do so in such a 
way as to exclude other potential law-making bodies. It is for these three reasons that 
we want states to be morally justified in enforcing coercive laws. 
 Importantly, these latter two features (being morally justified in possessing the 
monopoly to coerce over a given jurisdiction, including over foreign nationals) will be 
particularly important with respect to the following chapter where I consider the 
conditions of a state being legitimate and possessing the right to rule. This is because 
only legitimate states have the monopoly to coerce over a given jurisdiction. 
In what follows, I will be interested in the problem of the moral justification of 
coercion as a central (though not sufficient) element of state legitimacy. I will develop an 
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account of when a state is morally justified in engaging in forms of coercive practices 
which does not hold that democratic procedures are necessary to justify this coercion. 
My claim is thus that democracy is not required for a state to be morally justified in 
coercing. As I will show, the force of this (at first glance perhaps quite obvious argument) 
is that it runs contrary to views in both transitional justice scholarship and political 
philosophy. 
 
3. The Democratic Justification of Coercion 
 
In this section, I want to consider the view that democracy is a necessary 
condition on the state’s being morally justified in coercing. In the scholarship and policy 
around transitional justice, a number of commentators have defended this view. Many 
commentators argue (or indeed often simply assume) that democracy is required to 
morally justify the states law-making procedures such that it forms a necessary condition 
on these procedures being justified.  
Winter (2013) is representative of this view. He claims that establishing 
democracy is an essential aim of transitional justice, one that is required for the 
legitimacy of states. Winter argues that “a state has legitimacy when it is permissible for 
it to issue and enforce laws and regulations” (2013, p. 231). And writes: 
 
It is a necessary condition of a legitimate political order that it enables those 
governed to play equal and meaningful roles in the process of government 
(Winter, 2013, p. 237). 
 
Winter’s argument may be stated as follows: 
 
i) A legitimate state is a state that is permitted to issue and enforce laws and 
regulations. 
ii) States which do not possess legitimacy are not permitted to enforce laws 
and regulations. 
iii) Democracy (understood as a system ‘which enables those governed to 
play and equal and meaningful role in the process of government’) is a 
necessary condition for legitimacy. 
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iv) Therefore, only democratic states can permissibly issue and enforce laws 
and regulations.    
 
The view that democracy is a necessary condition on permissible coercion is also 
common in the literature in political philosophy. The most detailed defence of this view 
comes from Buchanan, who writes, 
 
If the wielding of political power is morally justifiable only if it is wielded in 
such a way as to recognise the fundamental equality of persons, and if 
democracy is necessary for satisfying this condition, then political legitimacy 
requires democracy (Buchanan, 2002, p. 712). 
 
For Buchanan, a legitimate state is a state that is morally justified in coercing its citizens. 
It is a necessary condition on permissible coercion that the fundamental moral equality 
of citizens is respected. And democracy, for Buchanan, is the only form of governance 
that respects this moral equality. It follows, on Buchanan’s account, that democracy is a 
necessary condition for justified coercion. 
In what follows, I want to challenge this view that democratic procedures are a 
necessary condition for the permissibility of coercive law-making. Prior to doing so, I 
want to note how plausible the view in fact is by highlighting some reasons in favour of 
including democracy in a view of justified coercion. Though prior to doing this, I want 
to highlight a point on how we understand democracy.  
In the literature on political philosophy, there are a wide variety of views about 
what democracy is, how it should be constructed and why it is valuable. For instance, 
there are different views about the procedures around democracy, such as whether 
democracy implies majority rule111, or requires a voting lottery. While there is broad 
agreement that democracy means ‘self-rule’ or ‘government by the people’ there is 
substantive disagreement about whether this requires procedures of direct or 
representative participation. Third, there is disagreement about what is morally valuable 
about democracy and about what principle or collection of principles morally justify 
                                                                
111 Some commentators hold that majority rule is essential to democracy. Wolff, for instance, writes that: 
 
So widespread is the belief in majority rule that there is not a single variant of democratic theory 
which does not call upon it as the means for composing differences and arriving at decisions (Wolff, 
1970, p. 38). 
 
Other commentators believe other, non-majoritarian forms of democracy are possible, for instance 
Saunders (2010). 
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democracy, whether this is equality, or liberty, or autonomy or some combination of 
these values. In this chapter I will not take a stance on these substantive problems in 
democratic theory. This for two reasons. First, my argument is not contingent on any 
particular view of democracy. It applies only to the view that democracy is required for 
morally justified coercion, and this argument is not affected by the particular view of 
democracy we endorse. Second, I take it that there is some agreement about what 
democracy is, and what it requires, as a system of political decision-making which 
confers legitimacy, such that it is possible to meaningfully to engage with the view that 
democracy is a necessary condition of morally justified coercion. Cohen captures this 
very generalised sense of democracy: 
 
The fundamental idea of democratic legitimacy is that the authorization to exercise 
state power must arise from the collective decision of the members of a society 
which are governed by that power (1997, p. 407). 
 
I share this very broad sense of democracy, as roughly ‘rule by the people’112, and will 
not endorse any more particular account of democracy beyond it. 
There are a number of reasons for thinking that democracy should play some 
role in morally justifying the state’s use of coercion.113 From simple observation, we 
know that democratic states generally introduce laws that are reasonably just, and, at 
least compared to dictatorial or other forms of authoritarian states, democracies 
generally do a reasonable job of protecting basic human rights.114 We may also appeal to 
the value of representative governments and legislatures—that in order for laws to be 
justified, they must be shaped by and reflective of the views and interests of those who 
are subject to them. Others have appealed to the value of public reason and the role that 
deliberative democracy plays in “justify(ing) the exercise of collective political 
power…on the basis of a free public reasoning among equals” (Cohen, 1997, p. 412). 
Others still have sought to ground the justification of democracy in more substantive 
                                                                
112 The only other element of democracy I believe to be essential (and indeed I’m unaware of anyone who 
denies this) is that democracy affords a vote to all citizens and all votes are counted equally. 
113 The role that democratic participation plays within a wider account of the state needs not be restricted to 
its function in justifying state coercion, of course. J. S. Mill argued that one of the ways in which democracy 
is valuable is that it cultivates the character of citizens (1946, p. 136–151). 
114  Some political philosophers (Arneson 1995) have provided instrumental arguments in favour of 
democracy on the grounds that democracy tends to lead to the protection of human and political rights 
(privacy, freedom of expression, religious expression). While it may be descriptively true that democracies 
tend to better protect political rights (that is, as an observation about the state of the world), it is important 
to distinguish between democracy and human rights protection—it is possible to have one without the other, 
a point that will be important with respect to my later argument. 
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moral values. Buchanan (2002), for instance, grounds his justification of democracy on 
the value of equality, or what he terms the ‘robust natural duty of justice’, claiming that 
only democracy can confer legitimacy to states in such a way that respects this principle. 
Despite these reasons in favour of democracy, in what follows I want to challenge 
the view that democracy is necessary to justify forms of coercion by the state. 
Importantly, my claim will not be against democracy per se, or against the value of 
democracy, but is restricted to the view that democracy is a necessary condition on 
justified state coercion. I will do so by highlighting a fundamental tension between 
democratic rule and the protection of human rights. In the face of this tension, my claim 
will be that the latter—the protection of human rights—is a necessary condition on 
justified coercion, and that democracy is not.  
 
4. Against the view that democracy is necessary for permissible state coercion 
 
In this section, I want to challenge the view that democracy is necessary to justify 
state coercion. I do so in two ways—first, I introduce some transitional justice cases 
where it looks intuitively permissible for the political agents in question to enforce 
coercive laws and second, I highlight a tension at the heart of democratic law-making 
between democracy and the protection of basic human rights, a tension which I claim 
highlights the falsity of the view that democracy is required to justify coercion.  
 To begin with, consider the following cases of political transition, 
 
a) Coup d’etat case: suppose an illegitimate government responsible for serious 
rights violations against its people is overthrown by a rich elite group which 
forms a government, takes charge of the state’s legislative institutions and 
implements laws which protect the human rights of citizens. 
 
b) Transitional government case: suppose in the wake of a civil war between rival 
groups, a transitional government is put in place (undemocratically) and 
succeeds in securing political stability and the protection of basic human rights 
through the introduction of laws. 
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c) Military intervention case: suppose an international military power intervenes in 
a state in the midst of conflict, succeeds in ceasing the conflict, and implements 
(and funds) a government which keeps the peace and protects the basic human 
rights of citizens. 
 
My claim is that the intuitive plausibility of these cases begins to show the implausibility 
of the view that democracy is necessary to justify the use of coercion by the state. Would 
we really believe these agents, who are in charge of the state’s legislative institutions, to 
be unjustified in coercing through law by virtue of the fact that they have not come into 
power through democratic election? It seems difficult to motivate such an argument, 
given that in all of these cases citizens are substantially better off insofar as their basic 
human rights are better protected.115 The point I take from these cases is that the burden 
of proof is on those who do believe that democracy is required to justify coercion, to 
explain why in these cases the respective state agents are not justified in coercing. 
 How might a defender of democracy respond? One response would be to 
highlight that in the hypothetical cases, the problem is not one of the conditions of 
justified state coercion, but of the conditions that foreign powers or temporary political 
agents must fulfil to coerce. Thus, the counter-argument goes, while it may be the case 
that foreign powers or other political agents are justified in coercing, it is not the cae that 
the state is, because a necessary condition on a states being justified in coercing is that it 
is democratic. 
This response is problematic because it fails to attend to how the cases are set up.  
In the coup d’état case, the transitional government case and the military intervention 
case the respective political agents precisely assume the control of the state’s legislative 
institutions (we can assume that this is the only way in which they can effectively coerce, 
i.e. because there is already a set of reasonably developed political and legal institutions 
in place). I take it then, that the burden of proof remains on those who take democracy 
to be a necessary condition for state coercion to explain why in these cases we should 
maintain the view that democracy is required for coercion. 
Consider a second argument. This takes the form of a simple and by no means 
original challenge to democratic authority—the ad absurdum challenge in the form of the 
                                                                
115 Importantly, my claim here is not that these agents are legitimate or that they have the right to rule in the 
stronger sense of being politically legitimate. My claim is the weaker claim that these agents who are in 
charge of the legislative institutions of the state are justified in coercing. 
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‘tyranny of the majority’.116117 The argument points to the implausibility of the view that 
democratic participation can justify state coercion by showing that democratic authority, 
without further restrictions and conditions on majority rule, will license injustice. To see 
this challenge consider the following example: 
 
Suppose a territory is composed of three factional ethnic groups. Group A 
represents 15% of the populace, group B 25% and group C 60%. Suppose a 
majoritarian democratic procedure is introduced to determine which political 
group ought to have the authority to coerce, and that the representatives from 
each of the respective groups have vowed to implement persecutory laws against 
members of the other groups. The vote affords each individual within each 
respective group one vote and considers each vote equally. Law-making power 
(and the authority to coerce) is then granted to the majority-supported group. 
 
Assuming that each voter votes for the representative of their group, the tyranny of the 
majority challenge states that in such a case group C will have the authority to persecute 
the members of A and B. And for the reason that it looks to license this injustice, 
democratic authority is problematic.  
One response here is that this fails to undermine the claim that democracy is 
necessary for coercion. All this case suggests is that along with democracy, we require 
further conditions which limit the legislative authority of the majority supported 
government. 
But this response fails to capture the dilemma that is at play in this case. The case 
evinces the inherent tension between majoritarian, democratic rule and the protection of 
human rights (or minority rights). It is a tension inherent to democratic views of 
authority which Brian Barry captures well: 
 
To be subject to a majority of a different language, religion or national identity 
is…threatening. In an area where nationalities are intermingled, like the Balkans, 
every move to satisfy majority aspirations leaves the remaining minorities even 
more vulnerable (1991, p. 35). 
 
                                                                
116 Alexis de Tocqueville presents the earliest detailed engagement with the problems of the tyranny of the 
majority in his Democracy in America (1963, pp. 254–270). 
117  It is important to note that my arguments against democracy only apply to majoritarian forms of 
democracy. There is a debate in the scholarship on democracy about the extent to which democracy implies 
or requires majority rule. Yet majority rule is implemented by most, if not all, democracies worldwide. 
Indeed, majority rule is so essential to our understanding of the constitution and operation of democracy, 
that I take it that the concerns I raise about the tyranny of the majority are forceful. 
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Barry’s worry, which I share, is that there is an inherent dilemma between satisfying the 
demands of a majority and protecting the basic rights and welfare of a minority.  
To be sure, this is not a dilemma that democracies are unfamiliar with. And 
indeed, more developed democracies have found ways to preserve the virtues of 
democratic rule while at the same time protecting vulnerable minority groups from the 
excesses of majority power. Yet here I want to highlight two further descriptive 
observations about the nature of fragile, (typically) less developed transitional justice 
contexts which indicate that the problem of the tyranny of the majority poses a very real 
serious challenge to an account of democratic coercion in transitional contexts. 
First (as in the hypothetical case above) transitional contexts are commonly 
composed of rival factional, religious, ethnic or racial groups. Think of the Tutsi and 
Hutus in Rwanda, or different ethnic and racial groups in South Africa, the Balkans, or 
Iraq.118 The distribution of rival ethnic groups in a given territory increases the chance of 
injustice carried out by a majority government against a minority group. And this 
descriptive feature of transitional contexts is something that any theory of justified 
coercion within such contexts should be sensitive to. Establishing laws in territories 
where there are pre-existing tensions between racial, ethnic or national groups in such a 
way as to prioritise the wishes of a certain portion of that populace (the majority) will 
only intensify the potential for injustice, and sharpen the dilemma between the wishes 
of a majority and the safety of a minority.  
A second observation is that transitional states do not generally have systems or 
institutional safeguards in place that protect minority rights by limiting the power of a 
majority-elected government in ways that more developed democratic states do. These 
safeguards include, 
 
i) A strong judiciary that is independent from and uninfluenced by the 
majority-supported government. 
 
ii) Judicial review—a process which gives judges the last word on aspects of 
law and which limits the legislative decisions of a majority. 
 
iii) Developed police forces to ensure law and order. 
 
iv) Legal systems that are sufficiently developed such that they may enforce 
human rights law. 
 
                                                                
118 For a scholarly engagement with the problem of the tyranny of the majority in Iraq see Bapir (2010). 
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v) Institutions which protect free speech and the freedom of the press 
(affording an outlet for expression to minority groups). 
 
In developed democracies, these institutional procedures play an invaluable role 
in protecting minority rights and limiting the coercive power of a majority. The absence 
of such procedures in fragile transitional contexts serves only to compound the problem 
of the tyranny of the majority. 
 The problem with the view that democracy is necessary for justified coercion is, 
then, twofold. First, if we hold democracy to be necessary to justify coercion, we 
preclude valuable, undemocratic forms of political coercion and second, we are open to 
the problem of the tyranny of the majority, which is exacerbated by certain features of 
transitional justice contexts. Given that non-democratic forms of political coercion can 
secure valuable goals, and that democracy is in tension with the protection of minority 
rights, my claim is that democracy is not a necessary condition for state coercion.119 In 
fragile political contexts we want some forms of coercion to secure goals such as 
reducing wrongdoing or otherwise disincentivising certain forms of conduct, to secure 
collective action and to establish the conditions for other political goals (economic 
development, the allocation of humanitarian aid, establishing functioning political 
institutions, and so on). In the following section, I will sketch the outline of an account 
of justified coercion that is non-democratic. 
 
5. Replacing democracy with human rights as a necessary condition for justified 
coercion 
 
Thus far I have challenged the view that democracy is a necessary condition for 
justified state coercion. Let me be clear here that my argument is not that democracy is 
not valuable. Indeed, as I explain further in the following chapter, I agree with the 
consensus view in the transitional justice scholarship that democracy should be an end-
goal of transitional justice. My claim is the more modest one that state coercion is 
                                                                
119 Of course, one may argue that even if democracy is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the 
justification of state coercion, it may provide a weighty pro tanto reason in favour of certain forms of coercion. 
This option is an open one. Indeed, according to the human rights based view of coercion I defend in the 
next section, it may well be the case that if a state protects human rights and is democratic, then this provides 
extra-justificatory force (given the values of democracy highlighted above). The main point I want to make 
is that it is the protection of human rights that does the work in justifying coercion, and while democracy 
may be a pro tanto moral reason in support of certain forms of coercion, it is neither necessary nor sufficient 
to justify this coercion. 
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permissible even though democratic procedures have not been used to establish those 
who possess law-making power. 
In this section, I want to develop an alternative view which appeals to the 
protection of human rights as a necessary condition on forms of state coercion. Prior to 
elaborating and defending this view, I will begin by suggesting, albeit briefly, some 
reasons why the protection of human rights should be seen as a necessary condition on 
the use of state coercion. 
 
5.1. Reasons for promoting the protection of human rights 
 
First, democracy presupposes the protection of human rights. Without the 
effective protection of human rights democracy is near impossible. Even attending the 
voting booth to register my preference for a political candidate requires that my basic 
human rights are protected—that I am free from assault or physical interference, that I 
have sufficient resources to live a dignified life 120 , that I am not desperately 
impoverished such that my basic needs of survival are not met, and so on. Returning to 
the hypothetical case of the three rival groups above. If what we want in such a context 
is the establishment of democracy, then we can see how the protection of human rights 
would be a vital pre-requisite. Our first aim would be to prevent human rights violations 
in the form of violence, to provide citizens with basic welfare and healthcare and to 
otherwise establish the political conditions for democratic governance between these 
three rival groups.  
A second reason relates to a point I raised earlier concerning the absence of 
procedures which serve to protect minority rights in fragile political contexts. My claim 
was that the problem of the tyranny of the majority was exacerbated by the absence of a 
strong and independent judiciary, processes of judicial review, a developed police force, 
a legal system sufficiently developed to enforce human rights law and institutions to 
protect free speech.  
I want to raise a similar point here about the role of particular political 
mechanisms in limiting the legislative power of a majority-supported government. The 
particular political mechanism I have in mind are state constitutions. Constitutions serve 
to limit, and to set guidelines on, governmental and judicial power. Good constitutions 
                                                                
120 Article 22 of the Universal Declaration posits the following right to a dignified standard of life ‘everyone...is 
entitled to realization...of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his [or her] dignity’. 
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set limits on the sorts of legislative decisions a government can make, for instance, and 
on the way in which the laws of a majority-supported government may be interpreted 
and applied by the judiciary. To give an example, many domestic constitutions protect 
minorities against the forces of majority rule by affording all individuals rights (to free 
speech, to fair representation and to appear before a judge to challenge false arrests 
[habeus corpus]).  
The problem with transitional contexts is that in the wake of conflict or 
illegitimate rule domestic constitutions are often no longer in existence or else have been 
amended to support and license authoritarian governance. Take as an example Richard 
Abel’s description of rule under a majority-supported government during the apartheid 
in South Africa where the constitution was amended by the white-majority supported 
government: 
 
South Africa in the 1980’s was an extraordinarily inhospitable environment for 
legal challenges to state power. Parliament was supreme. There was no bill of 
rights. All judges had been appointed by the National Party, and most strongly 
supported apartheid. The organised legal profession was supine; opponent 
lawyers suffered mysterious burglaries, bombings and assassinations; legal aid 
was grossly inadequate (1999, p. 69). 
 
The case of South Africa illustrates how an amended constitution can fail to serve its job 
of limiting the legislative power of a majority, and can in fact worsen the injustices of a 
tyrannous majority. 
The absence or amendment of constitutions in times of political transition 
supports the view that democracy should not be a necessary condition on political 
coercion, and that human rights should. Domestic constitutions limit government 
power—they restrict what a majority-supported government can do. In the absence of a 
constitution, or in the event a constitution has been amended to support executive 
power, these limits are lost and the state is able to wield power unrestrained. My claim 
is that this coercive power and the potential for injustice can be mitigated if we set the 
protection of human rights as a necessary condition on political power. I turn now to 
provide a more detailed defence of the role human rights play as a condition on state 
coercion. 
 
126 
 
6. The function of human rights in an account of justified coercion 
 
What we require from a human rights-based view of justified coercion is an 
account of why states are morally justified in coercing citizens in the interests of 
protecting human rights121, and of why protecting human rights is a necessary condition 
on state coercion. In this section, I make three points on this score. First, I argue that the 
protection of human rights provides the basis for a justification of the use of some level of 
coercive force by appealing to analogous cases in which coercion looks permissible to 
protect rights. Secondly, I argue that the protection of human rights provides the basis 
of a justification for the creation of a system of coercive laws. Thirdly, I argue that human 
rights serve not only to vindicate the use of coercion by the state, but also to set limits on 
the sorts of coercive measures that are permissible. 
 
6.1. An analogous case of justified coercion 
 
The first principle states that the protection of human rights122 serves to morally 
justify coercion. One may defend this principle by appealing to a broader principle about 
the protection of rights: 
 
Protection of rights principle: it is sometimes permissible to use force to protect the 
basic rights of individuals. 
 
The protection of rights principle is supported by other cases in which some level of 
coercive force—even violence—is permitted to protect rights. Think of cases of self-
defence (outlined in the previous chapter), where some level of force is permitted to 
prevent culpable attacks against oneself or other innocents. In such a case, it seems 
                                                                
121 There is a sense in which this claim is uncontroversial, and does not need any defence. We generally take 
it for granted that states should protect human rights and can use some forms of justified coercion to achieve 
this. Yet given the controversial view of this chapter that democracy is not required to justify coercion, I will 
spend some time developing and defending the different elements of the human rights-based alternative. 
122 I should emphasise that I use the term ‘human rights’—rather than ‘moral’ or ‘natural’ rights—to capture 
the more expansive list of liberties included in most human rights declarations. These include political rights 
to free expression, freedom of thought and religious freedom, alongside the more basic rights to life, liberty 
and possession which are generally accepted to be basic moral rights, as well as human rights. 
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permissible to use some123 level of coercive force to protect rights, and cases of self-
defence support the protection of rights principle. 
Yet by itself, the protection of rights principle is not sufficient to explain why the 
use of coercion by a state is permissible. This is because states do not use force to protect 
rights in only one-off cases, but systematically. What we want is a principle which 
justifies the use of coercion not only in particular cases, but through the systematic 
coercion of law—laws which seek to disincentivize rights violations with the threat of 
sanction and punishment. We must provide some positive support for such a system. 
 
6.2. Human rights and the justification of a system of coercive law 
 
The second aspect of the human rights-based account is that human rights 
protection can inform a justification of a coercive system of laws. To see this, consider 
the following principle: 
 
System of rules principle124: it is sometimes permissible to impose a system of 
coercive rules (backed up with threats of sanction or punishment) to direct the 
conduct of individuals in such a way so as to protect basic rights. 
 
To support the system of rules principle, consider a case in which it looks permissible to 
impose a system of rules to direct the conduct of others in such a way as to prevent rights 
violations. Suppose there is a community comprised of a small groups of attackers (A) 
and a larger group of innocents (I). Suppose further that one of the ways in which A may 
be disincentivized from attacking I is if a system of rules backed up with the threat of 
sanction is implemented. Even if the imposition of such a system is only one way of 
protecting members of group I, it looks to be permissible to implement such a system, 
assuming further conditions are met such as that the rules do not impose sanctions that 
are draconian or brutal. Grounding this is the thought that morality requires the 
protection of the basic rights of individuals in group I, and thus justifies the 
implementation of such a system. 
                                                                
123 I say ‘some’ rather than ‘any’ to capture a proportionality requirement. It would not be that any level of 
force is justified but only a level that is proportionate to that which is required to protect/save/prevent 
harm. 
124 To connect this to the argument in chapter two, the system of rules would be an example of positive 
security, as a ‘rule, norm or procedure which exists to protect’. 
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A second argument draws upon a principle that has been developed by 
Buchanan (2002, pp. 703–709). This principle states that no one has a moral right against 
being coerced to do that which they have a natural obligation of justice to fulfil. If this is 
correct, then a system of coercive laws does not violate an individual’s moral rights if 
this individual possesses a moral duty to do the things that the law prescribes. More 
formally: ‘a coercive law prescribing x does not violate the moral rights of an individual 
y if y has an independent moral obligation to do x.’  
 The above argument requires some qualifications, however. It may be the case that 
laws which coerce individuals to fulfil certain duties of justice—say, to give half of their 
income to those in poverty—are overly demanding, given that some level of discretion 
and autonomy should be afforded to individuals over their decisions about how they 
wish to distribute their wealth. There are two ways around this challenge. This first 
denies that such duties—such as that of giving half of one’s wealth to charity—are 
indeed duties of justice. One may argue that such duties are overly-demanding, for 
instance, or may argue that the duty would be to give a ‘reasonable’ amount of one’s 
wealth, and that enforcing coercive taxation would be permissible if it sought only to 
gain this ‘reasonable’ amount.  The second response restricts the principle to negative 
duties of non-interference. On this view, an individual does not possess a right against 
coercive laws when these laws coincide with their negative duties such as those against 
killing, stealing or restricting the liberty of others. This view is supported by the thought 
that it would be implausible to suggest that the negative duties imposed by the criminal 
law violate the moral rights of individuals, because individuals have a moral obligation 
to not violate the basic rights of others (through killing, theft, etc.). Similarly, it would be 
implausible to suppose that I have a right against the policeman who restrains me to 
prevent me from killing another innocent individual. 
  While this second response is correct, we should be careful about restricting the 
principle to only negative duties of non-interference. This would only justify a very 
minimal set of libertarian laws which prohibit interference. Yet there are good reasons 
for thinking we want coercive laws to enforce some positive obligations as well, such as 
those which impose obligations to pay tax for the common good. Indeed, the human 
rights-based account can help to explain why coercion should enforce positive 
obligations. Article 22 of the Universal Declaration posits the following right to a dignified 
standard of life, ‘everyone…is entitled to realization…of the economic, social and 
cultural rights indispensable for his [or her] dignity’. This article could serve as the basis 
129 
 
of a justification of tax laws which imposes positive obligations on individuals to 
contribute to a state system of welfare and healthcare, for instance.  
 These two arguments support the coercive rules principle. First, that it is at least 
sometimes permissible to introduce coercive laws if this serves as one means of 
protecting human rights. Second, individuals do not possess a right against coercive 
laws which impose obligations which coincide with their pre-existing moral obligations. 
It follows that a system of coercive law is (at least sometimes) i) permissible and ii) not 
impermissible because it does not violate the rights of those it imposes obligations on.  
 
6.3. Human rights and restrictions on the limits of coercive authority 
 
 
A third way in which human rights play a role in an account of coercion concerns 
the nature and content of the coercive laws in question. Human rights serve to prescribe 
limits on laws and on the ways in which they are enforced. This is a central function of 
modern day human rights law, which imposes obligations on states to respect the human 
rights of their citizens. In failing to do so, states lose their legitimacy under international 
law and, sometimes, their right to sovereignty—their right against interference by other 
states or international bodies. Indeed, it is a central principle of international human 
rights law that an illegitimate state is a state which violates the human rights of their 
citizens, and these states lose their right against interference. 
Human rights can inform an account of the sorts of limits that apply to the 
content of legislation and the way in which it is enforced. Laws which seriously and 
systematically violate the human rights of citizens are impermissible, according to both 
human rights law and the human right-based view of justified coercion I defend in this 
chapter. Thus a state which legally licensed the systematic torture of its citizens, or 
imposed cruel and unusual punishments125, would no longer be justified in coercing. 
And the human rights-based view of justified coercion can explain why. It is the 
protection of human rights which justifies forms of political coercion—and in failing to 
protect human rights or in actively violating human rights states are no longer justified 
in coercing.  
                                                                
125 Torture is prohibited in most international human rights treatises. Article 7 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights includes a right against cruel and unusual punishment—‘No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.   
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In this section I have defended the following three principles, each of which 
explain how human rights serve to both justify the use of coercive authority, and also 
prescribe limits on the extent of that authority. 
 
 
i) It is sometimes permissible to use coercive force to protect basic human 
rights. 
ii) It is sometimes permissible to impose a system of coercive laws to protect 
basic human rights. 
iii) In order to be justified a system of coercive laws must not violate basic 
human rights. 
 
  Majoritarian democratic procedures provide an account of how potential law-
maker, agents in charge of coercion, come in to power. According to the argument in this 
chapter, these procedures are not necessary to justify state coercion. To many this 
conclusion may seem controversial, and I have shown how it runs contrary to a number 
of views in the scholarship on transitional justice and in political philosophy. Yet three 
broader arguments support this conclusion. 
 First, to reiterate a point I have highlighted throughout this chapter, my 
argument here is not that these conditions must be met in order for a state to be 
legitimate. In the following chapter I defend a more substantive set of conditions on 
legitimacy as the right to rule. More modestly, my claim here is that democracy is not 
necessary for state coercion, but that protecting human rights is. 
 Second, I take it that even the most ardent advocate of the democratic account of 
state coercion will see sense in the human rights-based alternative. This is because 
effective (and safe) democracy requires the protection of human rights. And given that 
the protection of human rights is essential, if not a necessary condition, for the political 
association required for democratic procedures, the human rights-based view is 
sensitive to this view that effective and just democratic procedures require certain pre-
conditions to be in place. 
 Third, the human rights-based view leaves scope for non-democratically elected 
political agents to use coercion in ways that look valuable, as in the hypothetical cases I 
presented above. In the coup d’etat case, the transitional government case and the 
military intervention case, political agents assume control of the state’s legislative 
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institutions (non-democratically) and introduce laws which protect human rights. The 
human-rights based defence of state coercion can explain why these agents are permitted 
to engage in this valuable coercive law-making which serves to protect individuals in 
ways that the view that democracy is necessary for political coercion cannot. I take this 
to be an intuitively plausible consequence of the account; we want these sorts of agents 
to be morally justified in implementing laws which serve to better protect human rights 
in fragile or violent political contexts (when the other option is belligerent, authoritarian 
rule). 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
  In this chapter I have sought to challenge the view, prevalent in both transitional 
justice scholarship and political philosophy, that democracy is necessary to justify state 
coercion. I challenged this view by highlighting how non-democratic forms of law-
making are valuable (and look permissible) and by illustrating a dilemma between 
minority rights and majority rule at the heart of the democratic view. I then argued that 
the protection of human rights should be a necessary condition on state coercion, and 
sketched different aspects of this view. Fair, safe and effective democracy presupposes 
the protection of human rights. Establishing the conditions for democracy should be a 
priority, I claimed, and one which morally justifies the state’s use of coercion. 
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VI. Transitional Justice, Political Legitimacy and Democracy 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Transitional justice is concerned with how states should progress to a more just 
political order while coming to terms with legacies of wrongdoing. One of the central 
goals of this process of political transition is bringing about a state that is legitimate. In 
this chapter, I want to consider this problem of political legitimacy, with particular 
reference to transitional justice contexts. In the previous chapter I developed a view of 
the conditions that must be fulfilled for states to engage in morally justified coercion. My 
argument was that democracy is not a necessary condition on justified coercion, but that 
the protection of human rights is. In this chapter I am interested in the conditions that 
must be fulfilled in order for states to achieve the more demanding standard of political 
legitimacy as the right to rule. My argument will be that democracy is not a necessary 
condition on political legitimacy. This view, I will argue, is both unique to the 
mainstream view (for important reasons I outline below) and also better able to respond 
to some of the challenges which arise in transitional societies.  
What is this mainstream view? Most commentators on transitional justice hold 
that the process of transition from conflict or illegitimate rule should ultimately seek to 
achieve democracy. According to this widely shared view, the transition to a state that 
is legitimate is taken to be a transition to a state that is democratic.126 Underpinning this 
                                                                
126 The prevailing assumption in favour of democratic legitimacy is now captured in international legal 
documents and scholarship in which there are proclamations and defences of the human rights to 
democracy and political participation. For instance, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity… (a) To take part in the conduct of public 
affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; (b) To vote and to be elected at genuine 
periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, 
guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors. 
For legal commentary on the human right to democracy see Fox and Roth (2000) and Franck (1992). For a 
philosophical defence of the human right to democracy see Christiano (2011). 
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view is the assumption—which is often stated without defence—that democracy is 
required for legitimacy. And to the extent that only democratic states are legitimate on 
this view—democracy is deemed to be a necessary condition for legitimacy. 
Throughout this thesis I agree with this broader view that democracy should be 
an end-goal of transitional justice, yet in this chapter I will to challenge the view that 
democracy is a necessary condition for political legitimacy (i.e. that only democratic states 
are legitimate). This for two reasons. First, I argue that constructing a democratically 
legitimate state can be a prohibitively expensive task, one which a number of resource-
poor states can simply not afford. Second, that other valuable forms of governance 
should be open for consideration in a way that the view that democracy is a necessary 
condition for political legitimacy does not allow. In the second half of the chapter, I draw 
on an argument developed by Dean Machin (2012) regarding the permissibility of non-
democratic forms of governance. I do so with a view to developing an alternative view 
of legitimacy which preserves some of the valuable aspects of democracy, while at the 
same time avoiding the challenges that I raise.  
I should stress from the outset that this chapter does not seek to offer a conclusive 
case against democracy. Nor do I seek to argue that democracy is without value. As I’ve 
already noted, my view is consistent with the view that democracy is, all things 
considered, the best form of political governance. And as I’ve noted I agree with the 
broad consensus in the commentary on transitional justice that the establishment of 
democracy should be an end-goal of political transition in the wake of conflict or 
illegitimate rule. Instead, my argument is specifically targeted against the view that 
democracy is required for a state to be legitimate—that states which are undemocratic are 
always necessarily illegitimate. And in making these claims, what interests me are those 
contexts in which democracy is difficult or even dangerous to implement, or where the 
emphasis on establishing democracy (because it is viewed as being necessary for 
legitimacy) is likely to prevent other important goals of political transition. In these 
cases, I will argue, we should be open to alternative views of legitimacy which preserve 
at least some of the more valuable elements of democracy, yet which are not democratic. 
The chapter will run as follows. In the following section, I consider the concept 
of political legitimacy. In section three I raise two problems for the view that democracy 
is a necessary condition for state legitimacy. In section four I draw on an account 
developed by Machin (2012) with a view to developing an alternative view of legitimacy 
which preserves important aspects of democracy (such as publicity, representativeness, 
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equality), while at the same time avoiding the problems I identify. In section five, I 
consider some implications of my argument for the problem of legitimacy in transitional 
justice contexts. 
 
2. What is political legitimacy? 
 
In the previous chapter I argued that political legitimacy concerns the conditions 
under which a state has the right to rule. I claimed that this was distinguishable from 
certain forms of morally justified coercion (the subject of the last chapter) and that while 
morally justified coercion is necessary for legitimacy, the same is not true vice versa. 
Recall that I captured this with the following diagram.  
 
FIGURE 3: DISTINGUISHING MORALLY JUSTIFIED COERCION FROM PROCEDURAL 
LEGITIMACY127 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will be interested in the conditions required for procedural legitimacy 
(between sections B and C). 128  The conditions required for legitimacy apply to the 
                                                                
127 This diagram is slightly different from Fig.2 above. What I want to capture here is that both morally 
justified coercion and procedural legitimacy are required for a legitimate state. Importantly, the two 
diagrams are consistent with one another.  
128 The distinction between morally justified coercion and legitimacy is captured by Rawls. Rawls claims 
that legitimacy is a property of the procedures and processes through which political agents (and law-
makers) come into power, and that this is distinct from the question of whether these procedures are just. 
He writes: 
A legitimate king or queen may rule by just or effective government, but then may not; and 
certainly not necessarily justly even though legitimately. Their being legitimate says something 
about their pedigree: how they came to their office. It refers to whether they were the legitimate 
A B C 
Morally Justified coercion Procedural legitimacy 
Legitimate State 
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procedures whereby law-makers come to power, whereas the conditions required for 
morally justified coercion apply to the standards of justified laws (in the previous 
chapter I argued that a necessary condition on this was the protection of human rights).  
To be sure, the problem of political legitimacy has long troubled political 
philosophers, and there are a number of different views in the literature on political 
philosophy about the conditions that a state must fulfil in order to possess the right to 
rule. Some believe that the question of legitimacy encompasses political obligation129—
that when a state is legitimate, citizens have a correlative moral obligation to obey the 
law. 130  Others claim that the problem of legitimacy is concerned solely with the 
justification of state coercion, and does not require political obligation.131 
If my view were to be aligned with any other view in the literature on political 
philosophy, it would be closest to Simmons (2001). Simmons distinguishes between a 
state which is morally permissible and a state which is legitimate. For a state to be 
morally permissible its existence must be shown to be, “on balance morally 
permissible… that it is rationally preferable to a feasible nonstate alternative” (Simmons, 
2001, p. 126), and this is distinct from the more demanding standards of legitimacy.132 I 
too maintain this distinction between permissible forms of coercion and legitimacy133, 
and in this chapter I am interested in the more demanding standards of political 
legitimacy.  
                                                                
heir to the throne in accordance with the established rules and traditions of, for example, the 
English or French crown (Rawls, 1995, p. 175). 
129 The problem of political obligation concerns whether citizens are morally obliged to obey the law. 
130 This view of legitimacy was endorsed by some social contract theorists, most notably Locke (Locke, 2003, 
p. 142), for whom both the moral justification of coercion and the obligation of citizens to obey the law are 
grounded in the consent of citizens. 
131 Wellman takes this view, claiming that a state is legitimate if it has a moral right to impose its coercive 
authority on citizens, which is separate from the question of whether citizens are morally obliged to obey 
the law (Wellman, 1996, pp. 211-212). Dworkin (1986) also endorses this view, writing that the question of 
justified authority—which Dworkin terms the ‘justification of general coercion’—is distinct from the 
question of whether citizens are obligated to obey the law. He writes: 
These two issues – whether the state is morally legitimate, in the sense that it is justified in using 
its force against citizens, and whether the state’s decisions impose genuine obligations on them—
are not identical (Dworkin, 1986, p. 191). 
 
132 For Simmons, legitimacy represents the: 
Complex moral right it [the state or government] possesses to be the exclusive imposer of binding 
duties on subjects, to have it’s subjects comply with these duties and to use coercion to enforce 
these duties (Simmons, 2001, p. 130). 
 
133 My view is not identical to Simmons because his view is that legitimacy requires political obligation. I do 
not believe political obligation is a requirement of legitimacy, though as none of my arguments rest on this 
point, I will say nothing about it in this chapter. 
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I do not want to get too distracted by these competing views of the conditions 
required for political legitimacy. To the extent that my argument applies to all views of 
political legitimacy which hold democracy to be a necessary condition, I will not commit 
myself to any more specific view of legitimacy beyond the fact that I believe it requires 
both the moral justification of coercion and procedural legitimacy.  
This may leave us wondering why we require conditions on the legitimacy of 
states at all. Why is it important to have standards on a state’s legitimacy? Why not be 
content that a state is morally justified in coercing? 
We want states to be legitimate for at least two reasons, both of which I noted in 
the previous chapter. First, in claiming to possess the right to rule, states claim to possess 
a monopoly on justified authority over a given jurisdiction. As I noted in the previous 
chapter, states use coercion exclusively—in such a way that the laws of the state have 
supreme power, and no other group has a moral right to impose coercive laws. States 
not only seek to have authority over citizens, but to have exclusive authority. And it is 
only legitimate states which possess the monopoly on authority, in such a way as to 
exclude other groups from coercing.134 
Second, on a related point, legitimate states have the right not only to coerce their 
own citizens but to coerce non-nationals within the particular jurisdiction or territory 
the state has authority over. States not only impose laws on those who are born within 
the territory which the state has authority over, but also over foreign nationals who by 
entering this jurisdiction become subject to the states authority. Again, the fact that a 
state claims the right to rule over foreign nationals when they enter a geographical 
territory means an account of legitimacy must explain why it is permissible for the state 
to exercise its authority over individuals who are not nationals of the territory. 
It is for these two reasons—that legitimate states have a monopoly on force and 
that they possess this monopoly over a particular territory or jurisdiction—that we want 
states to be legitimate, and not just to be morally justified in coercing. 
I want to raise one final point regarding legitimacy. This aspect will prove 
particularly important with respect to the remainder of the chapter. An account of 
political legitimacy must provide a response to what Buchanan (2002) has called the 
                                                                
134 This point on the monopoly of force is illustrated by the distinction between morally justified coercion 
and legitimacy. A state which fulfils the conditions for legitimacy has a monopoly on force, and state which 
only fulfils the conditions for morally justified coercion does not. Thus if a military force assumed control 
of a state it would not have a monopoly on force (because it is not legitimate) and other forms of coercion 
would be permissible (i.e. rough justice practices or other punishments). 
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‘egalitarian challenge’. The egalitarian challenge is a demand on the justification of 
political authority. It requires political power to be exercised in such a way as to respect 
the fundamental moral equality of human beings. In Buchanan’s terms: 
 
If we are all equal, what can justify some persons (the government) making, 
applying, and enforcing rules on us? How can the justified wielding of political 
power be squared with the fundamental equality of persons? (Buchanan, 2002, 
pp. 697-698). 
 
The challenge states that political authority—the right of some individuals to rule over 
others—must be justified in such a way as to respect the fundamental moral equality of 
individuals, and this serves as a central demand on an account of political legitimacy. 
 Importantly, the egalitarian challenge must be met on two fronts (Buchanan, 
2002, pp. 711-712; Machin, 2012, p. 103). First, an account of legitimacy must explain why 
the equality of individuals is respected in terms of the substantive content of law (the 
‘substantive requirement’). Second, it must be shown how the equality of individuals is 
respected in the processes through which a state’s laws are made (call this the ‘process 
requirement’).135 
To be sure, democracy is not required to fulfil the substantive requirement of 
equality. It is conceivable that a monarch, or an undemocratically elected oligarchy could 
issue benign laws which respect equality, for instance in the form of laws which 
guarantee the human rights of all citizens are protected and respected in a manner akin 
to the view developed in the previous chapter. Yet democracy is commonly regarded as 
being essential to meeting the process requirement. This is because only law-making 
procedures which afford all individuals an equal say in decisions in the processes which 
determine who comes to make the laws can be said to respect the basic moral equality 
of individuals, or so one argument goes.136 From the process requirement, then, it seems 
to follow that only democracy can confer legitimacy on a political authority. 
                                                                
135 Importantly, both the process requirement and the substantive requirement of the egalitarian challenge 
must be met by an account of legitimacy. This is because even if laws respect equality in their content, this 
is separate from the question of whether the processes for deciding who gets to make the laws respect 
equality—something that must be independently justified. This view is very similar to my own overall view 
of a legitimate state which is one that is morally justified in coercing because it protects human rights and 
which is procedurally legitimate because it meets four equality-respecting conditions in law-making 
procedures. I explain this view, which is an amalgamation of the arguments in this and the previous chapter, 
at the end of this chapter. 
136 In Buchanan’s terms: 
  
A theory of legitimacy that does not include a democratic requirement faces an unanswerable 
objection: if the political system should express a fundamental commitment to equal consideration 
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In the following section I will consider this popular view that democracy is a 
necessary condition of procedural political legitimacy (from hereon just ‘legitimacy’) in 
more depth with a view to ultimately rejecting it in section four. 
 
3. Democratic legitimacy 
 
In this section, I will consider the view that democracy is a necessary condition 
for political legitimacy. Let me begin by re-emphasising the point that I am not seeking 
to develop a knock-down argument against the view that democracy is a valuable means 
of political governance. Rather, my precise target is the view that democracy is a 
necessary condition of political legitimacy—that without democracy a state does not and 
cannot possess the right to rule. As I shall explain below, my arguments are consistent 
with the view that democracy is the best means of political governance and (as such) 
should be a central aim of transitional justice. Yet according to my argument, it should 
not be seen as required for a state to be legitimate, as I shall explain in more depth below. 
 A second point to highlight as I noted in the previous chapter is that there are a 
wide variety of views about what democracy is, how it should be constructed and why 
it is valuable. For instance, there are different views about the procedures around 
democracy, such as whether democracy implies majority rule137, or requires a voting 
lottery. While there is broad agreement that democracy means ‘self-rule’ or ‘government 
by the people’ there is substantive disagreement about whether this requires procedures 
of direct or representative participation. Third, there is disagreement about what is 
morally valuable about democracy and about what principle or collection of principles 
morally justify democracy, whether this is equality, or liberty, or some combination of 
the two. In this chapter I will not take a stance on these substantive problems in 
democratic theory. This for two reasons. First, my argument is not contingent on any 
particular view of democracy. It applies only to the view that democracy is required for 
                                                                
of persons, why shouldn’t this commitment be reflected in the processes by which laws are made 
and in the selection of persons to adjudicate and enforce the laws, not simply in the content of the 
laws (Buchanan, 2002, p. 712). 
137 Some commentators hold that majority rule is essential to democracy. Wolff, for instance, writes that: 
 
So widespread is the belief in majority rule that there is not a single variant of democratic theory 
which does not call upon it as the means for composing differences and arriving at decisions (Wolff, 
1970, p. 38). 
 
Other commentators believe other, non-majoritarian forms of democracy are possible, for instance 
Saunders (2010). 
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legitimacy, and this argument is not effected by the particular view of democracy we 
endorse. Second, I take it that there is some agreement about what democracy is, and 
what it requires, as a system of political decision-making which confers legitimacy, such 
that it is possible to meaningfully to engage with the view that democracy is a necessary 
condition of legitimacy. Cohen captures this very generalised sense of democracy: 
 
The fundamental idea of democratic legitimacy is that the authorization to exercise 
state power must arise from the collective decision of the members of a society 
which are governed by that power (1997, p. 407). 
 
I share this very broad sense of democracy138, as roughly ‘rule by the people’139, and will 
not endorse any more particular account of democracy beyond it. 
The view that democracy is necessary for legitimate political authority is 
common in the scholarship and policy around transitional justice. Recall the argument 
from Winter set out in the previous chapter that, “a state has legitimacy when it is 
permissible for it to issue and enforce laws and regulations” (2013, p. 231). And 
democracy is necessary for this coercion to be permissible: 
 
It is a necessary condition of a legitimate political order that it enables those 
governed to play equal and meaningful roles in the process of government (2013, 
p. 237). 
 
And Wierzynska writes: 
 
Since democracy signifies the rule of the people, it will act in the interest of the 
people-protecting the people's security, well-being, political liberties, and other 
human rights. Thus, a democratic government will enjoy … legitimacy (2004, p. 
1948). 
 
The view that democracy is a necessary condition of political legitimacy is also 
common in the literature in political philosophy. The most detailed defence of this claim, 
as highlighted in the previous chapter, is from Buchanan (2002). Buchanan’s argument 
                                                                
138 Note that this broad sense of democratic legitimacy does not take a stance on substantive points of 
disagreement in democratic theory—i.e. whether democracy implies majority rule, or the moral value of 
democracy. 
139 The only other element of democracy I believe to be essential (and indeed I’m unaware of anyone who 
denies this) is that democracy affords a vote to all citizens and all votes are counted equally. 
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is that political power must be wielded in such a way as to respect what he terms the 
Robust Natural Duty of Justice (RNDJ) (2002, pp. 703-709). The RNDJ is an egalitarian 
principle which requires that political authority is exercised in such a way as to ensure 
that the interests of all individuals are given equal consideration and that the 
fundamental moral equality of individuals is reflected in the procedures whereby law-
makers come to power. Importantly, only democratic governance can fulfil the RNDJ.  
Buchanan writes: 
 
If the wielding of political power is morally justifiable only if it is wielded in such 
a way as to recognise the fundamental equality of persons, and if democracy is 
necessary for satisfying this condition, then political legitimacy requires 
democracy (2002, p. 712). 
 
Indeed, Buchanan’s claim is precisely that democracy is required for the exercise of 
political power to be justified (i.e. to meet the condition on the fundamental equality of 
persons), and that democracy is necessary for procedural legitimacy as well. For 
Buchanan, only democratic procedures can meet the egalitarian challenge. And insofar 
as the egalitarian challenge must be met by any account of legitimacy, it follows that 
democracy is a necessary condition on legitimacy.140 In the following section, I want to 
challenge this common view that democracy is a necessary condition on political 
legitimacy. 
 
4. Challenging the view that democracy is necessary for legitimacy 
 
 In this section, I want to raise two objections to the view that democracy is a 
necessary condition of state legitimacy. In the following section I will draw on an account 
of legitimacy developed by Machin (2012) which preserves some of the virtues of 
democracy while at the same time avoiding the challenges I raise in this section. 
The first objection I make highlights the financial costs involved in establishing 
democracy—funding elections, political campaigning, advertising, security costs, party-
funding, and so on. In some states these figures are extremely high—figures for 
spending by candidates in the 2016 US election, for example, are estimated by some 
sources at $6.8 billion (Berr, 2016), and costs for the 2015 UK elections are placed at 
                                                                
140 Other authors have defended the claim that democracy is a requirement on state legitimacy in different 
ways. See for instance Estlund (2008, pp. 85-97) and Christiano (2004). 
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£113,255,271 (Cowling, 2013). Even in smaller South American states, total spending for 
elections is estimated in the tens of millions, 
   
In Honduras, a very speculative estimate calculated public and private funds 
raised for the 2005 general election at USD 40.5 million…In Nicaragua…USD 18.2 
million…The only available information on El Salvador corresponds to state 
subsidies, which came to USD 22.5 million…In the case of Panama…USD 13.4 
million (Casas-Zamora & Zovatto, 2016, p. 59). 
 
I highlight these figures to make the following point: if we endorse the view that 
democracy is necessary for legitimacy, then there will be states that will inevitably be 
illegitimate by virtue of the fact that they cannot afford the financial burdens required 
to establish democracy.  
Take a state like Iraq. Since the war in 2003, the United States has invested billions 
of dollars into promoting democracy in Iraq. Some sources, taking figures from the US 
treasury, claim it has cost $212bn to reconstruct the country, “with most of that cash 
going to security” (Khan, 2014). Other sources claim: 
 
Billions went towards “Democratic nation-building,” such as a $750 million 
dollar U.S. Embassy building in Baghdad; $500 million for an Iraq police training 
program; and $17.1 million towards fostering political competition in Iraq in 
2011, though there were “no results reported”, according to United State Agency 
of International Development (Dovi, 2015). 
 
Of course, it is true that these resources may not—indeed likely would not—have all 
been effectively allocated to democratisation. Many resources were lost to corruption 
and bribery, for instance. Yet, notwithstanding this misspending, suppose the US had 
not been involved in the attempt to democratise Iraq. Suppose the US had left 
immediately after the deposition of Saddam Hussein. Imagine how financially 
burdensome it would have been if Iraq had incurred these costs by itself. The billions of 
pounds required to promote democracy would have been so expensive for the state that 
it would have been seriously economically debilitating (Iraq’s GDP in 2015 was $211.9bn 
[World Bank, 2017]).  
I take it that this serves as a practical objection to the view that democracy is 
necessary for legitimacy. In light of the figures on the costliness of democratic elections 
and campaigns, there will be cases where states can simply not afford to be legitimate. 
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If we hold the view that democracy is necessary for legitimacy, then we must accept that 
vast sums may need to be spent to implement democracy, if a state is to enjoy the right 
to rule. And these resources must be spent, even though they can be better allocated to 
other state provisions. This is problematic, particularly in the case of fragile, transitional 
states, because it may simply be the case that states cannot afford the resources to 
implement democracy effectively. A view of legitimacy that is so costly to implement 
need not be wrong, of course. But having a view of the conditions required for the right 
to rule which involves potentially debilitating levels of financial investment (levels that 
many states around the world simply do not possess) does look extremely demanding, 
if not overly-demanding. 
A second worry with the view that democracy is a necessary condition of state 
legitimacy is that this view immediately rules out as illegitimate other forms of political 
governance that look valuable. The objection has been developed by Machin (2012) who 
similarly challenges the view that democracy is a necessary condition of legitimacy. 
Machin introduces the following example to illustrate the objection: 
 
[Imagine] there is a choice between two states of affairs—J and L. In J laws are 
made non-democratically, perhaps by a Millian Charlemagne, and fair equality 
of opportunity for J’s citizens is secured. We can stipulate that L differs from J 
only in the following regard: in L laws are made democratically, fair equality of 
opportunity is not realised, and it is not realized because laws are made 
democratically. In all other relevant regards J and L are similar…The WDN claim 
[the claim that democracy is necessary for political legitimacy] implies that we 
cannot even consider J: it is not in the morally permissible set of law-making 
institutions (Machin, 2012, pp. 104-105).    
 
Machin’s argument is that it is problematic to view democracy as being necessary for 
political legitimacy, because other valuable forms of non-democratic governance are 
ruled out as being morally impermissible.  
This is problematic for at least two reasons (though Machin does not cash out the 
objection in exactly these terms), both of which I noted in the previous chapter. First, 
because other non-democratic means of coercive law-making are valuable, but (as I 
explained in the last chapter) are always necessarily impermissible, according to this 
view, by virtue of the fact that they are not democratic. Second, there are cases in which 
democratic law-making can lead to injustice (in Machin’s example, a failure to bring 
about fair opportunity, in my own view the tyranny of the majority set out in the 
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previous chapter), but because democracy is a necessary condition for political 
legitimacy this injustice must always be tolerated (in a trade-off between accepting or 
not accepting this injustice). 
 We can develop this objection further by making the view that democracy is 
necessary for legitimacy look even more counter-intuitive. Imagine there are two 
states—A and B. State A is democratic, but citizens have only two political candidates to 
choose from, candidates who have come to power as a result of gross inequalities in the 
distribution of wealth and who fail to properly represent the interests of a large number 
of citizens. Suppose further that state A is corrupt, fails to meet the basic needs of many 
citizens, implements policies which disadvantage minority groups and fails to provide 
effective welfare and healthcare. State B on the other hand is undemocratic (say, a benign 
dictatorship) but has a reasonably equitable distribution of resources, including excellent 
welfare and healthcare provisions, the state is also progressive and respects civil and 
political rights to free speech and political and religious expression. In the case of a 
comparison between these two hypothetical states, the problem with the view that 
democracy is necessary for political legitimacy, is that state B—which we can suppose is 
preferable to state A in all ways apart from that it is undemocratic—is and can never be 
legitimate (or possess the right to rule), even though it is valuable, and indeed preferable, 
in all other respects. I take it that this case shows that it is implausible to suppose that 
only democratic forms of law-making are permissible in such a case. 
In this section I have raised two objections to the view that democracy is 
necessary for political legitimacy. In the following section I will consider an alternative 
view of legitimacy which has been developed by Machin (2012). This view preserves 
some of the more valuable elements of democratic legitimacy, while avoiding the two 
objections I have raised. Following this, I will draw out some implications of this 
alternative view on the question of establishing a legitimate state in transitional justice 
contexts. 
 
5. Machin’s alternative to democracy 
 
The main argument that Machin (2012) develops, which I will defend and 
develop as well, is that some non-democratic forms of law-making can confer legitimacy 
to states, if these forms of law-making meet four conditions. The implication of this view 
that I’m interested in (particularly with respect to transitional justice cases) is that non-
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democratic forms of coercive law-making can be legitimate if they meet the four 
conditions that Machin sets out. 
In developing his account of legitimacy, Machin similarly seeks to respond to the 
argument that democracy is a necessary condition of political legitimacy. Machin seeks 
to show that this view is false, and that forms of non-democratic governance can in fact 
confer legitimacy (the right to rule) to states if these forms of governace meet certain 
conditions.141 
In order to make this argument Machin claims (2012, p. 102) it must be shown 
that non-democratic forms of governance can meet the ‘egalitarian challenge’. As 
outlined above, the egalitarian challenge is a demand on the justification of political 
legitimacy. It claims that political legitimacy—the right of some individuals to rule over 
others—must be justified in such a way as to respect the fundamental moral equality of 
individuals. Many democratic theorists, such as Buchanan (2002), use the egalitarian 
challenge to show that only democracy can justify the inequalities of political power. The 
reason it does so is that it affords all individuals a say in determining who comes to 
govern over them, and in doing so it succeeds in respecting the fundamental equality of 
individuals. In Buchanan’s terms: 
 
According to what may be the most plausible version of democratic theory, the 
inequality that political power inevitably involves is justifiable if every citizen 
has “an equal say” in determining who will wield the power and how it will be 
wielded, at least so far as the content of the most basic laws is concerned ( 2002, 
p. 710). 
 
Buchanan’s claim is that it is only democracy that can overcome the egalitarian challenge. 
And it is this claim that Machin’s alternative account of legitimacy seeks to challenge.  
To be sure, one may take a different approach to the egalitarian challenge by 
rejecting the principle of equality, or questioning its importance relative to other 
principles. For instance, one could deny that there is a fundamental moral equality 
between individuals, or downplay the importance of the principle in an account of 
                                                                
141 There is an important differences between my own and Machin’s views of political legitimacy, which will 
impact on some of the conclusions we respectively arrive at. For instance, Machin holds that legitimacy (the 
right to rule) is a scalar matter of degree (2012, p. 103), and that agents (such as just foreign military powers) 
can have a right to rule in the weaker sense. My view is that the justified coercion and legitimacy are 
separate, such that a just military power would be justified in coercing but would not in any sense possess 
legitimacy (i.e. they would not be legitimate, even in the weaker sense). I note this only for clarity, none of 
my arguments are altered by this difference in views. 
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political legitimacy, or argue that other values (liberty, fair opportunity, or giving people 
what they deserve, for instance) outweigh the requirements of equality in the 
justification of political legitimacy. 
Yet there are good reasons for wanting to preserve the principle of equality as 
both a bedrock moral principle, and as a demand on procedural legitimacy. Two reasons 
stand out in particular—one moral and one specific to transitional justice cases. First, the 
principle of equality—that all individuals are morally equal and that this should be 
reflected in an account of what gives some individuals the right to rule—conforms with 
a number of our shared intuitions about the value of individuals. Second, basic moral 
equality as a desideratum of political legitimacy is important—indeed especially 
important—in the wake of periods of political oppression and authoritarian rule, when 
the basic moral equality of individuals is not respected, and where for that very reason, 
we reject that dictators or other forms of authoritarian rule have the right to rule.142 There 
is thus a strong intuitive argument in favour of preserving egalitarian principles as 
morally bedrock, and also contextual reasons which arise from the context of transitional 
justice. As such, I believe we should take the egalitarian challenge seriously as a demand 
on political legitimacy.  
Machin seeks to show that it is not democracy per se which is necessary to meet 
the process requirement of legitimacy. Instead, four conditions must be met. And, 
crucially, it is the fact that democracy meets these fours conditions that means it satisfies the 
process requirement of legitimacy, and not democracy per se.  
The four conditions are as follows (Machin, 2012, pp. 106-107): 
 
i) Horizontal equality 
ii) An acceptable level of vertical inequality 
iii) That citizens have an institutionalised opportunity for a voice. 
iv) Publicity 
 
I will explain each in turn.  
                                                                
142  One hallmark feature of an illegitimate state is that it fails to respect the basic moral equality of 
individuals. This may be because of the persecution of minority groups, because legal systems fail to respect 
the principle of ‘equality under law’ (that all are subject to the same laws, and that the law does not 
discriminate against particular groups) or because a monarch or dictator rules in such a way as to not consult 
those subject to their rule (thereby failing to respect the fundamental equality of individuals’ interests). 
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The requirement of horizontal equality states that political procedures which 
confer legitimacy must respect horizontal equality—“the equality between citizens qua 
citizens” (Machin, 2012, p. 106). The condition of acceptable vertical inequality requires an 
explanation of why some individuals can come to possess law-making power, and why 
this inequality in power (between law-makers and citizens) is not unacceptable. Both of 
these conditions are met, Machin claims, through procedures which grant citizens a say 
in electing and removing their state’s lawmakers.143 Such procedures also account for 
acceptable vertical inequality—law makers have the right to rule because they have 
stood to be a representative and have gained the support of the people in procedures 
which grant citizens a say in who comes to make the laws which govern over them 
(Machin, 2012, p. 106). 
The third condition is that citizens are afforded an institutionalised opportunity to 
voice their opinion on who should come to create the laws which govern over them. This 
is important for a number of reasons—“it gives citizens some control over their own 
fate”, “it publicly declares that citizens are moral equals” and “it offers a way of 
legitimizing certain laws independently of their content” (Machin, 2012, pp. 106-107). 
All are achieved when decision-making procedures offer individuals a voice in who 
governs over them. 
The fourth condition is that of publicity. The importance of publicity as a 
condition on legitimacy is that “citizens are entitled to some account of why their 
legislature passed law f rather than law g (or indeed no law at law)” (Machin, 2012, p. 
107). And the need for transparency is grounded in a more basic principle about the need 
for openness in the working of political institutions more generally. Here Machin cites 
Jeremy Waldron: 
 
Society should be a transparent order, in the sense that its working and principles 
should be well-known and available for public apprehension and scrutiny 
(Machin, 2012, p. 107). 
 
Machin’s argument is that when these four conditions are met, the process 
element of the egalitarian challenge is fulfilled. That is, when the conditions of horizontal 
equality, acceptable vertical inequality, an institutionalised voice and publicity are met, 
the question—“if we are all equal, why should only some of us wield political power” 
                                                                
143 There is an important question about how many citizens must vote to achieve these two conditions. The 
example below of the BCCA below illustrates that not all citizens need to participate in political procedures 
in order for them to confer legitimacy, so long as this exclusion is justified. 
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—is responded to acceptably, and the procedures are legitimate. The fundamental 
equality between citizens is respected, and the inequalities between citizens and 
lawmakers are justified. Crucially, Machin claims, it is only because democracy meets 
these four conditions that it responds to the egalitarian challenge. 
At this point one may quite reasonably object that the four conditions look to be 
so intrinsic to democracy, that surely only democratic forms of legitimacy can meet 
them. There are two responses to this concern. First, there has been no mention so far of 
affording one vote to one person, or of requiring votes from all individuals, or indeed of 
elections at all. Nor has there been any mention of political parties or of promoting 
political competition. Nor indeed have we heard any of the taglines of democracy ‘rule 
of the people’, ‘will of the people’ or ‘majority rule’. The point being that none of the 
features typically deemed to be essential to democracy are required by the four 
conditions.  
Second, Machin introduces an example of non-democratic governance which 
meets the four conditions. To illustrate how the four condition can confer legitimacy on 
political procedures Machin appeals to an example from the scholarship on deepening 
democracy. Accounts of deepening democracy seek to, “enable citizens to have a 
meaningful input in bureaucratic (and other) decisions in circumstances in which it is 
not feasible for all citizens to have a say” (Machin, 2012, p. 109). In the event that a 
democratic procedure which affords a vote to all individuals cannot be assembled, then 
the field of ‘deepening democracy’ seeks to explore alternative means of political 
participation. 
The example Machin gives is that of a Citizen’s Assembly in British Columbia 
(BCCA) which was used to make recommendations on electoral reform for the 
democratic system of British Columbia (2012, pp. 109-110). Members of the assembly 
were taken from representative groups—according to a representative distribution of 
age, gender, race, and so on. The Assembly heard presentations from specialists and 
consulted with citizens in their process of deliberation on how best to reform the 
electoral system. 
Machin claims that the Assembly satisfies the four conditions of political 
legitimacy, and as such that the decisions of the assembly are legitimate.144 First, the 
                                                                
144 Clearly, the point here is not the assembly has the right to rule British Columbia—this was never in 
question, the assembly is not a legitimate state. The question is whether the decisions of the assembly are 
legitimate, and the claim here is that they are because the procedures which arrived at these decision met 
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assembly offered British Columbian citizens an institutionalised opportunity for a voice in 
electoral reforms. Machin writes, “not all of those who were interested in joining the 
BCCA [British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly] were admitted but there were good 
reasons for this in terms of the diversity and representativeness of the BCCA” (Machin, 
2012, p. 109). This also explains how the Assembly meets the conditions of vertical and 
horizontal equality. The Assembly meets the condition of acceptable vertical equality 
because exclusion was justified on the “plausible” terms of representativeness and 
diversity (2012, p. 109), in light of the fact that it was logistically impossible to consult all 
citizens. The condition on horizontal equality is met because individuals are not 
discriminated against on unjustifiable grounds, and as such they are respected as equal 
qua citizens. Machin writes, “it [the Assembly] didn’t make any invidious comparisons 
between the included and excluded citizens” (2012, p. 109). Finally, the Assembly held 
public hearings and published its findings and in doing so met the publicity requirement. 
Accordingly, the Assembly meets the four necessary conditions of legitimacy.  
Machin’s four conditions, he claims, are necessary for procedural legitimacy. 
They confer legitimacy because they respond to the process requirement of the 
egalitarian challenge—“the problem that if we are all equal, how can some come to rule 
over others?” It is the fact that democracy typically meets the four conditions that it 
responds to the egalitarian challenge. But democracy itself is not necessary for 
procedural legitimacy, the four conditions are. 
Machin qualifies his defence of the four conditions in a number of important 
ways. First, he claims the account is not meant to show that non-democratic forms of 
law-making are to be preferred, all things considered (Machin, 2012, p. 103). The four 
conditions show that some non-democratic forms of law-making are morally 
permissible (if they meet the four conditions) not that they are morally preferable, all 
things considered, to democracy. Second, the defence of the four conditions is not 
intended to meet all of the requirements imposed by different accounts of legitimacy 
(Machin, 2012, p. 106). As noted above, there is a wide diversity of views in the literature 
about what legitimacy requires, and developing an account which meets all of the 
requirements of these views would be, in Machin’s terms, “a difficult task”. Instead, the 
more limited aim of the four conditions view is to show first, “that addressing the 
process-aspect of the egalitarian challenge does not require democracy” and second, that 
                                                                
the four conditions. In principle, the same applies to the procedures adopted by the state to explain why the 
state possesses the right to rule.   
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“non-democratic forms of law-making cannot be excluded from consideration” (Machin, 
2012, p. 106). 
There are two further points I want to raise here. First, I want to re-emphasise 
that the four conditions are not sufficient to legitimise political power, but only necessary. 
Other conditions must be met by all things considered legitimate states and indeed I will 
later claim that the condition on justified coercion set out in the previous chapter is one 
of them. Second, one virtue of the four conditions view is that it provides normative 
guidance about legitimate and illegitimate forms of governance, and why we should 
seek to move from the latter to the former (as an implication for transitional justice 
contexts). Machin writes: 
 
Dictatorship is ruled out because it is regularly incompatible with the 
requirements of publicity and because it denies citizens any institutionalized 
opportunity for a voice in decisions that affect them (2012, p. 107). 
 
So too would other forms of governance which did not allow citizens a say in who comes 
to govern—monarchies or oligarchies, theocracies or plutocracies. The four conditions 
thus provide normative guidance by explaining when and why a political agent does or 
does not possess the right to rule. 
The main point I want to take from Machin’s view—which is illustrated by the 
case of the British Columbian assembly—is that non-democratic forms of governance 
can confer political legitimacy. In the following section, I will explore this conclusion 
with particular reference to transitional justice.  
 
6. Implications for transitional states 
 
Thus far I have challenged the view—common in the literature in political 
philosophy and in scholarship on transitional justice—that democracy is a necessary 
condition of political legitimacy. Drawing on an account developed by Machin I 
introduced an alternative view of the necessary conditions required for a state to possess 
the right to rule. In this section, I will draw out some implications of my argument for 
the problem of political legitimacy in the context of transitional justice.  
To begin with, recall the problem of political legitimacy in the context of 
transitional justice. Transitional justice is the process of moving from authoritarian rule 
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or conflict to more just political societies, while at the same time coming to terms with 
legacies of wrongdoing. One of the central problems of transitional justice is the 
establishment of a legitimate state which possesses the right to rule (with all the 
important permissions this encompasses—the monopoly on power, meeting the 
egalitarian challenge and so on). According to the mainstream view in the literature on 
transitional justice and political philosophy, the establishment of a legitimate state is the 
establishment of a democratic state—only states that are democratic are legitimate in the 
sense that they have the right to rule. Machin’s four conditions view which I have 
defended in this chapter challenges this mainstream view. It states that four conditions 
are necessary for legitimacy, and not democracy. These conditions—horizontal equality, 
an acceptable level of vertical inequality, that citizens have an institutionalised 
opportunity for a voice and publicity—must be met for a state to be legitimate. And, 
importantly, it is only because democracy satisfied these four conditions that it confers 
legitimacy on states. 
Here I want to unite this view of procedural legitimacy with the necessary 
condition on morally justified coercion set out in the previous chapter. An all-things-
considered legitimate state, on this view, is a state that is both morally justified in 
coercing and fulfils the condition on procedural legitimacy, 
 
a) Morally justified coercion, 
 
i) The protection of human rights. 
 
b) Procedural legitimacy  
 
ii) Horizontal equality. 
iii) Reasonable vertical equality. 
iv) Institutionalised voice. 
v) Public equality.  
 
All of these conditions must be met for a state to be legitimate, on the view I have 
defended in this and the previous chapter. 
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 Here I want to briefly consider what this view of political legitimacy means for 
cases of transitional justice. Consider a variation of the diagram I outlined above, 
 
FIGURE 4: A REPRESENTATION OF TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
Suppose we represent the process of political transition from authoritarian rule to 
democracy as preceding from A to B to C. A represents a period of illegitimacy where 
governments are authoritarian (or otherwise undemocratic), commit systematic rights 
violations and fail to respect the rule of law (or fail to respect the moral equality of 
individuals in other ways). Suppose at A1 the illegitimate state is deposed and a 
transitional government comes to power (say a foreign power, or a rich elite). On my 
account, between A1 and B this government should be engaging in justified coercion145, 
a necessary condition of which is that human rights are protected. Having secured the 
protection of human rights, between B and C this agent should be seeking to establish 
the four conditions of horizontal equality, an acceptable level of vertical inequality, that 
citizens have an institutionalised opportunity for a voice and publicity. At phase C, in 
securing both morally justified coercion (protecting rights) and procedural legitimacy 
(procedures which meet the four conditions), the state in question is legitimate, and 
possesses the right to rule. Importantly, both the conditions on justified coercion and the 
conditions on procedural legitimacy must be met if the process of transitional justice is 
to achieve a legitimate state, on this view. 146 
                                                                
145 Indeed, to take the broader view of this thesis, one of the ways in which the government should be 
engaging in justified coercion is through practices of punishment formulated along the lines of the self-
defence view defended in chapter four. Moreover, I take it that citizens may be justified in engaging in rough 
justice in the interests of self-defence. This would be permitted because we have not yet arrived at a 
legitimate state which possesses the monopoly on coercion. 
146 One point to raise with respect to this representation of transitional justice is that it is unlikely that the 
process of transition will be as seamless as the process implied by the diagram. The process will unlikely be 
an easy transition from illegitimate rule to a transitional government to a legitimate state. 
A B C 
Morally Justified coercion Procedural legitimacy 
A1 
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Let me focus in on the phase of moving towards procedural legitimacy between 
B and C in more depth.   
 
 
FIGURE 5: STAGES OF TRANSITION TO PROCEDURAL LEGITIMACY 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
      
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 At B we have arrived at a state which is morally justified in coercing, and between 
B and C we are seeking to establish a state that is procedurally legitimate and has the 
right to rule. One virtue of the ‘four conditions’ view is that it explains the conditions 
that a transitional government must put in place (between B and C) to secure the right 
to rule. There are two elements to this. First, as noted above, the four conditions explain 
what is wrong about illegitimate states. In this sense the four conditions inform a 
normative account of the elements of illegitimate states that should be changed. 
According to the four conditions, illegitimate states are morally problematic because, 
 
i) Horizontal equality is not respected—citizens are not treated as equals (for 
instance through laws which persecute minority groups). 
ii) Acceptable vertical inequality is not met—an authoritarian ruler fails to 
rule in such a way that the inequalities in political power between them 
and citizens are morally justified.  
iii) Publicity—authoritarian rulers make laws secretly, in a way that is not 
transparent or open for citizens. 
Publicity Horizontal 
Equality 
Acceptable 
vertical 
inequality 
Institutionalised 
voice 
 
B C 
Procedural Legitimacy  
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iv) Institutional voice—citizens are denied a say in the processes whereby laws 
are made and therefore the substantive laws will not be representative.  
 
In explaining what is wrong about the law-making procedures adopted by illegitimate 
or authoritarian states, the four conditions provide an account of what should be altered 
at an institutional level during the period of political transition.   
  Second, and relatedly, the four conditions provide a positive account—a kind of 
blueprint—of the stages that states must go through in order to progress towards 
procedural legitimacy. There are three things to note on this point. First, there is no 
reason why the progression through these stages should be in any particular order, or 
indeed cannot take place simultaneously. Second, some measures will fulfil more than 
one of these conditions—for instance a procedure which is representative and affords 
citizens a say in who comes to possess law-making power will fulfil the horizontal and 
institutionalised voice conditions. Third, making the transition through these stages will 
be a vital pre-requisite for achieving fully-fledged democracy (recall it is because 
democracies achieve these four conditions that they are procedurally legitimate). As 
such, we can see achieving these conditions as being part of the broader transitional goal 
of arriving at a democratic state. 
 To be sure, to re-iterate a point I have made repeatedly, this view is consistent with 
the view that democracy is the best form of governance, a form that confers legitimacy 
on states in a way that no other form of legitimacy can.147 But in the event that democracy 
is prohibitively difficult—because it is too expensive, because establishing democracy 
will divert resources from other important institutions or because establishing 
democracy will mean other important political goals cannot be realised—what we want 
is a view of legitimacy that can preserve some of the important elements of democracy 
while avoiding these challenges. 
The four conditions view provides this account. In not requiring a vote for all 
citizens, advertisement, candidate funding, costly elections, the four conditions promise 
to be less costly (at least in principle) than democracy (or at least judging by our 
knowledge of how democracy functions in most democratic societies). Further, the four 
conditions allows scope for valuable non-democratic governance, in ways that the view 
                                                                
147  We can for instance accept the arguments of some philosophers that the rights which arise from 
democratic political arrangements protect more basic moral human rights better than any other form of 
legitimacy (Arneson 1995). Or that egalitarian principles are best secured by democracy (Buchanan 2002), 
or that democracy best secures liberty, or better cultivates moral citizens (Mill 1974), and so on. 
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that democracy is necessary for legitimacy cannot. Recall the hypothetical case I outlined 
above. There are two states—A and B. State A is democratic, but problematic in other 
ways (there are only two candidates, they are not representative, there are inequalities 
in wealth, and so on). State B is undemocratic, but is valuable in other ways (reasonably 
equitable distribution of resources, excellent welfare and healthcare, respect for civil and 
political rights, and so on). According to the necessary condition view of democracy, 
state B can never be legitimate. But according to the four conditions we have an account 
of how state B can become procedurally legitimate and thereby possess the right to rule, 
which does not require democracy. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have challenged the view that democracy is necessary for 
political legitimacy. Drawing closely on an account of legitimacy outlined by Machin 
(2012), I defended an alternative view in the form of four necessary conditions on 
political legitimacy—horizontal equality, acceptable vertical inequality, publicity and an 
institutionalised voice. Meeting these conditions does not require democracy, and it is 
only because it meets these conditions that democracy is deemed to be necessary for 
political legitimacy. Importantly, this view is still consistent with the view that 
democracy is, all things considered, the morally best form of political governance. As 
such, we can preserve the mainstream view that democracy is a crucial feature of the 
end goal state achieved by transitional justice. In the event that democracy is too costly, 
or otherwise difficult to achieve, the four necessary conditions inform an account of 
legitimacy which a state must fulfil in order to be legitimate. Twinned with the condition 
on morally justified coercion set out in the previous chapter, the four conditions explain 
what transitional governments must achieve in order to possess the right to rule. 
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VII. Transitional Justice and Retroactive Law 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Retroactive laws operate on actions which take place prior to their application. 
Retroactive laws which apply liability to past conduct (the form of retroactivity I will be 
interested in this chapter) are viewed as being both legally and morally problematic. 
Legally, they are problematic because they are deemed to violate widely adhered to 
principles of legality—that there can be ‘no crime without the law’ (nullum crimen sine 
lege), and the prohibition against ex post facto law—which prohibits laws which operate 
on matters taking place prior to their enactment (literally, ‘after the fact’). They are 
morally problematic because it looks to be unfair to punish an individual for an act that 
was legal at the time it was carried out. So the argument against retroactive laws from 
general jurisprudence goes.148 
In this chapter I want to challenge this view that retroactive laws are always 
legally and morally problematic. My claim will be that the legality-based problems and 
unfairness of retroactive laws are dependent on the nature of the acts to which 
retroactive laws apply, the nature of the law-making which permitted the conduct to 
which retroactive laws apply and a law-maker’s knowledge of these two factors. My 
claim, to state it from the outset, is that it is neither contrary to principles of legality nor 
unfair to retroactively criminalise acts if these acts were i) a serious act of moral 
                                                                
148 See, for instance, Fuller argues that, “a retroactive law is truly a monstrosity. Law has to do with the 
governance of human conduct today by rules. To speak of governing or directing conduct today by rules 
that will be enacted tomorrow is to talk in blank prose” (1969, p. 53); Raz argues that, “One cannot be guided 
by a retroactive law… The law must be open and adequately publicized. If it is to guide people they must 
be able to find out what it is” (2009, p. 214); and Blackstone, “There is still a more unreasonable method… 
which is called making of laws ex post facto; when after an action is committed, the legislator then for the 
first time declares it to have been a crime, and inflicts a punishment upon the person who has committed 
it… he had therefore no cause to abstain from it; and all punishment for not abstaining must of consequence 
be cruel and unjust” (1979, p. 46) 
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wrongdoing and ii) the only reason the act went unpunished is because a law-maker 
amended the legal system to legally permit themselves to carry out such acts and iii) a 
lawmaker’s knowledge of both i) and ii).  
This argument is significant for two reasons. First, there is a strong general 
presumption against retroactivity in both scholarship on general jurisprudence and 
under international law. My argument challenges the strength of this presumption in a 
way that no other commentator has done (or at least no other commentator that I am 
aware of). Second, owing to the fact that retroactive laws are always deemed to be both 
legally and morally problematic, commentators overwhelmingly frame cases where 
retroactive laws look justified in pro tanto terms (the idea being that the pro tanto 
importance of securing justice outweighs the pro tanto injustice of retroactively holding 
an individual to account). But my argument challenges the view that retroactive laws 
are always legally and morally problematic, and thus denies that there is always a 
dilemma at the heart of retroactive law-making. 
The motivation for my arguments in favour of retroactivity in this chapter is to 
defend the use of retroactive laws, under limited conditions, in cases of transitional 
justice. The question of the permissibility of retroactive law-making within transitional 
justice states is an important one for at least two reasons. First, transitional legal systems 
are commonly faced with the problem of dealing with past wrongdoing carried out by 
officials of a past, undemocratic regime. The introduction of retroactive laws offers one 
means of legally holding to account those in office who were responsible for acts of 
political wrongdoing that were legally licensed at the time they were carried out. Second, 
transitional states are commonly faced with the forward-looking challenge of transitioning 
to a more just legal system/ society more generally. Incoming transitional governments 
must seek ways of ameliorating previously unjust or inefficacious legal institutions, 
which had commonly been used by a past regime to serve unjust political aims. This was 
the case in Germany in the wake of the Second World War, Argentina in the wake of the 
Junta government of the 1970/80’s, South Africa in the wake of the apartheid, amongst 
a host of other cases of political transition. As I will argue below, the use of retroactive 
laws offers transitional states one legal means through which to facilitate the transition 
to a more just, more democratic legal system, while legally holding past political 
wrongdoers to account. My arguments are thus meant to carry implications not only for 
how retroactive laws are viewed in general jurisprudence, but also for how they are 
viewed as a legal measure in transitional justice contexts. 
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The chapter will run as follows. In the following section I analyse what a 
retroactive law is, distinguishing them from other forms of backwards-looking law-
making. In section three, I consider the argument against retroactivity—in particular, the 
legality-based reasons and the view that retroactive laws are unjust because they are 
unfair. In section four, I focus on a particular instance of political wrongdoing—the case 
of forced disappearances in Argentina—with a view to providing some context through 
which to understand my claim that retroactive laws are in fact not unfair nor contrary to 
principles of legality when they are applied to the acts of unjust law-makers. In section 
five I develop this argument by establishing a limited set of conditions under which 
retroactive laws are neither legally nor morally problematic. In section six, I provide a 
positive justification for retroactive laws on the grounds of deterrence, and supporting 
the move towards a democratic state. 
 
2 What is a retroactive law? 
 
Above I defined a retroactive law as a law which ‘operates on acts which take 
place prior to their application’, but this definition requires more care. There are a 
number of ways in which laws can operate on past acts. For instance, laws may alter the 
legal status of a past act by removing or attaching liability to them. Or laws may change 
the level of sanction attached to illegal conduct. Or, laws may change the form of liability 
attached to a past act—for instance from public to criminal, or change the legal rights or 
duties that individual’s possess with respect to past acts (i.e. the amount of tax payable 
on a particular transaction). 
One important distinction is between retroactive and retrospective laws. 149 
Retrospective laws alter the legal status of past acts, but only effect this change from the time 
of their creation, and subsequently (i.e. today and in the future). For instance, imagine a 
retrospective tax law is introduced on a Tuesday which changes the legal status of a 
transaction on the preceding Monday such that an individual now has to pay extra tax. 
Suppose they have until Friday to pay the amount. In this case, the law is backwards-
looking (applying to past conduct) but also prospective (it is only enforceable from the 
time the law comes into place on Tuesday). 
Retroactive laws, on the other hand, change the legal status of a past act in such 
a way as to make this law enforceable at the time it was carried out (if this were 
                                                                
149 For more on the distinction between retrospective and retroactive laws see Juratowitch (2008, pp. 9-12). 
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physically possible). An extreme (and somewhat unrealistic) example of a retroactive 
law would be a murder case. Suppose a murder takes place on Monday (and murder is 
not illegal). A retroactive law made on Tuesday would make all the acts of murder on 
Monday illegal, and would make it possible to punish all those who committed murders 
on the Monday. To put this slightly differently—a retroactive law changes the law in 
such a way as to declare that the new law is and was always the law, such that past acts 
in violation of this law are punishable. In our case, a retroactive law against murder, 
introduced on Tuesday and applied to the conduct of Monday, would make a murder 
carried out on Monday liable for punishment on Tuesday, when the law is introduced.  
This means, as Waldron captures, that retroactive laws are more controversial 
than retrospective laws: 
 
Retroactive legislation is more radical. A retroactive law is one that operates on 
past events as though it were in force when the past event took place (Waldron, 
2004, p. 632). 
 
The crux of the difference between retroactive and retrospective law concerns the way 
in which the law attaches to past conduct. Where retrospective laws look back to the past 
and amend laws in the present and future as a result, retroactive laws change the legal 
status of a past act in such a way as to make past acts liable for legal action. In what 
follows, I will be interested in retroactive laws of the form which attach criminal liability 
to past acts (like in the improbable murder case above). 
 
3. What is wrong with retroactive laws? 
 
In this section I want to attend more closely to what exactly is problematic about 
retroactive laws. I will draw attention to two factors in particular. First, retroactive laws 
are legally problematic because they violate principles of legality and are thus contrary 
to the requirements of the rule of law. Second, retroactive laws are morally problematic 
because they are unfair. 
 
 
 
 
 
159 
 
3.1. Legality-based problems 
 
One reason that retroactive laws look to be problematic is that they are prohibited 
in both international law and in many domestic constitutions. Article 11 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights captures this prohibition against retroactivity: 
 
No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission 
which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at 
the time when it was committed. 
 
Identical wording is set out in Article 7 of the European Convention of Human Rights, under 
the principle ‘No punishment without the law’. In the domestic case, the American 
constitution Article 1, Section 10, Article 1 states: 
 
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation… of ex post 
facto150 Law. 
 
The Prohibition is also captured by the constitutions of a number of states worldwide— 
including the UK151, Canada, Brazil and Germany, to name only a few. 
Many legal documents, both international and domestic, thus prohibit 
retroactive law-making. And the main legal reason for this prohibition is that retroactive 
laws are in violation of widely held legal principles and norms. These are the principles 
of ‘no crime without the law’ (nullum crimen sine lege) and the prohibition on ex post facto 
laws.  
As principles of legality, these two norms set standards on the ways in which 
laws should be made and should operate. As such, they fall under the broader umbrella 
concept of the ‘rule of law’. To be sure, the concept of the ‘rule of law’ has a number of 
meanings152, but the sense I intend here is that of a set of principles which prescribe a 
                                                                
150 When applied to laws the term ex post facto, literally ‘after the fact’, captures any form of law which applies 
to past events. Both retroactive and retrospective laws are examples of ex post facto law. 
151 For a discussion of the history of the presumption against retroactivity in English common law see 
Juratowitch (2008, pp. 27-42). 
152 The Oxford Dictionary of Law captures these different meanings. One sense points to the rule of law as 
distinguished from the rule of men, or the rule of a monarch. This captures the feature that the rule of law 
offers predictability, assurance, stability, and so on. Another sense is attributed to Dicey as a set of concepts 
identified as being essential to the English legal system—“the absolute predominance of regular law, so that 
the government has no arbitrary authority over the citizen’ the equal subjection of all (including officials) to 
the ordinary law administered by the ordinary courts; and the fact that the citizen's personal freedoms are 
formulated and protected by the ordinary law rather than by abstract constitutional declarations.” The sense 
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criteria for good law-making—on the procedures through which laws are made and on 
how they operate on the conduct of the individuals who are subject to them. 
A number of jurisprudential scholars have outlined accounts of rule of law 
standards153, and many of these accounts share the principle that retroactive laws should 
be prohibited. I will briefly draw attention to two notable accounts of the rule of law 
because they help to explain why the two principles of legality are so established and 
widely adhered to.  
Lon Fuller introduces the following rule of law standards: i) Generality; ii) 
Promulgation; iii) Non- retroactivity; iv) Clarity; v) Non-contradiction; vi) No laws that 
require the impossible; vii) Constancy of the laws through time and viii) Congruence 
between official action and declared rule  (Fuller, 1969, pp. 46-91). On the prohibition 
against retroactive law Fuller writes: 
 
A retroactive law is truly a monstrosity. Law has to do with the governance of 
human conduct by rules. To speak of governing or directing conduct today by 
rules that will be enacted tomorrow is to talk in blank prose. To ask how we 
should appraise an imaginary legal system consisting exclusively of laws that are 
retroactive, and retroactive only, is like asking how much air pressure there is in 
a perfect vacuum (Fuller, 1969, p. 53). 
 
Fuller’s argument in this passage is twofold, one claim is ontological, the other is 
normative. The ontological claim is that retroactivity is so opposed to the basic function 
of law in guiding conduct that it is logically impossible to conceive of a system of 
retroactive law.154  The normative claim is that that retroactive laws are monstrous, 
                                                                
of the rule of law I intend here is similar to this latter sense as a set of procedural and substantive 
requirements on the nature and procedures around laws and law-making.  
153 Importantly, the main source of disagreement about the standards of the rule of law concerns the moral 
status of these standards. This disagreement in turn rests on a broader disagreements between natural law 
scholars and positivists about the moral status of law more generally i.e. law’s relation to morality and 
whether laws must have moral content if they are to be laws. I will not get into this debate here. 
154 Fuller adopts a slightly different view elsewhere, such that his overall position on how retroactive laws 
relate to the broader function of law is somewhat ambiguous. In Positivism and Fidelity to Law he writes: 
  
There would be a certain occult unpersuasiveness in any assertion that retroactivity violates the 
very nature of law itself. Yet we have only to imagine a country in which all laws are retroactive in 
order to see that retroactivity presents a real problem for the internal morality of law … a general 
increase in the resort to statutes curative of past legal irregularities represents a deterioration in 
that form of legal morality without which law cannot exist (Fuller, 2009, p. 60). 
 
Fuller’s general position seems to be that while retroactive laws are irregular, they are not absolutely 
prohibited but nor should they be used too much. This is a position very similar to my own in this chapter.  
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because it is unjust to hold individuals to account for actions that it is impossible for 
them to avoid (a feature I will consider in more depth below). 
Similarly, Raz introduces the following standards in his conception of the rule of 
law: i) All laws must be positive, prospective and clear; ii) Laws should be relatively 
stable; iii) The making of laws should be guided by open, stable, clear and general rules; 
iv) The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed; v) Principles of natural justice 
must be observed; vi) The courts should have review powers over the implementation 
of other principles; vii) The courts should be easily accessible; viii) the discretion of the 
crime-preventing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law (Raz, 2009, pp. 214-
219). On retroactivity in particular Raz writes: 
 
One cannot be guided by retroactive law. It does not exist at the time of action… 
The law must be open and adequately publicized, if it is to guide people they 
must be able to find out what it is (Raz, 2009, p. 214). 
 
Driving Raz’s account is the basic idea—analogous to Fuller—that the basic function of 
law is to guide conduct. And for this reason, there should be a strict presumption against 
retroactive law-making. The standards of the rule of law prohibit it. 
These two views about the rule of law are by no means exhaustive but they 
provide some explanation of the two principles of legality highlighted above. They 
illustrate why the principles prohibiting ex post facto laws and of ‘no crime without the 
law’ are so established. The prohibition against ex post facto laws is important because if 
law is to serve its basic function in guiding conduct it must be prospective.155  The 
principle of no crime without the law is important because laws must be clear, publicised 
in advance, public and there must be convergence between official enactments and 
declared rules. As such, these two principles of legality conform with the requirements 
of the rule of law. 
 
 
 
                                                                
155 Both H.L.A. Hart and Fuller, amongst a number of other legal scholars, converge on this view that the 
basic function of law is to guide conduct. Hart writes, “I think it quite vain to seek any more specific purpose 
which law as such serves beyond providing guides to human conduct and standards of criticism of such 
conduct (Hart, 2012, p. 249). And Fuller claims, “Law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules” (Fuller, 1969, p. 106). 
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3.2. The unfairness of retroactive laws 
 
 
Retroactive laws are not only legally problematic in being in violation of widely 
held principles of legality, they are morally problematic as well. The main reason for 
this, at least on the face of it, is that retrospectively holding someone legally liable for 
conduct that was legal at the time it was carried out looks to be unfair. In the following 
section I want to deny that it is always unfair to retrospectively criminalise certain acts. 
But prior to doing so it will help to draw attentions to some of the reasons that may 
underpin the judgement that retroactive laws are unfair. 
Consider a case in which an act is retroactively criminalised after the fact. 
Suppose trespassing is not criminal on a Monday (say, because the notion of private 
property does not exist). Yet suppose that the law changes and trespassing becomes 
illegal by a law passed on a Tuesday. Suppose the law is retroactively applied to the 
previous Monday such that all of those who trespassed on the Monday become liable 
for punishment from the Tuesday onwards.  The use of retroactive law in this case would 
be morally problematic for at least three reasons, 
 
i) Fair-warning—retroactive laws are unfair because they violate the 
principle of ‘fair warning’. It is a basic requirement of fairness that 
individuals are given fair warning about what actions come with 
legal liability attached so they may conform their conduct to the 
requirements of the law.  
 
ii) Inability to do differently—retroactive laws are problematic because 
they make it impossible for individuals to do anything to avoid 
liability. If individuals do not know which conduct will be 
criminalised in the future, they are unable to do anything 
differently to avoid liability in the present. 
 
iii) Certainty about the law—individuals rely on the law to guide their 
behaviour. It is only if laws are prospective that individuals can 
know the law, rely on it and therefore plan their lives in light of it. 
A retroactive law undermines the certainty that individuals can 
have about the law. 
 
Together, these three reasons highlight why retroactive laws are usually considered to 
be unfair and thus morally problematic.156 
                                                                
156 Other commentators have pointed to a longer list of problems with retroactive law-making. Duxbury 
(2013, pp. 147-149), for instance, highlights thirteen problems with retroactive law, including: that 
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Indeed, I agree that the legality-based reasons considered in the previous section, 
and the morality-based reasons considered in this chapter are weighty, and they serve 
to explain why there should be a general presumption against retroactive laws. Yet 
despite this strong presumption against retroactive law-making, I will argue that there 
are exceptional circumstances under which it is neither contrary to principles of legality 
nor unfair to introduce retroactive laws against certain acts.   
To make this argument, it will be important to get clear about what these 
exceptional circumstances are. And to illustrate this I will appeal to a particular case of 
political wrongdoing from a case of political transition from authoritarian rule. What I 
want to draw attention to in appealing to this case is both the nature of the acts in 
question and the nature of the law-making under which said acts were not criminalised 
and thus deemed to be perfectly legal. It will be important to keep these two factors in 
mind because they will be important to my later argument (in section five) that 
retroactive laws are neither legally nor morally problematic when applied to a morally 
wrong act that was permitted because a law-maker adjusts the law to permit it.  
 
4. The Exceptional Nature of Transitional Contexts 
 
In this section I want to highlight an exceptional case of law-making which will 
provide the context for my argument in the following section that under certain 
conditions retroactive laws are neither legally nor morally problematic. To illustrate 
these condition I want to consider a particular case of political wrongdoing—the case of 
Argentina under the rule of a military Junta in the 1970’s and 80’s. 
 
4.1. Forced Disappearances in Argentina 
 
In 1976, the Argentine government was overthrown by a coup d’etat and replaced 
with a military Junta led by the military generals Videla, Massera and Agosti. There 
                                                                
retroactive laws judge yesterday’s conduct by today’s standard (2013, p. 147); that retroactivity “militates 
against legal finality… and certainty” (2013, p. 148); that retroactive law “amounts to an abuse of the 
legislature’s temporally specific democratic mandate“ (2013, p. 148). There are two things to note with 
respect to Duxbury’s list. First, some of the arguments simply do not apply to retroactive law-making in 
transitional justice cases, for instance the worry that retroactive law may undermine a democratic mandate. 
Second, some of Duxbury’s problems in fact serve as the basis of arguments in favour of retroactivity. Think 
about the ostensible problem that retroactive laws judge yesterday’s conduct by today’s standard. This looks 
to be a substantive benefit in the case of a transitional society trying to implement legal measures to combat 
previous wrongdoing by an unjust regime. 
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followed seven years of military dictatorship, one of the main policies of which was the 
suppression of communists and other leftist opponents to the regime which the Junta 
labelled as ‘subversives’. The Junta employed forced disappearances against 
subversives, which comprised arbitrary arrests, mass detention without trial, torture and 
killing. The disappearances policy was introduced swiftly, as one commentator writes: 
 
In but the first sixteen days of the new de facto government, 152 individuals died 
in political violence: 19 policemen, two members of the military, 68 “presumed 
guerrillas,” nine civilians whose corpses were later identified, and 54 civilians 
whose identities remained unknown (Feitlowitz, 1998, p. 25). 
 
Overall figures of deaths from the policy of forced disappearances are estimated at 
30,000 (Hernandez, 2013). 
To effectively implement the forced disappearances, the Junta seized control of 
the judiciary to ensure that their actions had no legal resistance. One of the ways in which 
the Junta ensured the disappearances policy was legally permitted was by removing past 
members of the judiciary and replacing them with legal officials who were sympathetic 
to their policies, and willing to turn a blind eye. As one commentator writes: 
 
The day of the coup, the Junta extended the state of siege… arguing that this 
provided a legal justification… the supreme court was purged, the Prosecutor 
General and Federal judges replaced, and all new judges were required to swear 
an oath of loyalty to the acts and objectives of the Process of National 
Reorganisation (Guest, 1990, p.26). 
 
The Junta also amended parts of the constitution on the grounds of ‘national security’ so 
as to give themselves greater discretion to implement oppressive measures. Another 
commentator writes: 
 
A flurry of statutes and decrees, instructions, special provisions and resolutions 
criminalized participation in either political parties, or labor strikes; publication 
of all news items concerning terrorist activity, subversion, abductions or the 
discovery of bodies, unless officially announced; various modes of criticism of 
official policies in university classrooms; and all ‘political acts’ that relate to a 
political party, regardless of whether such acts resulted in concrete action 
(Snyder 1984, p.510).  
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The passage illustrates that the Junta’s law-making served not only to permit their brutal 
and oppressive policies, but to criminalise the acts of those who were opposed to their 
rule. 
The policy of forced disappearances is a paradigm case of political wrongdoing 
by an authoritarian government that was legally licensed by the Junta regime at the time. 
Judicial independence was lost, and the judiciary was staffed to ensure that they would 
turn a blind eye to the disappearances policy. Importantly, the sympathetic judiciary 
served only to provide extra support for the policies of the government, who had already 
legally licensed their acts. This is an important point—the Junta had legally permitted their 
acts with a plethora of legislation granting the government discretionary powers in the 
interests of national security. The presence of a sympathetic judiciary served only to 
further support (or rather to not challenge) the repressive policies. 
The forced disappearances policy imposed by the de facto Junta government 
provides a context through which to assess the permissibility of retroactive law. The key 
factors I wish to highlight is the is the following, 
 
i) The fact of serious moral wrongdoing. 
ii) That the serious wrongdoing was legally permitted by officials 
with de facto law-making power. 
iii) That the law-maker knew both i) and ii). 
 
These three factors will be important in my later arguments about the permissibility of 
retroactive law in the following section. What I want to argue is that when these three 
conditions are met it is neither legally problematic nor morally impermissible to 
retroactively criminalise the acts of political wrongdoing. 
 Prior to developing this argument I want to draw attention to one more point. 
Transitional legal systems are different from ‘normal’, democratic, peacetime legal 
systems because they must reckon with serious past political wrongdoing (analogous to 
the case of forced disappearances in Argentina). Moreover, a second, broadly forward-
looking aim is that transitional legal systems must facilitate the transition to more just 
societies, which respect human rights and the rule of law. This goal serves as a factor 
which impacts on the sorts of legislative mechanisms that a transitional government can 
put in place to reckon with past political wrongdoing. When I point to the ‘exceptional 
nature’ of transitional societies, I want to highlight these two elements, one backwards-
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looking and one forwards-looking, which legal systems in transitional societies must 
reckon with.  
  
5. Are retroactive laws always legally and morally problematic? 
 
Earlier I elucidated the different ways in which retroactive laws are considered 
to be both legally and morally problematic. They are legally problematic because they 
contravene widely adhered to principles of legality, and the requirement that laws 
should be prospective, which is informed by the standards of the rule of law. They are 
morally problematic because it is unfair to legally hold an individual to account for an 
act that was legal at the time it was carried out. According to the mainstream view in 
general jurisprudence, it is always the case that retroactive laws are morally and legally 
problematic. And it is this mainstream view that I will challenge in this section. 
Prior to doing so, I want to point to a second element of the mainstream view. It 
follows from the view that retroactive laws are always legally and morally problematic 
that commentators frame the probem of the permissibity of retroactive law-making in 
pro tanto terms. We see this in much of the scholarly engagement with the use of 
retroactivity at the Nuremburg trials, and in scholarship elsewhere on the permissibility 
of retroactive legislation. Consider the following passages: 
 
Since the internationally illegal acts for which the London Agreement established 
individual criminal responsibility were certainly also morally most 
objectionable…Justice required the punishment of these men, in spite of the fact 
that under positive law they were not punishable at the time they performed the 
acts (Kelsen, 1947, p. 165). 
 
The moral reasons in favour of punishing the legally innocent defendants can 
sometimes outweigh the legality-based reasons against doing so (Altman & 
Wellman, 2004, p. 57). 
 
And H.L.A. Hart writes of the retroactive punishment of a women who accused her 
husband (whom she had been wanting to leave) of treason against the Nazi government, 
a crime for which the man was killed: 
 
Odious as retrospective criminal legislation and punishment may be, to have 
pursued it openly in this case would at least have had the merits of candour. It 
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would have made plain that in punishing the woman a choice had to be made 
between two evils, that of leaving her unpunished and that of sacrificing a very 
precious principle of morality endorsed by most legal systems (Hart, 1958, p. 
619). 
 
In these three passage, the purported dilemma at the heart of retroactive law-making is 
framed as follows. There are legal and moral reasons against retroactive punishment, 
but (at least in the case of the egregious wrongdoing punished at Nuremburg, and in 
other cases) there are moral reasons in favour of punishing. And, these commentators 
claim, in the case of Nuremburg (and in other cases), the moral reasons for punishment 
outweigh the legality and morality-based reasons against. 
In what follows, I want to deny this way of approaching the purported dilemma 
between legality and justice which some commentators take to be at the heart of 
retroactive law-making. I want to claim that the legality and morality-based reasons 
against retroactive laws do not apply in exceptional cases. It follows from this that 
retroactive laws are not always legally and morally problematic. And it follows from this 
that there is not always a dilemma at the heart of retroactive laws such that their 
permissibility need not be framed in pro tanto terms. 
To make this argument, I must challenge the arguments against retroactive law-
making. These are as follows: 
 
1) Legality-based reasons 
i) No crime without the law—it is legally prohibited to punish the legally 
innocent.  
ii) All laws must be prospective to guide conduct (therefore ex post facto laws 
are prohibited). 
2) Morality-based reasons 
i) It is unfair to hold individuals to account for actions that were legal at the 
time they were carried out.  
 
To be clear, I agree that these principles have weight in most cases. My claim is 
that they do not apply in all cases. In other words, my challenge is to the universality of 
these legal and moral principles against retroactivity. I will claim that these principles 
are conditional, dependent on certain factors persisting in different cases. In the event 
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that these factors do not persist, these legal and moral principles do not apply. In what 
follows, I will develop this argument further. 
 
5.1. The prohibition against punishing the legally innocent 
 
The first principle is that there is no crime without the law (nullem criminem sine 
lege). This states that it is legally prohibited to enforce a legal sanction unless a pre-
existing law has been violated. An analogous principle states that it is legally 
impermissible to punish an individual who is legally innocent. 
On the face of it, this principle seems like a universal legal maxim. And clearly 
the principle has strong intuitive support. A legal system which routinely punished 
those who had not violated an existing law would be both morally and legally 
repugnant. But while weighty as a principle of legality, my claim here is that this 
principle is not universal. The force of this principle of legality is contingent on the 
nature of the legal system under which laws are made, and also on the procedures in 
accordance with which laws are made. I want to claim that when law-makers amend a 
system of laws to permit their own acts, then the principle that it is legally impermissible 
to punish the legally innocent is void.  
To see this consider the following case: 
 
Nefarious King: Suppose a nefarious King seizes power of a state through unjust 
means. He introduces a number of new laws which are legally and morally 
problematic. One such law is a prohibition against murder for all citizens, except 
for himself. And the reason for this exemption is that the King wishes to permit 
his favourite practice of arbitrarily killing citizens whom he does not like the look 
of. Suppose further that the King actually introduces this law in the form of a 
legal statute which applies to all citizens, except for himself (say he justifies it on 
the basis of ‘national security’). For years subsequently, the King engages in 
practices of arbitrarily killing his citizens. 
 
Suppose the King is deposed, and a new (more just) government is faced with the 
problem of whether to punish the King for his moral offences. Does the principle that it 
is legally prohibited to punish the legally innocent have any weight on their 
deliberations? Does the King’s technical ‘innocence’ bear on their decision over whether 
to punish him? I want to claim that it doesn’t—that the King’s technical legal innocence 
has no bearing as a principle of legality. And this is because the only reason that the King 
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is legally innocent is because he amended the laws in such a way as to permit his acts, 
and he had de facto law-making power. 
Importantly, my claim here is not that the king is not legally innocent because of 
his moral culpability. My argument is not that the King is not innocent because he is 
guilty of gross moral wrongdoing. Nor is my claim that the King’s wrongdoing is so 
heinous that it outweighs the principles against punishing the legally innocent. This 
would be to return to the pro tanto manner of approaching the problem which I am 
precisely denying in certain exceptional cases. Instead, my claim is that the principles of 
‘no crime without the law’ or the prohibition against punishing the legally innocent do 
not stand as principles of legality in the event that the only reason a law-maker is 
innocent is because they amend the law so as to legally permit their acts. In the event that legal 
innocence is the result of amendments to the system, then the principle that it is legally 
prohibited to punish the innocent is void.  
My claim is that because the only reason that a King (or indeed a regime member 
with law-making power) is technically innocent is because they have altered the rules in 
their favour. When this happen, the principle that it is prohibited to sanction the innocent 
is void in this case. It holds no weight whatsoever.  
Let me suggest an alternative legal principle, which I take it to be more plausible:  
 
It is legally prohibited to punish the legally innocent when their legal innocence 
is not the result of their having amended laws in their own favour to license their 
acts. 
 
I take it that this more plausible principle means that the prohibition against punishing 
the legally innocent does not apply to the hypothetical case of the King above, or to the 
cases of political wrongdoing in Argentina. To be sure, the principle which prohibits 
punishing the innocent is important in most cases, the principle simply does not apply 
in the event that technical legal innocence is the result of an alteration in the law. I thus 
take it that the principle of legality is not universal, but is conditional on the nature of 
the law-making in question. 
 And my claim is that the mainstream view that retroactive laws are always 
legally problematic because they violate the prohibitions against punishing the legally 
innocent is incorrect, and does not apply in this case. It follows from this that the 
prohibition against punishing the legally innocent is not pro tanto either. For a principle 
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to be pro tanto it must have a level of universality such that it applies in every case to 
which it has a bearing. But here I am precisely denying the universality of the prohibition 
against punishing the legally innocent.  
 
5..2. The rule of law argument against retroactive laws 
 
The second legal principle against retroactivity states that it is always prohibited 
to enforce retroactive laws because this deviates from the rule of law requirement that 
laws must be prospective. Recall that the requirement of prospecivity is held to be 
essential to law-making by scholars in jurisprudence (e.g. Raz and Fuller). And it follows 
from the requirement of prospectivity that retroactive law-making should be prohibited. 
In this section I want to challenge the view that it is always prohibited to deviate 
from the rule of law. In making this argument, I want to show that in exceptional 
circumstances deviations from the rule of law standards are permissible. And if it is 
permissible to deviate from the rule of law standards in exceptional circumstances, then 
it may be permissible to deviate from the rule of law and enforce retroactive law. 
 For this argument to undermine retroactive law-making it must be the case that 
the standards of the rule of law are absolute, and may never be altered or deviated from. 
As a description of how laws operate in liberal democracies, this is not the case. Many 
state constitutions permit deviations from the rule of law in exceptional circumstances 
such as war, or terrorism, in times of extreme emergency or in the wake of natural 
disasters. In these cases, where sometimes the very existence of the state is under threat, 
many constitutions permit deviations from or suspensions of, the rule of law.157 This was 
the case in the wake of 9/11 and after terrorist attacks in Europe, for instance. In many 
of these cases states such as the UK and the US resorted to extraordinary measures, with 
governments granting themselves broad discretionary powers which involved 
deviations from the rule of law and incursions on procedural civil liberties with the use 
                                                                
157  To be sure, while common, this constitutional provision is not necessarily universal. As two 
commentators writes: 
Today, different constitutional systems differ greatly in their treatment of the subject matter of 
emergency powers…Many modern constitutions contain explicit, frequently detailed, emergency 
provisions…While explicit constitutional reference to emergencies is common, it is by no means 
universal. The constitutions of the United States, Japan, and Belgium, for example, are almost 
entirely devoid of references to states of emergency and to emergency powers (Gross & Aolain, 
2006, p. 37). 
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of measures such as pre-trial detention, extraordinary rendition158 and greater powers of 
surveillance.159 
To be sure, this is a descriptive claim about the nature of state constitutions, and 
by itself this will not undermine the argument that the rule of law prohibits retroactivity. 
This is because while it may be the case that state constitutions do permit deviations 
from rule of law standards, it may also be the case that they ought not to. 
Yet we can also support deviations from the rule of law by appealing to moral 
arguments. To begin with, it will help to get clearer on how states of emergency or 
exception work. A state of emergency is an exceptional circumstance such as a war, a 
natural disaster, a time of serious resource scarcity or terrorism. In a state of emergency, 
the standards of the rule of law which are normally non-negotiable in peacetime, 
democratic settings are replaced with state of emergency legislation. This legislation 
grants states broader discretionary powers. Most commonly, during a state of 
emergency states limit the civil rights of citizens (to privacy, against pre-trial detention 
or against having their property searched without a warrant, for instance). To be sure, 
these measures, which are generally justified on the grounds of national security, are 
controversial. The key point here is that they are often permitted by a shift in legislation 
from the normal rule of law standards to a state of emergency. 
That states of emergencies exist, and require some kinds of alteration to normal 
standards of law and law-making, is not really in question in the scholarship around 
states of emergency. The debate is largely over whether states of emergency can be 
‘accommodated’ within normal legal standards160, the extent to which normal principles 
of legality can be suspended and the extent to which civil liberties can be curtailed in the 
interest of national security. The issue, then, is really one of how to structure laws and 
constitutions around the fact that states of emergency exist, and the extent to which 
broader discretionary powers may be granted to governments.161 
                                                                
158 Extraordinary rendition takes place when a state seizes a suspect and removes them, without trial, to face 
punishment in another country. See Bingham (2010, pp. 138-143) for discussion. 
159 See Bingham (2010, pp. 133-159) for a discussion of these measures as they were applied in the UK and 
US. 
160 See Gross & Aolain (2006, pp. 15-85) for a discussion of the different ‘models of accommodation’ utilised 
by liberal democracies in response to states of emergency. 
161 Different answers are given to this question. For instance, some have argued that rule of law standards 
exemplified by common law systems can, “inform a rule-of-law project capable of responding to situations 
which place legal and political order under great stress, for example, states of emergency or executive 
decisions about national security” (Dyzenhaus, 2006, p. 17). On the other side of the debate, more 
controversial theorists—most notably Carl Schmitt—take the view that legal norms can be completely 
suspended in the event of a ‘state of exception’, where this is the decision of a sovereign who must decide 
(and has executive power to decide) what is best for the preservation of the state (Schmitt, 1985, pp. 5-15). 
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I do not want to take a stance on the exact way in which states of emergency 
license deviations from the rule of law, or on how laws or constitutions may respond to 
the states of emergency which can at time threaten the existence of the state. All that I 
require for my argument is the broadly accepted premise that states of emergency permit 
deviations (albeit extremely limited deviations) from the rule of law standards. The way 
this operates is that the rule of law standard is temporarily suspended and replaced with 
state of emergency legislation. As it stands, this is a descriptive claim, though we can 
support it with different moral arguments—for instance emphasising the importance of 
security or justice or prioritising the needs of society. Again, I do not want to take a 
stance on the exact justification for deviating from the rule of law standards in times of 
exception, nor do I need to. All that I need for my argument is the premise that deviations 
from the rule of law form the basis of an argument that shows i) the rule of law is not a 
universal or non-flexible standard and ii) certain states of exception can permit the 
suspension of the rule of law and a recourse to limited forms of emergency legislation. 
This illustrates why it is the case that the rule of law is not sufficient to undermine the 
requirements of the rule of law.  
My argument can be stated as follows: 
 
i) In exceptional circumstances (such as a state of emergency) it is permissible 
to suspend the rule of law and have recourse to emergency legislation. 
 
ii) Transitional justice contexts provide an example of an exceptional 
circumstance. 
 
iii) Therefore, in a transitional justice context it is permissible to alter or deviate 
from the rule of law. 
 
I take it that the second premise does not require too much support. But here are some 
reasons why transitional justice contexts represent an exceptional circumstance. First, 
transitional justice contexts are not normal, peacetime democratic settings. They are 
precisely contexts in which democracy is the goal, and putting in place the conditions 
for democracy. Second, with transitional justice contexts it is common that a legitimate 
state does not exist, and again this is precisely one of the goals of political transition. 
Third, transitional states must implement both legal and non-legal measures to reckon 
with serious wrongdoing carried out by political officials or citizens under the past 
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regime. Fourth, there remains a threat of residual violence and other security-related 
problems. These reasons are far from exhaustive, but they illustrate the exceptional 
nature of transitional justice contexts and demarcate important differences between 
transitional justice and normal, peacetime contexts. Given that transitional justice 
represents an exceptional case, my claim is that the rule of law is not an universal 
standard and that in transitional justice cases deviations from the rule of law are 
permissible. It follows that the rule of law-based argument is not sufficient to preclude 
the permissibility of retroactive law-making, law-making which is in conflict with the 
rule of law requirement of prospectivity. And given that the standards of the rule of law 
are suspended in exceptional circumstances, it follows that there is not always a pro tanto 
reason against retroactivity on the basis of the rule of law.  
To be clear, I do not want to deny the importance of rule of law standards. In all 
but the most exceptional of circumstances these principles set important standards on 
how laws are made. My claim here is that there are exceptional social circumstances—
where laws must respond to unique challenges which are not present in peacetime, 
democratic contexts—which can permit deviations from normal standards, and that 
transitional justice contexts provide one such example of an exceptional circumstance. 
There is, of course, an inherent tension in this claim. This is because one of the essential 
goals of transitional justice is not only achieving democracy but achieving the rule of law 
as a standard on the procedures of law-making. One may thus quite reasonably wonder 
why deviations from the rule of law should be permitted in the context of transitional 
states. My response is to emphasise that if deviations from the rule of law help to achieve 
the conditions required for the rule of law (i.e. removing security threats, removing 
corrupt officials, removing corrupt members of a judiciary) then this may serve as a 
lesser-evil justification for deviating from the rule of law. I provide this positive account 
in section six below. 
 
5.3. The moral argument against retroactive laws 
 
In this section I will consider, and challenge, the moral argument against 
retroactive law-making. I will claim that it is not always, unconditionally unfair to 
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retroactively hold individuals to account for acts that were not illegal at the time they 
were carried out. 
 Recall that the argument states that retroactive law-making is problematic 
because it is unfair to hold an individual to account for an act that was legal at the time 
it was carried out. This for three reasons: i) fair-warning, ii) inability to do differently 
and iii) legal certainty. In this section I will claim that it is not always, unconditionally 
unfair to retroactively hold individuals to account for acts that were not illegal at the 
time they were carried out. Again, it follows that there is not always a pro tanto moral 
principle against retroactivity.  
While it is certainly true that retroactive laws are unfair for the reasons noted 
above in most cases, I want to argue that there are certain conditions under which these 
reasons do not apply. I will claim that the unfairness of retroactive laws is dependent on 
a number of factors. First, the nature of the action that is to be criminalised. Second, the 
nature of the laws and the way in which they were made. Third, a law-maker’s knowledge of 
these two factors: 
 
i) The nature of the action in question—whether an action x was a serious 
act of moral wrongdoing independent of what the law says about it.162 
 
ii) The nature of the law in question—whether the reason action x was 
legally permitted was because a law-maker permitted themselves to carry 
out x.163 
 
iii) The law-maker’s capacity to know both i) and ii).164 
 
                                                                
162  The condition on serious moral wrongdoing is important because I take it that it may be unfair to 
retroactively punish a law-maker who permits acts whose wrongness is up for reasonable moral debate—
euthanasia, or abortion, for instance. Take a case like that of Henry VIII. While we may want to retroactively 
hold him to account for legally permitting the beheading of his wives, it’s not as clear that we would want 
to retroactively punish him for legally permitting his own divorces. And the condition on moral wrongness 
can explain this divergence in intuitions. 
163 This condition is important because my claim is that retroactive laws are only not unfair if they apply to 
those responsible for making the law. I thus restrict my justification for retroactive law for cases of 
individuals who possess this law-making power. 
164 The capacity for knowledge condition is significant because it looks to be impermissible to retroactively 
punish individuals who lack the capacity to know that they are committing morally wrong acts, or to know 
that they have altered the laws to permit their acts (i.e. the mentally ill or children).  
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My claim is that these three factors impact on the unfairness of retroactive laws such that 
if a law-maker carries out a morally wrong act, and the reason the act was legal at the 
time it was carried out was because the law-maker had amended the law to legally 
permit it, and the law-maker had the capacity to know these things, then it is not unfair 
to retroactively criminalise their acts. To see this, return to the case of the King, 
 
Nefarious King: Suppose a nefarious King seizes power of a state through unjust 
means. He introduces a number of new laws which are legally and morally 
problematic. One such law is a prohibition against murder for all citizens, except 
for himself. And the reason for this exemption is that the King wishes to permit 
himself to kill citizens who belong to a particular group that he despises. He sees 
it as his Kingly duty to eradicate this group, and thus prohibits others apart from 
himself from murdering. For years subsequently, the King murders members of 
this group. 
 
Suppose that the King is eventually deposed, and a new government is assembled which 
is charged with reforming the legal system. Would it be unfair for this new government 
to retroactively attach liability to the actions of the King? 
I want to argue that it would not be unfair.  This is because the three reasons 
which explain the unfairness of retroactive laws in most cases do not apply in this case. 
The King could not complain that a retroactive law fails to provide him with fair warning 
because he is the one with law-making power—he knows that the only reason he is able 
to commit such heinous acts is because he himself has this power. The fair warning 
concern applies to citizens who are subject to laws, and not to officials who (at least in 
the case of the King) have made themselves exempt from the laws which only apply to 
others. Given that he was the one with law-making power, the King cannot reasonably 
complain that the retroactive application of liability violates the principle that all laws 
must provide him with fair warning about which conduct is prohibited. Second, the 
worry that retroactive laws make individuals subject to them unable to do anything 
different also dissipates in the case of law-makers like the King. He has the opportunity 
to not commit moral wrongdoing, and to not legally license this wrongdoing. The King 
has full discretion over his actions and over the laws he introduces. Thus the excuse that 
he was unable to do things that would avoid retroactive liability in the future is void.165 
Third, the worry about legal certainty again only has strength in the case of citizens who 
                                                                
165 One response here would be that the King would not be able to do things that avoid retroactive liability 
from a future law-maker. My view here is that the king ought to have known that his actions would 
potentially be made liable to a criminal sanction.   
176 
 
are subject to the law. Given that the King has law-making authority it is simply not the 
case that retroactive laws would undermine the King’s certainty in the system. Indeed, 
he is precisely the individual responsible for fostering certainty in the legal system.  
To be clear, my claim here is not that retroactive laws are permissible because of 
the King’s heinous moral wrongdoing. Although the fact of wrongdoing is significant 
(indeed in my view necessary), it is the fact of an amended law which does work in 
justifying retroactivity. Nor is my claim that the importance of securing justice 
outweighs the unfairness of retroactive laws. My aim in this chapter is precisely that in 
certain cases there is not a pro tanto dilemma at the heart of retroactive law-making. This 
is because it is precisely not unfair to criminalise the morally wrong acts of officials who 
have law-making power, where the only reason their acts were permitted at the time 
was because they amended the law in their favour. Importantly, the case of the King is 
similar, in all relevant respects, to the case of senior government officials (who commit 
moral wrongdoing and also have law-making power) in authoritarian states, like the 
case of Argentina set out above. This is a point I will return to below. 
I have emphasised the importance of retroactive laws applying only to the 
conduct of law-makers who have amended the law to permit their own actions. This is 
significant because my defence of retroactive law-making applies only to the actions of 
such law-makers, and not to the actions of ordinary citizens who do not possess law-
making power. This is because to retroactively criminalise the actions of ordinary 
citizens does look to be both legally and morally problematic. To see why this is the case 
consider a variation of the case above: 
 
Blue-Eyed Group: Suppose a nefarious King introduces a number of new laws 
which are legally and morally problematic. One such law is a prohibition against 
murder for all citizens, except for a select number of citizens with blue eyes 
whom the King favours. The King wishes to permit his favourite practice of 
arbitrarily killing citizens from a particular (non blue-eyed) group, and he allows 
the members of the blue-eyed group to similarly carry out such killings. For years 
subsequently, the King, and his blue-eyed group, engage in practices of 
arbitrarily killing citizens. 
 
Suppose again that the King is eventually deposed, and a new government is assembled 
which is charged with reforming the legal system. Would it be unfair for this new 
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government to retroactively attach liability to the actions of the King’s blued-eyed 
group? 
The members of the blued-eyed group fail to meet the law-making condition that 
I have held to be necessary to the permissibility of retroactive laws. While their grossly 
immoral acts were legally permitted, these citizens did not have law-making power. As 
such, they may quite reasonably object that retroactive laws criminalise acts which were 
legal at the time they carried them out. In doing so, they violate the conditions of fair 
warning, inability to do otherwise (though this is contestable in the case of immoral acts) 
and legal uncertainty. 
I’m less certain that the use of retroactive laws in this second case would not be 
legally problematic or unfair. The members of the blue-eyed group do have a justified 
complaint that they are being punished for an act that was not illegal, that they were not 
given fair warning, that they were unable to differently, amongst other complaints 
against the retroactive application of laws in such a case. This need not mean that 
retroactive laws are impermissible. In such a case, a justification for punishing the 
members of the blue-eyed group could be formulated in pro tanto terms. That is, the 
moral value of punishing those culpable for gross offences would outweigh the 
principles of legality and fairness, though I will not develop this argument here. The key 
point in this section is that while it may be unfair to retroactively punish those who did 
not have law-making power, it is not unfair to retroactively punish those who i) commit 
moral wrongdoing and ii) have law-making power through which they legally permit 
this wrongdoing and iii) have the capacity to know i) and ii).  
 I want to reiterate the fact that this challenge to the legal problems and unfairness 
of retroactive laws as they are applied to law-makers is contrary to the mainstream view 
in general jurisprudence (and according to domestic constitutions and international 
laws) that retroactive laws are always, necessarily unfair. And that, therefore, there is 
always a pro tanto principle against them. 
 
 
 
 
 
178 
 
6. A positive justification for retroactive law-making 
 
Thus far my arguments have been largely negative. I have challenged the view 
that retroactive laws are always impermissible because they violate principles of legality 
and morality. Yet while these arguments show why, under limited conditions, 
retroactive laws are not contrary to legal or moral principles, they do not yet provide us 
with reasons in favour of why retroactive law-making should be carried out. To make 
this argument, I want to develop a positive justification for retroactive law-making. This 
will be the purpose, albeit briefly, of this section. In particular, I want to introduce two 
sets of reasons in favour of retroactive law-making: first, a deterrence-based argument 
and second, an argument based around the context of transitioning to democracy. 
Prior to developing these arguments, I want to make a brief comment about the 
use of retroactive law at the Nuremburg trials. 
 
6.1. Retribution 
 
The most common justification for the use of retroactive law at Nuremberg—
both at the time, and in subsequent scholarship on the trials—was a retributive one. The 
argument was that the defendants at Nuremberg were guilty of such heinous acts of 
wrongdoing that they simply deserved to suffer punishment, and for many this 
punishment meant death. Altman and Wellman capture this retributive argument thus: 
 
The most obvious and popular reason to punish the defendants at Nuremberg 
was simply that they deserved it. This retributive conviction is not difficult to 
explain: justice demands that morally guilty people be punished for their 
wrongdoing, and given that the defendants at Nuremberg were so horribly 
morally guilty, it would have been a gross transgression of justice if they had 
been left unpunished (2004, p. 58). 
 
I do not want to deny that there are sometimes strong retributive reasons for 
retroactively punishing wrongdoers, particularly those culpable of such heinous acts as 
the Nuremberg defendants. As such, I want to leave this open as a possible avenue for 
justifying retroactive law-making in some cases, and say no more about it here.  
I do however wish to place emphasis on, and further develop, the forward-
looking reasons in favour of retroactive punishment. I do so because I want to situate 
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the justification for retroactive law-making in the context of transitional states where (as 
I have highlighted in previous chapters) there is the threat of residual violence, where 
legal system are underdeveloped and where the goal of political transition is to achieve 
democracy, the rule of law and a respect for human rights (as well as a more just legal 
system more generally). This sort of context highlights the plausibility of two broadly 
forward-looking reasons: deterrence and reasons which arise in the context of transitions 
to democracy (what I will term ‘democracy-based reasons’). 
 
6.2. Deterrence 
 
The first argument in favour of retroactive law-making appeals to the value of 
deterrence. It states that retroactive law-making is justified if it serves to deter 
individuals from committing undesirable actions in the future. This could take the form 
of general deterrence—where we retroactively punish in the hope of deterring a number 
of would-be law breakers; or special deterrence—where we retroactively punish to deter 
the wrongdoer themselves from committing further acts of wrongdoing (and breaking 
the law). 
Here, of course, a difficulty arises in that we may quite reasonably wonder why 
we should retroactively punish at all. If the goal is to deter future acts, then surely there 
is no need to go back into the past to criminalise conduct. Surely it would be just as 
effective to introduce a statute in the present—expressing the message ‘from now on all 
acts X are criminal’. And surely this achieves the values of deterrence, while avoiding 
the need for retroactive legislation. 
To see why this isn’t the case return to the example of the King above. The King 
introduces a law which permits him to arbitrarily kill his citizens. The King is deposed, 
and the new government is faced with the problem of whether to retroactively punish 
the King. One deterrence-based reason for retroactively punishing the King would be 
based on ‘making an example’ of him. What we want to do is to express a very clear 
message to any would-be King or authoritarian ruler seeking to amend the legal system 
to serve unjust ends that such conduct will be punished. One way of doing this is by 
making an example of the King through retroactively holding him to account. This 
‘making an example’ rationale is often applied to international criminal trials, and was 
certainly appealed to in the case of Nuremberg. The thought is simply that we strengthen 
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the deterrent message of a law by holding someone up as an example of an individual 
who has become liable to said retroactive law.  
A second deterrence-based reason for retroactively punishing the King is based on 
special deterrence. This states that retroactively punishing the King for his past acts is 
permissible if this serves to disincentivise him from committing further acts of 
wrongdoing. We can see the strength of this justification in cases where leaders are 
reluctant to relinquish power, or where they threaten further violence. This would 
support retroactively holding them to account for their past wrongdoing in the interests 
of preventing them from committing future wrongdoing. Suppose a king threatens to 
continue carrying out unjust policies. Suppose further that his past acts were grossly 
immoral, but legal at the time he carried them out (because he altered the law so as to 
legally license them). Retroactively criminalising these past acts would serve as one way 
of preventing him from carrying out future injustices (we can punish the king for his 
past actions, incarcerate him and thus prevent him). 
Both the arguments from ‘making an example’ and special deterrence provide 
deterrence-based reasons in favour of retroactively attaching liability to past acts of 
political wrongdoing. 
 
6.3. Democracy-based reasons 
 
A second set of reasons in favour of retroactive law is based on the role that 
retroactive law-making can play in facilitating the transition to democracy. The basic 
thought is that by retroactively criminalising the acts of undemocratic leaders, emerging 
democracies can signal their commitment to democratic values while at the same time 
facilitating the transition to a most just, and more democratic legal system. 
This argument rests on two sets of principles—norm expression and legal 
development.  
The former rests on the premise that some laws have expressive content. Think 
of anti-discrimination laws, minimum wage laws, or laws against pornography. One 
reason for introducing such laws is that they signal a commitment to certain values—
values like equality, decency, repugnance at the mistreatment of minority or vulnerable 
groups, or women.  
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This expressive element to law may have a number of functions—to alter 
behaviour, to change prevailing social norms or it may have a non-instrumental, 
expressive function. Sunstein (1996) has analysed this expressive function of law. He 
points to the example of antidiscrimination laws and laws around capital punishment, 
which he claims a society may adopt irrespective of their instrumental function: 
 
A society might identify the norms to which it is committed and insist on those 
norms via law, even if the consequences of the insistence are obscure or 
unknown. A society might, for example, insist on an antidiscrimination law for 
expressive reasons even if it does not know whether the law actually helps 
members of minority groups. A society might endorse or reject capital 
punishment because it wants to express a certain understanding of the 
appropriate course of action when one person takes the life of another (Sunstein 
1996, pp. 2027–2028). 
 
If we accept the premise that laws can have expressive content, then we can see 
an important expressive function in the introduction of retroactive laws in transitional 
contexts. By retroactively attaching liability to lawmakers who introduced laws that 
were contrary to natural justice, or otherwise unfair in licensing immoral conduct, 
emerging democracies can signal a commitment to equality, liberty and other democratic 
values. In retroactively holding past undemocratic law-makers to account, the incoming 
transitional government can convey the message that past law-making was wrong, and 
that the reason it was wrong was that it fails to reflect principles of natural justice—
equality, liberty and so on.  
A second element to the democracy-based justification for retroactive laws is 
based on legal improvement and the setting of precedents. According to this 
justification, the retroactive application of liability is justified if it serves to kick-start 
substantive improvements in the legal systems of transitional states. And the reason that 
transitional states may punish past law-makers is that they not only put in place a new 
statute (something to the effect that ‘unjust law-making of the form X is never 
permissible’) but in retroactively applying this statute they set a precedent for future 
cases.  
Here it is possible to draw a lesson from the use of retroactive law at Nuremburg. 
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) not only created the legal categories of crimes 
against humanity and crimes of aggression, it introduced the principle that state officials 
could be held individually responsible for committing such acts. We know, with the 
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benefit of hindsight, that the introduction of individual responsibility at Nuremburg had 
a substantial ameliorative effect on the development of international law. It also served 
to set important precedents for future international tribunals in Rwanda, Yugoslavia and 
in the more recently formed International Criminal Courts (ICC). 166 As Cassese writes: 
 
In the wake of the major [Nuremburg] war trials momentous changes in 
international law took place…A conspicuous number of international 
instruments, including the Statutes of the ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia], the ICTR [International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda] and the ICC [International Criminal Court], were then drawn up 
embodying the prohibition of crimes against humanity, certain of which 
improved and extended the London Agreement (2005, p. 441). 
 
While the case of Nuremburg is a case from international law, the same applies in 
principle to cases of domestic transitional states. Statutes criminalising the past acts of 
officials can serve to kick-start significant improvements in a legal system, and 
retroactively applying these statutes can serve to set a precedent for the punishment of 
future cases of political wrongdoing. 
 One difficulty here concerns the promotion of the value of the rule of law (as a 
requirement on the nature of laws and of the legal system more generally). There is a 
tension in the view that we should utilise retroactive punishments to promote the rule 
of law, because (as I’ve noted) retroactive laws are in violation of the basic requirements 
of the rule of law (clarity, prospectivity, and so on). It strikes me the most plausible 
response here is that if deviations from the rule of law are permissible in exceptional 
circumstances (as I have argued they are), then securing the rule of law would serve as 
a justification for deviations from the rule of law in exceptional circumstances. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 The purpose of this chapter has been to provide a justification of retroactive law 
in a limited range of cases, with particular reference to transitional justice contexts. The 
first part of the chapter was largely negative—I challenged the common view that 
retroactive laws are always and unconditionally unfair and legally problematic. The 
                                                                
166 For an analysis of the use of the Nuremburg precedent of individual responsibility at the tribunals in the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda see Ratner and Abrams (2001, pp. 187–227). 
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second part of the chapter provided a limited justification of retroactive laws on the 
grounds of deterrence, and reasons based on the transition to democracy. 
Returning to the case of Argentina, one implication of the view defended in this 
chapter is that it is neither legally problematic nor morally impermissible to retroactively 
criminalise the members of the Argentine military Junta for their unjust yet legally 
permitted policy of forced disappearances. This follows from my arguments that it is 
neither legally nor morally prohibited to criminalise a past act X if X constituted i) an act 
of serious moral wrongdoing and ii) the only reason X was not criminalised at the time 
was because law-makers amended the law to permit or license X and iii) the law-maker 
had the capacity to know i) and ii). 
It follows from my arguments that retroactive law-making should not be viewed 
as sceptically as it is in general jurisprudence and under both domestic constitutions and 
under international law. Indeed, the significance of my arguments is not only that they 
challenge the strength of the presumption against retroactive law, but also the claim that 
retroactive laws can serve as one legal method through which to legally respond to 
challenges common to transitional justice contexts. Retroactive law-making offers an 
important tool for transitional governments to hold to account past regime members. 
And given that in certain circumstances the use of retroactive law is neither legally nor 
morally problematic, and can serve important forward-looking aims, the general 
presumption against retroactivity should in my view be reconsidered. 
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
 
 
The aim of this thesis has been to engage with the normative dimension of 
transitional justice—the problem of the moral and political principles which should 
guide the process of transition from conflict and authoritarian rule. The central claim is 
that security is a priority for periods of transition to democracy. Establishing security is 
a central priority of transitional justice for a number of reasons—because security is a 
pre-requisite for democracy, because security in the form of civil and procedural rights 
is routinely denied by authoritarian rule and because security is essential for securing 
other goals of political transition, chiefly that of establishing a legitimate state. 
These claims, amongst others, have animated the main arguments made 
throughout this thesis. In this concluding chapter, I want to give a synopsis of the main 
arguments of each chapter, before drawing a number of implications from the arguments 
of the thesis on the field of political philosophy more generally.  
 
In Chapter Two I focussed on the concept of security. As a political value, 
security has been under-analysed in political philosophy relative to other values such as 
liberty, justice and rights. I began by drawing attention to some of the shortcomings in 
the analysis of security by philosophers and criminologists. I then introduced my 
contribution to the debate in the form of a conceptual distinction between two senses of 
security—the negative and the positive senses. I argued that the positive sense of 
security captures the sense of the presence of ‘rules, norms and procedures’ which exist 
to protect and provide. I then explored how the positive sense of security is valuable 
because it is intimately related to values such assurance, liberty and the importance of 
being able to claim security from political institutions. 
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It has been common for philosophers to understand security as a purely negative 
value —pertaining to the absence of harms and threats to our person. Yet one of the main 
implications of this chapter is that without the positive sense of security we cannot 
appreciate different senses of security, and the role that security-measures play in 
modern societies. The positive sense captures the sense of security employed in the uses 
of ‘food security’, ‘job security’ or ‘financial security’. Moreover, the positive sense of 
security encompasses the sorts of protections provided to us by certain laws and 
procedural rights (habeus corpus, fair trials and impartial hearing) which exist to protect 
us against the excesses of state power. I concluded the chapter by claiming that security 
(both negative and positive) should be a core priority in the transitional towards 
democracy—because security is the sine qua none of establishing civil and political rights, 
institutional development, political assembly and other prerequisites for democracy. 
In Chapter Three I considered the permissibility of rough justice—the problem 
of whether citizens are permitted to take justice into their own hands when the state fails 
to. Having defined rough justice, and observed some cases of rough justice in transitional 
justice contexts (where they are ubiquitous), I drew upon some of Locke’s arguments 
about the natural right to punish in the state of nature to develop a defence of rough 
justice based on deterrence, security, institutional improvement and the protection of 
basic rights.  
According to the protection-based defence of rough justice I defended, rough 
justice is permissible in the absence of a legitimate state if: 
 
i) Rough justice punishment serves the end of protection by restraining, 
deterring the wrongdoer or deterring other would-be wrongdoers. 
 
ii) Punishment is only directed towards those who have become liable (i.e. 
by forfeiting their right against punishment by violating the rights of 
another). 
 
iii) There is a reasonable guarantee that punishment will protect innocents 
(through retraining or deterring the wrongdoer, or others would-be 
wrongdoers). 
 
iv) The degree of punishment is proportionate to and does not exceed the 
level required to restrain or deter others rights violations. 
 
v) The minimum reasonable level of punishment is applied when there is 
uncertainty about the degree required to restrain or deter others. 
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vi) There have been some procedures to reasonably establish the guilt of the 
suspect, when this is in question. 
 
 
When these conditions are met, rough justice is permissible. This, twinned with the 
justice-forcing-principle, which added contributory force to the justification of enforcing 
rough justice. 
 
vii) That punishment may ameliorate the formal justice mechanisms of the 
state. 
 
These conditions limit the cases in which rough justice is permissible, but if we think of 
a case like the punishment of Gaddafi, then the account provides the basis for a 
justification of punitive rough justice against Gaddafi, and other war criminals. To be 
sure, the punishment would be quite different to the brutal punishment that Gaddafi 
actually received. Yet in principle, the account I have developed still justifies 
punishment. 
In Chapter Four I developed a justification of legal punishment that is sensitive 
to some of the problems endemic to transitional societies. There are two challenges of 
transitional justice which any account of punishment must be sensitive to: i) the absence 
of a legitimate state (and that establishing a legitimate state is a goal), ii) the fact of 
increased rights violations in fragile, transitional communities. The account I defended 
appealed to the more basic right to self-defence, and the right to threaten in the interests 
of self-defence, as the basis of a justification for a rudimentary system of law (threats) 
and punishments. Contrary to the mainstream view in the philosophy of punishment, 
my account rejects the premise that a legitimate state is a pre-requisite for justified legal 
punishment, and instead defends the view that justified punishment can in fact facilitate 
the move towards a legitimate state. Moreover, protection and the prevention of 
wrongdoing was essential to my account, and as such it meets the second challenges of 
the increased propensity of wrongdoing. It is the ability of the theory to address these 
two aspects of transitional contexts that I take to be its key virtue. 
In Chapters Five and Six I considered the problem of political legitimacy with 
respect to transitional justice. In chapter five I attended to an essential element of state 
legitimacy—the justification of state coercion. In particular, I sought to challenge the 
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view, defended in both transitional justice scholarship and political philosophy, that 
democracy is necessary to justify state coercion. In doing so, I sought to show how non-
democratic forms of coercive law-making are valuable (and look permissible). I then 
argued that the protection of human rights should be a necessary condition of state 
coercion. This view is important, I claimed, because fair, safe and effective democracy 
presupposes the protection of human rights. Establishing these conditions for 
democracy should be a priority, I argued, which morally justifies the state’s use of 
coercion. 
In Chapter Six I challenged the view that democracy is necessary for political 
legitimacy. My challenge was on two grounds—first, that democracy can be 
debilitatingly costly for fragile states, and second that the view that democracy is 
necessary for political legitimacy precludes other important, and valuable forms of 
political governance. Drawing closely on an account of legitimacy outlined by Machin 
(2012), I defended an alternative view which holds that there are four necessary 
conditions on political legitimacy—horizontal equality, acceptable vertical inequality, 
publicity and an institutionalised voice. Meeting these conditions does not require 
democracy, and it is only because it meets these conditions that democracy is deemed to 
be necessary for political legitimacy. Importantly, this view is still consistent with the 
view that democracy is, all things considered, the morally best form of political 
governance. As such, we can preserve the mainstream view that democracy is a crucial 
feature of the end goal state achieved by transitional justice. Yet in the event that 
democracy is too costly, or otherwise difficult to achieve, the four necessary conditions 
inform a less demanding account of legitimacy which a state must fulfil in order to be 
legitimate. 
In Chapter Seven I provided a limited justification for retroactive law, with 
particular reference to transitional justice contexts. The first part of the chapter was 
largely negative—I challenged the common view that retroactive laws are always and 
unconditionally unfair and legally problematic. The conclusion of my argument was that 
it is neither legally nor morally prohibited to criminalise a past act X if X constituted i) 
an act of serious moral wrongdoing and ii) the only reason X was not criminalised at the 
time was because law-makers amended the law to pardon or license X and iii) the law-
maker had the capacity to know i) and ii). The second part of the chapter was positive, I 
provided a limited justification of retroactive laws on the ground of deterrence, and 
reasons based on the transition to democracy.  
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There were two implications of the arguments in this chapter. First, that it is 
neither legally nor morally problematic to retroactively criminalise the actions of 
members of a regime, when the only reason their unjust conduct was legal at the time 
was because they amended the laws to license it. Secondly, that the general presumption 
against retroactive law-making in both general jurisprudence and under international 
law should be weakened in such a way as to allow for this specific case. Indeed, the 
significance of my argument is that it not only challenges the strength of the 
presumption against retroactive law in general jurisprudence but also that it shows that 
retroactive laws can potentially serve as one legal method through which to legally 
respond to challenges common to transitional justice contexts. Retroactive law-making 
offers an important tool for transitional governments to hold past regimes members to 
account. And given that in certain circumstances the use of retroactive law is neither 
legally nor morally problematic, and can serve important forward looking aims, 
retroactive laws should be seen as one tool amongst others to facilitate the transition to 
democracy. 
 
1. Implications for political philosophy 
 
 
Bernard Williams once argued that the problem of establishing security forms 
what he terms the “first” political questions: 
 
 
I identify the “first” political question in Hobbesian terms as the securing of 
order, protection, safety, trust, and the conditions of cooperation. It is “first” 
because solving it is the condition of solving, indeed posing, any others. It is not 
(unhappily) first in the sense that once solved, it never has to be solved again. 
This is particularly important because, a solution to the first question being 
required all the time, it is affected by historical circumstances; it is not a matter of 
arriving at a solution to the first question at the level of state-of-nature theory 
and then going on to the rest of the agenda. This is related to what might counts 
as a “foundation” of liberalism. It is a necessary condition of legitimacy that the 
state solves the first question (Williams, 2005, p. 3). 
 
 
There are a number of elements to this passage from Williams, but the elements I take to 
be most important is that establishing security is a vital prerequisite for other political 
goals, and that establishing security is a problem that we must continually return to. The 
passage is important because it illustrates the problem with the relative neglect of 
security in political philosophy. Whatever our views are on legitimacy, distributive 
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justice, or on other core problems of political philosophy, establishing security must be 
seen to be essential to the construction of just political communities. Whether we are 
liberals, conservatives, democrats, socialists, advocates of neo-liberalism, security is 
essential to the sorts of societies we want to construct and, in William’s view and indeed 
my own, it is essential to the justness of governments which rule over us.   
 I take this to be the first implication of my account for political philosophy more 
generally. I have claimed that security is essential for the process of establishing 
democracy, and that concerns with establishing security should guide transitional justice 
practices. But this lesson generalises to political philosophy more generally. Security is 
an essential aspect of political communities. And it is one which informs our 
understanding of things like the rights of citizens to protect themselves when states fail 
to, of punishment and of the way in which we construct legitimate states, including how 
they use their coercive power. Security must be taken seriously as a political value in a 
way that political philosophy has yet to do. 
 The second implication I want to draw from my arguments in this thesis concerns 
how we understand the value of security, and how states should go about establishing 
security measures. In chapter two I argued that philosophers have tended to understand 
security in purely negative terms—as the negation of harms and threats to one’s person. 
This understanding of security lends itself to a view of security measures which serve 
this negative function—to minimise rights violations and to prevent acts of wrongdoing 
such as theft. This is, of course, an important element of security. But, I claimed, it is not 
the whole story. This is because there is also a positive sense of security which 
encompasses the norms, rules and procedures which exist to protect and provide. The 
value of these rules, norms and procedures is not only that they serve a negative function 
(though they do do this as well). It is that they promote the values of assurance, liberty, 
guarantees and the importance of being able to claim security from political institutions, 
values that are essential to the functioning of things like laws, insurance policies and 
healthcare provisions, amongst other measures.  
There are two things I want to highlight here with respect to how we understand 
security. First, we must attend more closely to how states go about implementing 
security measures, understanding this process as not only requiring negative measures 
to prevent harms and threats, but also positive measures (rules, norms and procedures) 
to secure other future-oriented goods and values. The values I highlighted were those of 
assurance, liberty, guarantees and the importance of being able to claim security from 
the state, but these are not necessarily exhaustive. Second, and relatedly, we must better 
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understand how security relates to, protects and is partly constituted by other values. 
The relation between security and liberty has been the subject of much legal and 
philosophical scholarship. 167  But what about the relationship between security and 
assurance? Between security and the (legal and procedural) guarantees we require to 
live a good life? Between security and the right to claim certain goods or protections 
from the state? Between security and the way in which we relate to our futures? These 
relationships have been underexplored by political philosophers. And if my arguments 
as to the importance of security in political societies are correct, then this neglect is 
problematic. 
A third implication I want to draw out concerns how we understand the core 
problems of transitional justice as problems of political philosophy. In the introduction 
I claimed that problems of transitional justice are fundamentally ethical—that measures 
such as compensation, war crimes trials, lustration or reconciliation encompass basic 
problems of moral and political philosophy, i.e. problems about whether and when we 
should give people what they deserve, the tensions between forward and backwards-
looking principles, the value of forgiveness, amongst others. But here I want to turn this 
claim on its head, and suggest that it is not only the case that ethical and political 
concepts have a bearing on transitional justice, but that transitional justice has a bearing 
on basic problems of political philosophy,  
Throughout this thesis I have argued that certain features of transitional justice 
contexts force us to reconsider basic concepts and assumptions of political philosophy. 
Recall the following claims,  
 
a) That the absence of a legitimate state in transitional contexts forces us to 
reconsider the rights of individuals to engage in rough justice practices when 
a state fails to realise justice. 
 
b) The fact of increased rights violations in transitional contexts, forces us to 
factor in considerations of protection and prevention into our understanding 
of why punishment is justified. 
 
c) The fact that establishing a legitimate state is a central goal of political 
transition forces use to challenge the assumption in the philosophy of 
                                                                
167 For an analysis of the relationship between security and liberty see, for example, Posner (2001), Waldron 
(2003), Himma (2007) Neoclaus (2007) and Mockaitis (2016). 
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punishment  that a legitimate state is a necessary condition for justified 
punishment.  
 
d) The fact that the majority rule element of democracy can lead to the tyranny 
of the majority forces us to reconsider (and in my view reject) the role that 
democracy plays in justifying state coercion. 
 
e) The fact that democracy can be extraordinarily costly forces use to reconsider 
the way in which it relates to state legitimacy, and (I claimed) seek other 
conditions of legitimacy which preserve some of the valuable elements of 
democracy.  
 
f) The fact that retroactive law-making can serve a valuable role in transitional 
contexts forces us to reconsider the unfairness of retroactive law-making and 
the general legal presumption against it in both domestic constitutions and 
under international law.  
 
These arguments show how the challenges of transitional justice force us to re-evaluate 
the way we understand certain core problems of political philosophy and general 
jurisprudence—the rights of individuals to realise justice, the permissibility of state 
punishment, the problem of justifying state coercion, the problem of state legitimacy, the 
way we understand and construct democracy, the construction of good laws and legal 
institutions, amongst others. As such, I want to claim that transitional justice is and 
should be regarded as a genuine problem for political philosophy, one that forces us to 
reconsider the principles, values and protections that we sometimes take for granted in 
the context of developed liberal democracies. 
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